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ABSTRACT 
 
SOFT POWER IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE AKP 
GOVERNMENTS: 2002-2009 
 
Alpaydın, Utku Ali Rıza 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. H. Tarık Oğuzlu 
 
July 2010 
 
 The concept of soft power has turned out to be one of the agenda-setting 
terms in the field of international relations upon its inception in the early 1990s. 
Despite its widespread usage, the inherent nature of the concept could not been 
grasped to a great extent. The increasing references to soft power in many of the 
analyses about Turkish foreign policy during the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP, (Justice and Development Party, JDP) era has created a need to present the 
notion of soft power as a proper theoretical concept and to discuss the foreign policy 
of the Turkish state conducted by the AKP governments in the light of such a 
theoretical background. Therefore, this thesis intends to present a refined theory of 
soft power embracing all the relevant points of the existing literature on soft power 
theory in order to make it utilizable for all cases and to implement this proposed 
theory to the case of Turkish foreign policy in a comparative manner by examining 
pre-AKP period and the period during the AKP has been in rule. Out of these 
explanations, the research question of this thesis emerges as such: “To what extent 
has soft power increased its influence in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP 
governments?” The main argument of the thesis can be put forward in the following 
manner: “The soft power of Turkish state has increased during the AKP term, 
although there has been some degree of soft power culture in the history of Turkish 
Republic.” 
 
Keywords: Soft power, Justice and Development Party (JDP), Turkish foreign 
policy, power currencies, benignity, brilliance, beauty                                                
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ÖZET 
 
AKP HÜKÜMETLERİ DÖNEMİ TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI‟NDA  
YUMUŞAK GÜÇ: 2002-2009 
 
Alpaydın, Utku Ali Rıza 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. H. Tarık Oğuzlu  
 
Temmuz 2010 
 
Yumuşak güç kavramı 1990‟ların başında ortaya çıkışından itibaren 
uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde gündem belirleyen terimlerden bir tanesi haline 
gelmiştir. Yaygın olarak kullanılmasına karşın, kavramın özü halen büyük ölçüde 
anlaşılabilmiş değildir. İktidardaki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde uygulanan 
Türk dış politikası üzerine yapılan araştırmaların birçoğunda yumuşak güç 
kavramına artan bir şekilde atıfta bulunulması yumuşak güç kavramının uygun bir 
kuramsal terim olarak sunulması ve AKP hükümetleri tarafından uygulanan dış 
politikanın bu şekilde ortaya konan kavramsal bir arka plan ışığında tartışılması 
gereğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu sebeple, bu tez yumuşak güç kuramını tüm vakalar 
üzerine uygulanabilir hale getirmek için mevcut yumuşak güç kuramı literatüründeki 
tüm ilgili noktaları kapsayan düzeltilmiş bir yumuşak güç kuramı sunma ve bu 
önerilen kuramı Türk dış politikası vakasına AKP öncesi dönemi AKP‟nin iktidarda 
olduğu dönem ile karşılaştırmalı olarak uygulama amacını gütmektedir. Bu 
açıklamalar doğrultusunda bu tezin araştırma sorusu şu şekilde ortaya çıkmaktadır: 
“Yumuşak gücün etkisi AKP hükümetleri yönetimindeki Türk dış politikasında ne 
derecede artmıştır?” Bu tezin temel argümanı ise aşağıdaki şekilde ileri sürülebilir:   
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinde bir nebze yumuşak güç kültürü olmasına rağmen, 
Türk devletinin yumuşak gücü AKP hükümetleri döneminde artmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yumuşak güç, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Türk dış 
politikası, güç birimleri, iyi huyluluk, mükemmellik, güzellik 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Soft power has been one of the most popular catchwords of the current 
period. Many people, from journalists to academics, from politicians to students, 
have been using the term in their speeches, declarations, and writings with or without 
knowing exactly what it stands for. When Joseph Nye Jr. coined the term in his book 
“Bound to Lead” published in 1990, he may not have foreseen that soft power would 
gain such popularity. Although it has gained widespread attention and popularity 
from that time on, there has remained ambiguity on the meaning of soft power. It can 
even be claimed that it has generally been misunderstood, misused and trivialized by 
the people who could not have grasped the whole idea in this concept. Therefore, in 
2004, Nye published another book, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 
Politics”, in which he has developed the notion of soft power and has tried to make it 
clear what it embraces by examining the concept with a special focus on the 
American experiences. Still however, there is ambiguity about the sources of soft 
power and how it can be utilized by other states while conducting their foreign 
policies in the most efficient manner. It should also be mentioned that many scholars, 
other than Nye, has commented on the issue of soft power. While some of them have
2 
provided their own theory of soft power, some others have applied the analytical 
framework provided by Nye for the examination of other countries‟ soft power.1  
Turkish foreign policy, the fundamentals of which have traditionally been 
shaped by three main determinants, i.e., the legacy of the Ottomans, the geographical 
positioning and the Kemalist ideology, is argued to have undergone a radical 
transformation with the end of the Cold War. The coming to power of the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, hereafter AKP, (Justice and Development Party in English) in 2002 
is claimed to signify another rupture in the course of Turkish foreign policy during 
the post-Cold War epoch. It is even maintained by several scholars that the foreign 
policy followed by the AKP represents a deviation from the traditions of Turkish 
foreign policy that have been practiced since the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Although the general framework of traditional Turkish foreign 
policy remains on the ground, since it is inevitable to get rid of the features of a 
country coming from its historical, geographical and ideational experiences very 
suddenly, it can be argued that these characteristics have commenced to be perceived 
and interpreted distinctively by the AKP. One such distinguished endeavor has been 
made by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has 
maintained that Turkish state has to adapt to the new conditions of the globalizing 
world in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War by re-inventing the depths of the 
country in terms of geography, history and culture. Davutoğlu presents his ideas on 
                                                             
1 For example, Geun Lee. “A theory of soft power and Korea's soft power strategy”, Korean Journal 
of Defense Analysis, 21: 2 (2009), 205-218; Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang. “Sources and Limits of 
Chinese 'Soft Power'”, Survival, 48:2 (2006), 17-36; Louis Klarevas. “Greeks Bearing Consensus: 
Suggestions for Increasing Greece‟s Soft Power in the West”, 142-159; Joel Wuthnow. “The Concept 
of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse”, Issues & Studies, 44: 2 (June 2008), 1-28; Christian 
Wagner. “From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India‟s 
South Asia Policy”, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics Working Paper 26, 
(March 2005), 1-16. 
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this matter with his book titled „Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye‟nin Uluslararası Konumu 
(Strategic Depth: Turkey‟s International Position)‟ which was published in 2001. The 
book written by Davutoğlu can be argued to form the basis of the foreign policy 
approach of the AKP. This argument can be supported with the fact that Davutoğlu 
had been serving as the Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan before appointed to the post of Foreign Minister in the recent 
cabinet revision in May 2009.  
Simultaneously with the coming to power of the AKP and the gaining 
prominence of the strategic depth doctrine in Turkish foreign policy, there has 
occurred an increase in the number of the scholarly articles and journalistic writings 
about Turkish soft power. However, the most of these works have touched upon the 
issue without providing a firm theoretical basis about the concept of soft power. The 
same is also valid for the works of other thinkers abroad. The writings about soft 
power, including the ones of Nye focusing on American experience, generally do 
state that a country has soft power in its surrounding regions by looking at concrete 
examples like the popularity of soap operas, the number of foreign tourists and the 
cultural and regional affinities with the neighboring regions and countries. It should 
be noted that these examples can, of course, be counted as the indicators of 
countries‟ soft power. However, it is thought that what it is more important, in terms 
of the examination of a state‟s soft power, is to locate these examples into a 
meaningful, coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework. Therefore, it can be 
argued that this study has two main objectives. Firstly, at the macro level, this study 
aims at presenting a fresh theory of soft power by collecting the beneficial points of 
the existing soft power theories in terms of foreign policy analysis into a coherent 
whole. A solid theory of soft power with a firm conceptual and operational 
 4 
infrastructure aiming to integrate the original ideas of Joseph Nye Jr. and several 
other scholars‟ views on soft power theory will try to be presented with a specific 
reference to foreign policy analysis. In other words, this study will work for 
providing a theoretical framework of soft power which will be utilizable for foreign 
policy analysis of any country. When it is taken into consideration that the concept of 
soft power has been developed within the specific American context, it turns out to 
be a rather challenging task to examine other states‟ soft power. Therefore, it can be 
said that this study intends to lie down a general framework for the analysis of soft 
power applicable to all states in this regard. It is also thought that the presentation of 
a revised theory of soft power will be helpful in removing the blurred images, 
misconceptions, misusages of soft power encountered in the literature for the 
upcoming works concerning the subject of soft power. Secondly, at the micro scale, 
this study tries to analyze soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Turkish foreign 
policy has been chosen as the case for the thesis since the issue of soft power has 
been too popular in Turkey nowadays. However, the number of scholarly works on 
Turkish soft power is very limited despite its ever-increasing popularity. Moreover, 
the issue of Turkish soft power has not been dealt in detail in the previous studies. 
The existing works on Turkish soft power generally focus on specific geographies, 
topics and timeframes.
2
 However, in this work, the issue has been taken up as a 
whole and has been dealt with comprehensively in an all-inclusive manner. The 
timeframe for the analysis is determined as the period in which the AKP has been in 
power in Turkey, namely the years between 2002 and 2009. However, some of the 
instances that have happened in 2010 are also included into the analysis, since they 
                                                             
2 The examples include but not limited to Bülent Aras. “Turkey between Syria and Israel: Turkey‟s 
Rising Soft Power”, SETA Policy Brief, 15 (May 2008); Meliha Benli Altunışık. “The Possibilities 
and Limits of Turkey‟s Soft Power in the Middle East”, Insight Turkey 10:2 (2008), 41-54; Mustafa 
Akyol. “Turkey‟s soft power in the Arab world”, Hurriyet Daily News, 30 April 2010. 
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are seen as substantially important. Even though the AKP era will be focused upon, it 
will also be investigated whether there has been a tradition of soft power in Turkish 
foreign policy since the foundation of the Republic until the beginning of the AKP 
rule. In other words, the analysis will be provided as a comparison of Turkish soft 
power in the period before the AKP‟s term and during the AKP‟s tenure. This study 
is likely to constitute a valuable contribution in this vein as well, because while most 
of the works about Turkish soft power are concerned with the current situation, this 
study traces the issue backwards and tries to find out whether there has existed a 
culture of soft power in Turkish foreign policy throughout the history of Turkish 
Republic. 
In the context of these explanations, the second chapter elaborates on the 
theory of soft power. In the first part of the chapter, the original theory provided by 
the coiner of term, Joseph Nye Jr., will be presented. Later on, the different 
conceptualizations of soft power by various other scholars and the critiques of Nye‟s 
original theory will be provided. In the following part, the similar concepts confused 
or used interchangeably with soft power, which are civilian power and normative 
power, will be examined. In the concluding section of the chapter, a refined theory of 
soft power which has emerged out of the discussions made in the previous sections 
and which plays the guiding role in the rest of the thesis will be put forward. 
In the third chapter, the soft power character of Turkish foreign policy since 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the beginning of the AKP 
governments‟ term, between 1923 till 2002, will be discussed. The chapter begins 
with exploring the main determinants of the traditional Turkish foreign policy which 
are believed to play the most substantial role in the emergence of the principles 
shaping the production and implementation processes of Turkish foreign policy in 
 6 
the traditional sense. The next section in the chapter deals with the issue of soft 
power in Turkish foreign policy during the defined time period. The analysis of soft 
power in traditional Turkish foreign policy is bounded to the theoretical framework 
presented in the last section of the theory-related chapter. 
The fourth chapter constitutes the crux of the thesis where the main issue of 
soft power in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP governments will be 
investigated. The foreign policy outlook of the AKP and the governments formed by 
it will be outlined by lying down the crucial points of the „Strategic Depth‟ doctrine 
provided by Ahmet Davutoğlu, and by examining the party program, election 
manifestos and governmental programs prepared and declared by the AKP officials. 
After highlighting the principles of the foreign policy understanding of the AKP, the 
soft power approach and activities of Turkey during the AKP era will be assessed 
within the confines of the newly-constructed theoretical understanding set forth in 
the theoretical chapter. 
The last chapter is the conclusion part, in which the findings of the analysis 
will be presented with a general evaluation of the soft power nature of Turkish state 
in a comparative basis. The summaries of the each chapter will be presented together 
with the interpretation of the findings by the researcher.  
In terms of the methodology used, it can be said that this study is based on 
historical research. The materials used throughout the study include both official and 
non-official sources. The speeches made by the AKP officials and the ruling cadres 
have been utilized along with the academic writings, book chapters, newspaper 
articles and internet sources. For the analysis, the single case study method has been 
made use of by taking Turkish foreign policy as its only case. The history of Turkish 
 7 
foreign policy has been divided into two phases for analytical purposes and the issue 
of Turkish soft power has been dwelled upon by comparing the soft power strategies 
and the level of attractiveness of Turkish state in the two following time periods 
before and during the AKP, that is from 1923 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2009.
8 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
2.1 Soft Power 
Although it has gained public attention and popularity, the ambiguity on the 
meaning of the term „soft power‟ continues. This is mainly due to the fact that Joseph 
Nye, the coiner of the term, did not provide a concrete definition of it; rather he tried 
to explain it in various guises. The widespread popularity of the term has brought 
about several misconceptions, misunderstandings, misuses of soft power. Therefore, 
this chapter will try to clarify the conceptual meaning of „soft power‟. 
 
2.1.1 Origins of Soft Power 
 Joseph Nye coined the term „soft power‟ in his book Bound to Lead that was 
published in 1990 and he tried to make what he meant by „soft power‟, which was 
the heading of the article as well, clear in an article published in Foreign Affairs the 
same year. The book and the article came out during a period when American power 
was argued to be in decline vis-à-vis its competitors in the world stage. However, he 
argued the opposite and claimed that there was no serious challenge to American 
primacy emanating from any state, but from the „transformation of power‟. In his
9 
own words: “The coming century may see continued American preeminence, but the 
sources of power in world politics are likely to undergo major changes that will 
create new difficulties for all countries in achieving their goals.”3  
From this quotation, it can be inferred two significant points regarding the 
notion of power Nye had in his mind. The first one is that Nye sees power important 
in reaching the aims of states. This notion of power was originally produced by 
Robert Dahl in his article, The Concept of Power. Dahl proposes his understanding of 
power by making a differentiation between the „intuitive idea of power‟ and the 
„intuitive view of the power relation‟. Dahl explains the former as „something like 
this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would 
not otherwise do‟.4 For the latter, he argues that „it seemed to involve a successful 
attempt by A to get a to do something he would not otherwise do‟.5 Steven Lukes, by 
examining Dahl‟s article, argues that the difference between these two expressions is 
that the former refers to potential power, while the latter means actual power, 
meaning the difference is between the possession of power and the exercise of 
power.
6
 From this point, many other scholars defined power in terms of its exercise, 
that is, the actualization or realization of the potential power. For example, Harold 
Lasswell and Morton Kaplan defined power as the production of intended effects on 
other persons.
7
 According to Lukes, also, “many think that power involves „getting 
                                                             
3 Joseph Nye. “Soft power”, Foreign Policy 80, (1990), 155 
4 Robert Dahl. “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, 3:2 (1957), 203 
5 Dahl. “The Concept of Power”, 204 
6 Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View, (London: MacMillan Press, 1974), 12 
7 Felix Berenskoetter. “Thinking About Power”, in Power in World Politics, Felix Berenskoetter and 
Michael J. Williams, eds. (London&New York:Routledge, 2007), 5 
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what one wants‟.”8 Joseph Nye can be cited as one of that „many‟, since he argues 
that power means „the ability to get the outcomes one wants‟9. 
The second inference is related to the „difficulties‟ part of the quotation. 
According to Nye, the changes in the nature of power, which can be observed in the 
general diffusion of power
10
, the complexity in world politics due to the emergence 
of new actors - other than states - and new issues - other than high politics - as a 
result of the complex interdependence
11
, the changes in the instruments and 
strategies of power
12, have made it „less transferable, less coercive, and less 
tangible‟13. Therefore, these changes rendered the utilization of the traditional means 
of exercising power, that is, coercive methods practiced through military and 
economic power, ineffective or inapplicable. For Nye, “these trends in the world 
politics suggest a second, more attractive way of exercising power.”14 Nye continues 
to argue that, “this second aspect of power – which occurs when a country gets other 
countries to want what it wants – might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast 
with hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.”15 This second 
way of exercising power is about „the ability to shape the preferences of others‟16. On 
that issue, Nye writes: “Co-optive power is the ability to structure a situation so that 
other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with 
its own.
17
 Nye classifies the resources of that ability by saying that: “The ability to 
affect what other countries want tends to be associated with intangible power 
                                                             
8 Steven Lukes. “Power and the battle for hearts and minds: On the bluntness of soft power”, in Power 
in World Politics, Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds. (London&New York:Routledge, 
2007), 84. 
9 Joseph Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York:Public Affairs, 2004),1 
10 Nye. “Soft power”, 155. 
11 Nye. “Soft power”, 156-157. 
12 Nye. “Soft power”, 158. 
13 Nye. “Soft power”, 167. 
14 Nye. “Soft power”, 166. 
15 Nye. “Soft power”, 166. 
16 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 5. 
17 Nye. “Soft power”, 168. 
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resources such as culture, ideology and institutions.”18 Afterwards, he presents the 
importance of soft power by pointing at the legitimacy gained in the eyes of others 
and by arguing the cost-effectiveness of soft power against hard power.
19
 
In his later works, Joseph Nye tries to develop his notion of soft power. 
However, these revisions or updates provide no credible solutions to the problem of 
definitional, theoretical problems. Even his major output on that issue, Soft Power: 
The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) doesn‟t address the theory of soft 
power; rather it deals with specifying the sources of soft power and giving practical 
suggestions to wield soft power effectively. In this book, Nye presents power as „the 
ability to influence others to get outcomes one wants‟20 and offers „three ways to 
affect the behavior of others: coercion, inducement or attraction‟21. One of the main 
contributions of this book in terms of soft power is the depiction of world politics as 
a „three-dimensional chess board‟ consisting of interstate military issues, interstate 
economic issues, and transnational issues. The importance of soft power lies at the 
third level, „since obtaining favorable outcomes on the bottom transnational board 
often requires the use of soft power assets‟22. 
On the issue of getting the outcomes one wants, he reiterates „the second, 
more attractive way of exercising power‟ and calls it „the second face of power‟ 
which he derived from the work of Bachrach and Baratz, Two Faces of Power 
(1962). In its original conception, „the second face of power‟ means “the agenda-
setting power, namely, the ability of actors „to create or reinforce barriers to the 
                                                             
18 Nye. “Soft power”, 166-167. 
19 Nye. “Soft power”, 167. 
20 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 2. 
21 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 2. 
22 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 5. 
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public airing of policy conflicts‟.”23 Nye adds „the power of attraction‟ to the second 
face of power, and indeed, he places more on emphasis on it for co-optive behavior. 
In specific, he writes: “It (soft power) is also the ability to attract, and attraction often 
leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive 
power.”24  
Nye, also, differentiates hard power and soft power by looking at the variety 
of ways to obtain outcomes one wants
25
. Nye specifies four ways to do so - coercion, 
inducement, agenda-setting and attraction – and he combines the first two under the 
heading of „hard power‟, while the latter two are casted as the instances of soft 
power.
26
 As it can be inferred from the differentiation, Nye does not see hard power 
and soft power as inherently contradictory or incompatible. In Nye‟s own words: 
“Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to 
achieve one‟s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between 
them is one of degree, both in the nature of behavior and in the tangibility of 
resources”.27 
In the book, Nye, also broadens his notion on the resources of soft power, 
culture, ideology and institutions. Nye contends that „in international politics, the 
resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization 
or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and 
policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others‟28. In another account, he 
writes: “The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at 
                                                             
23 Berenskoetter. “Thinking About Power”, 7. 
24 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 6. 
25 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 6-7. 
26 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 7. 
27 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 7. 
28 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 8. 
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home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and 
having moral authority).”29 However, the sources of soft power provided by Nye are 
not limited to those, and he, also, acknowledges this phenomenon that can simply be 
exemplified with the mere existence of „primary‟ in the quotation. On this matter, 
Nye writes: “For example, sometimes countries may be attracted to others with 
command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be 
used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate.”30 He 
supplements his argument by saying that: “…, sometimes the same power resources 
can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction. A country that 
suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard power 
resources but also some of its ability to shape the international agenda and some of 
its attractiveness. Some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the 
myth of invincibility or inevitability.”31 
One of the recent accounts on soft power provided by Nye, himself, appeared 
in his contribution to the book edited by Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, 
Power in World Politics (2007). In the chapter written by Nye, he tries to elucidate 
his position on soft power by responding to the criticisms directed to him. He makes 
his case by distinguishing his notion and usage of soft power from the widespread 
use of it as synonyms for cultural or economic power, or as an antonym of 
hard/military power. Nye argues that his notion of soft power stems from the 
definition of power he adopted. He maintains: “For my purposes, I chose an agent-
focused definition of power that was quite close to the common usage implied by the 
dictionary - the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants. Of the three 
                                                             
29 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 11. 
30 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 8. 
31 Nye. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics, 9. 
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main ways to affect others‟ behavior – coercion, inducement or attraction – I used the 
term soft power for the third.”32  
Another point he makes in this chapter is about the resources of soft power. 
Nye repeats and strengthens his argument that economic and military resources can 
contribute to the soft power of a country although they are largely associated with 
hard/command power. On this subject, Nye writes: “Like economic resources, 
military resources can produce soft as well as hard power depending on the context 
of how they are used.”33 
 
2.1.2 Other Conceptions of Soft Power 
 As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, soft power gained 
widespread scholar and public attention. Therefore, in this section, how other 
scholars have perceived and used the notion of soft power is going to be analyzed. 
Three of the accounts that involve criticisms to Nye‟s soft power and provide 
solutions for the problems of that approach are going to be focused on. 
 Several of the accounts of soft power found in the literature seemed to 
converge on the point that soft power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants 
through attraction rather than coercion and payment, the definition provided by Nye. 
For example, according to Yasushi Watanabe, “it is well known that soft power 
refers to a country‟s ability to obtain the outcomes it wants not through coercion or 
rewards but through its attractiveness – specifically, the attractiveness of its culture, 
                                                             
32 Joseph Nye. “Notes for a soft-power agenda”, in Power in World Politics, Felix Berenskoetter and 
Michael J. Williams, eds. (London&New York:Routledge, 2007), 163. 
33 Nye. “Notes for a soft-power agenda”, 168. 
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political values, and policies.”34 Watanabe, also, recalls the ancient Chinese strategist 
Sun Tzu‟s adage „It is best to win without fighting‟.35 Another reading of Nye was 
presented by Kazuo Ogoura. According to him, Nye originally coined this term to 
describe a third type of power that was neither military nor economic in character.
36
 
The best illustration of his argument is the table presented in Soft Power: The Means 
to Success in World Politics (2004), where Nye presents three types of power – 
military, economic, and soft – in terms of the behaviors, primary currencies and 
government policies. (See Table 1).
 37
  Ogoura says: 
„Hard power‟ for Nye means any method that is coercive, in other 
words, anything that involves compulsion or threats. Methods in 
which the other party is encouraged to accept something in some way 
of its free will, he termed „soft power‟.38 
 
 Behaviors Primary Currencies Government Policies 
Military Power 
- coercion 
- deterrence 
- protection 
- threats 
- force 
- coercive diplomacy 
- war 
- alliance 
Economic Power 
- inducement 
- coercion 
- payments 
- sanctions 
- aid 
- bribes 
- sanctions 
Soft Power 
- attraction 
- agenda-setting 
- values 
- culture 
- policies 
- institutions 
- public diplomacy 
- bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy 
Table 1: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), Joseph Nye Jr. 
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Another scholar, Frank Wibert argues that there is both a narrow and a broad 
definition of soft power. To quote:  
The broad definition of soft power comes from international relations 
theory and refers to accomplishing international aims through 
persuasion and co-option rather than through the use of armed force or 
other forms of coercion such as the use of economic sanctions. 
Sometimes the definition is used more narrowly and is limited to the 
cultural or ideological means of obtaining an objective. Conversely, 
sometimes a broader definition is used to include payments (such as 
foreign assistance) or trade concessions as part of the range of non-
coercive techniques.
39
 
 
Another scholar emphasizing the dual senses of soft power, similar to above, 
is Alexander L. Vuving, who tries to present a theoretical explanation of soft power 
in his paper How Soft Power Works (2009). According to Vuving, soft power has 
two senses as it was understood by the public and several scholars. “In the narrower 
sense, soft power is similar to cultural influence. In the broader sense, soft power is 
synonymous with non-military power and includes both cultural power and 
economic strength.”40 He points out one significant problem that causes the 
misunderstanding of the concept: the „vehicle fallacy‟, that is the equation of power 
with power resources and the resulting confusion of resources with behavior. On this 
subject, he takes a perspective closer to Nye. Vuving asserts that: 
The same resource can produce both hard and soft power. For 
example, a military, which is usually thought of as a typical hard 
power resource, can both coerce some people and attract some others, 
when it achieves a victory. Also, a typical “soft power resource” such 
                                                             
39 Frank Vibert. “Soft Power and the future of international rule-making”, Paper presented at the 
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as a moral value can be used both to persuade someone, when the 
person privately agrees with it, and force another, when it is used to 
build social pressure.
41
 
 
Vuving tries to overcome this fallacy by making „a subtle distinction between 
power resources and power currencies‟42. According to him, „power currencies are 
usually properties of resources or activities‟.43  
In order to present his theory, Vuving argues that the definition presented by 
Nye is problematic and he tries to complement it. His definition is that “soft power is 
the ability to get others to want, or accept, what you want”.44 Afterwards, Vuving 
presents the mechanisms through which soft power work by comparing it with that of 
hard power, and he reaches at the conclusion that soft power works through 
attraction. Then, he sets out to solve the question of „What generates attraction?‟ The 
answer he gives to that problem constitutes the crux of his theory of soft power. He 
defines „at least three power currencies from which both power and its „softness‟ are 
derived‟.45 Vuving writes that: 
Benignity is an aspect of the agent‟s relations with others, especially 
with the client of soft power. It refers to the positive attitudes that you 
express when you treat people, especially when you treat the 
client.....it generates soft power through the production of gratitude 
and sympathy.  
Brilliance is an aspect of the agent‟s relations with its work. It refers 
to the high performance that you accomplish when you do things... It 
generates soft power through the production of admiration. 
                                                             
41 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 4. 
42 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 5. 
43 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 5. 
44 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 6. 
45 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 8. 
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Beauty is an aspect of actors‟ relations with ideals, values, causes, or 
visions. It refers to the neat resonance that is evoked when you 
represent ideals, values, causes, or visions....Beauty generates soft 
power through the production of inspiration.
46
 
 
In the following pages, he tries to associate those currencies with the tools of 
soft power, that is to say, the policies the governments adopted. For example, 
multilateralism, economic aid, humanitarian assistance are counted as acts of 
benignity.
47
 The acts of brilliance include the success stories in terms of economics 
or domestic stability, as well as military campaigns. The conduct of domestic and 
foreign policies on normative principles represents one of the acts of beauty.
48
 
 At the end of his work he summarizes the power currencies as such: 
“benignity, or the kindness of behavior and attitude; brilliance, or the shine of 
capabilities and successes; and beauty, or the resonance of shared norms and 
goals.”49 
Tarık Oğuzlu provided another approach to soft power in his article Soft 
power in Turkish foreign policy (2007). In this article, Oğuzlu tries to project an 
understanding of soft power through comparing it with hard power in terms of the 
„logic of action‟. Oğuzlu, first, provides his definition of power and the necessary 
conditions for the emergence of power. He defines power as „the capacity to 
influence other actors and shape their preferences through the possibilities in hand‟ 
and suggests three conditions for power to emerge. These conditions can be casted as 
the possession of possibilities/assets to influence others, the awareness of the 
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47 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 14. 
48 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 15. 
49 Vuving. “How Soft Power Works”, 20. 
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possessor of those capabilities, and the recognition of that power by the other actors 
in the system.
50
 Out of these conditions comes the change of policies by the parties 
on which power is exerted in line with the interests of power-holder, as Oğuzlu 
claims.
51
 Therefore, he points out to the relational nature of power and seeks the 
motivations behind the policy changes of the power-exerted parties by questioning 
the „logic of action‟ rather than looking at the methods used as the literature suggests. 
He indicates that „the literature makes a distinction between hard and soft power is 
made on the basis of the instruments used‟52, which asserts that if the military and 
coercive instruments are used, it is an exercise of hard power, while the use of 
civilian, economic and normative instruments identifies soft power. It can be said 
that Oğuzlu, also, argues the „vehicle fallacy‟ problem for this kind of differentiation. 
What he proposes, on the other hand, is examining the ways the means are employed. 
Thus, Oğuzlu argues that: 
If an instrumental logic of action were in play, meaning if the goal 
were to force others to make a cost-benefit analysis through coercing 
or coaxing strategies, then one could talk about hard power. If the goal 
were to ensure that others would automatically follow the lead of the 
power-holder due to the power of attraction the latter has in the eyes 
of the former, then one could refer to the existence of soft power.
53
 
 
Oğuzlu states that if the change of others‟ behavior is resulted not from a 
cost-benefit analysis, but from the legitimacy of identity and policies of the power-
exerting party in the eyes of others, then one can talk about soft power.
54
 Therefore, 
soft power amounts to power of attraction in Oğuzlu‟s analysis. To get attraction, 
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legitimacy is perceived as a prerequisite by Oğuzlu. He provides three important 
sources of legitimacy: the values owned by the power-holder; political, social, 
economic and cultural institutions of a country; and the methods employed in the 
execution of foreign policy.
55
 
 The last and one of the recent attempts to theorize soft power, which deserves 
to be mentioned, is provided by Geun Lee in his article A theory of soft power and 
Korea's soft power strategy (2009). He tries to offer a new definition of soft power 
by analyzing the issue in terms of the resources rather than the nature of power 
exerted. Lee points at the lack of a well developed theoretical framework and the 
highly contextual nature of Nye‟s representation of soft power and aims at providing 
a theoretical framework that can be applied to every case.  
Firstly, Lee presents five different categories of soft power in line with the 
policy goals to be achieved. “They are: (1) soft power to improve the external 
security environment by projecting peaceful and attractive images of a country; (2) 
soft power to mobilize other countries‟ support for one‟s foreign and security 
policies; (3) soft power to manipulate other countries‟ way of thinking and 
preferences; (4) soft power to maintain the unity of a community or community of 
countries; and (5) soft power to increase the approval ratings of a leader, or domestic 
support for a government.”56 
According to Lee, all these categories make use of the „soft resources‟ such as 
ideas, images, theories, know-how, education, discourses, culture, traditions, national 
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 21 
or global symbols, etc.
57
 Lee seems to grasp what Nye‟s conception of soft power is, 
however, he finds it defected, because he puts the sources of soft power, what he 
calls „soft resources‟, at the center of his theory, while the nature of the power being 
exerted makes up the basis of Nye‟s conception. His theory can be summarized as 
such in his own words: ...”when non-material symbolic „„soft resources‟‟ are 
employed to exert influence on others, the final outcome is soft power, while the 
final outcome is defined as hard power when material „„hard resources‟‟ are 
employed.”58 Therefore, in the conceptualization of Lee, there is no place for hard 
resources to create soft power, only soft resources can create soft power no matter 
what they co-opt or coerce others. Indeed, this falls short of Nye‟s conceptualization 
of soft power which also acknowledges the creation of soft power through 
hard/material resources. 
Out of the discussion of the several accounts of soft power provided by other 
scholars than Nye, it can be concluded that Nye‟s conceptualization of soft power 
has to be upgraded by making definitional clarifications and adding stronger 
emphasis on the resources of soft power.  
Firstly, soft power and co-optive power in the original conception are used 
interchangeably. Nye seemed to perceive and utilize these terms synonymously. 
However, for the author, they represent a theory-practice relationship. The term „soft 
power‟ resides at the theoretical level, while co-optive power, indeed co-optive 
behavior, is at the practical level. That is to say, co-optive power is not a power in 
itself, but a behavioral strategy made up of two main means, agenda-setting and 
attraction, for the exercise of soft power. Therefore, it may be better to call „co-
                                                             
57 Lee. “A theory of soft power and Korea's soft power strategy”, 209. 
58 Lee. “A theory of soft power and Korea's soft power strategy”, 210. 
 22 
optive strategy‟ or „co-optive behavior‟ to what was coined as „co-optive power‟ by 
Nye. In a similar vein, „command power‟ should be termed as „command/coaxing 
strategy‟ or „behavior‟. If one tries to incorporate insights from the resource-based 
theory of Geun Lee, it becomes obvious that it also needs some re-definitions. What 
Lee has termed as „soft power‟ can be renamed as „civilian power‟, since it originates 
from non-material soft resources, while „hard power‟ in Lee‟s terms can be re-cited 
as „econo-military power‟. 
Secondly, the emphasis on soft power resources, namely culture, political 
ideals and foreign policies, creates a confusion that Nye has also admitted. That 
emphasis makes Nye‟s notion of soft power seem similar to soft power in Lee‟s 
terms. Therefore, the military and economic resources should be given enough 
weight in defining the resources of soft power. In other words, the fact that soft 
power resources are not limited to those counted above should be emphasized.  
As a result of the incorporation of these two points to Nye‟s account of soft 
power, a definition as such emerges: „Soft power‟ is the ability to get what one wants 
by using all types of power resources, that is, civilian and econo-military powers 
alike in the proposed conception, through co-optive strategies/behavior.” In this 
manner, „hard power‟ is the ability to get one wants by using all types of power 
resources, that is, civilian and econo-military powers alike in the proposed 
conception, through command/coaxing strategies/behavior. Such a conception of 
power would help define and categorize the countries in terms of their foreign 
policies as well. In other words, all countries using all types of power resources 
through co-optive strategies/behavior can be called „Soft Power States‟, while all 
countries using all types of power resources through command/coaxing 
strategies/behavior can be called „Hard Power States‟. 
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2.1.3 Critiques of Nye’s Conception of Soft Power 
 The above mentioned other conceptions of soft power can be considered as 
criticisms to Nye‟s conception of soft power as the scholars try to refine, 
complement or alter the conception of soft power according to their own views. 
However, one of those criticisms requires more attention than others because it 
threatens the „soft‟ nature of soft power. This criticism is about the lack of clear 
boundaries or strategies of the ability to attract or the power of attraction in the 
original conception of the term by Nye.  
Although attraction can be said to remain at the center of Nye‟s theory of soft 
power, he does neither provide a definition of it nor an operational map for its 
acquisition. He just tries to prove its existence by adopting a practical approach 
which tries to look at the levels of attraction gained out of public opinion polls, the 
number of foreign students in a country, the number of broadcasts outside the 
countries, etc. In other words, Nye tries to present attraction through measuring it 
without presenting a conceptual notion of the term. He does not delve into the 
question of how attraction is gained. Vuving‟s and Oğuzlu‟s accounts mentioned 
above try to some extent answer that question. Vuving has presented three power 
currencies – benignity, brilliance and beauty - that play the role of intermediaries in 
creating attraction. Oğuzlu introduced legitimacy/credibility criteria for the 
attainment of attraction. According to him, the legitimacy of a state based on its 
values, institutions and foreign policy actions grants it attraction on the eyes of other 
states. A similarity line can be drawn between Vuving‟s power currencies and 
Oğuzlu‟s sources of legitimacy. Benignity represents the ways in which a state 
behaves in its foreign policy; brilliance can be said to amount to the institutions; and 
beauty can be depicted as the values.  
 24 
Another severe criticism on the issue of attraction-generation comes from 
Janice B. Mattern. In her contribution to the book edited by Felix Berenskoetter and 
M. J. Williams Power in World Politics (2007), titled „Why soft power isn‟t so soft: 
representational force and attraction in world politics‟, she tries to reveal the hidden 
mechanism through which attraction is gained, indeed created. Her main argument is 
that soft power may not be so soft, as the title suggests. The hard side of the soft 
power, in her view, stems from the inherent coercive nature of the means utilized in 
shaping the preferences of others. According to Mattern, shaping or influencing the 
behavior of others is done by socio-linguistically constructing „reality‟ through 
verbal fighting - rather than persuasion - the strategy of which is representational 
force working through structuring narratives in such ways that they leave no possible 
out, no other possible choice for outsider and they threaten their subjectivity if they 
do not succumb to it.
59
 In this view, attraction may not be so innocent, but it may rest 
upon an innate coercion, if not physical. 
 
2.2 Similar Concepts 
 Soft power is sometimes used interchangeably with civilian power and 
normative power, both of which have emerged and been generally used in the 
context of European Union. Rather than signifying a specific type of power, these 
concepts were employed to represent the foreign policy identity of European Union. 
 
 
                                                             
59 Janice Bially Mattern. “Why soft power isn‟t so soft: representational force and attraction in world 
politics”, in in Power in World Politics, Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds. 
(London&New York:Routledge, 2007), 98-119. 
 25 
2.2.1 Civilian Power 
 Originally developed by Duchêne François in 1972, „civilian power‟ concept 
tried to create a new identity and a new role in international politics for the then 
European Community, now European Union. The idea that the concept was 
grounded on is that Europe can play a distinctive role in world politics given the 
economic prowess and the military weakness of the Europe, on the one hand, and the 
ideals, values that Europe represents on the other. Manners and Diez have 
reformulated Duchêne‟s original argument as such: 
He (Duchêne) argued that, given that the people of Europe had largely 
formed „amilitary‟ values, the stalemate of the Cold War had 
„devalued purely military power‟, and Europe was far from a 
consensus on its own development as a military superpower between 
the two poles, the then European Community „would have a chance to 
demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political 
co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power.
60
 
 
From this marks, it can be argued that the civilian power concept is about the 
„means‟ and the „ends‟ of Europe61, which it can use and pursue in its relations with 
the other states.  
On the „means‟ side, civilian power means a preference for the use of non-
military instruments in conducting foreign relations. Those non-military instruments 
include economic and civilian elements. Given the limitations of Europe in pooling 
military capabilities and the lack of Common Foreign and Security Policy with one 
voice, due to the persistence of national considerations, the EC/EU tended to use its 
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economic power and civilian capabilities in its foreign relations. This position has 
been put forward by Karen Smith, as well: 
Because the European Community is a „civilian group of countries 
long on economic power and relatively short on armed force‟, it has 
an interest in trying to domesticate relations between states, and 
Duchêne urged the Community to „bring to international problems the 
sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics 
which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with 
“home” and not foreign, that is, alien affairs.‟62 
 
 However, this never meant the renunciation of military power, the use of 
military instruments for Duchêne, the coiner of the term „civilian power‟.63 The 
emphasis on the economic and civilian means vis-à-vis military instruments is the 
defining characteristic of a „civilian power‟ actor.  
On the „ends‟ side, civilian power means the promotion of peace, 
international cooperation and several other values. In the words of Smith: 
The „civilian ends‟ cited (or rather, preferred) by Maull and Duchêne 
are, therefore, international cooperation, solidarity, domestication of 
international relations (or strengthening the rule of law in international 
relations), responsibility for the global environment, and the diffusion 
of equality, justice and tolerance.
64
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A similar argument has been made by Jan Orbie while he reviews the work of 
Stelios Stavridis: 
He (Stavridis) quotes Duchêne‟s remark that Europe „must be a force 
for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards‟ 
and promote values that belong to its „inner characteristics‟, such as 
„equality, justice and tolerance‟ and an „interest for the poor abroad‟.65 
 
 The difference between the concepts of „civilian power‟ presented in this 
section and that of „soft power‟ is that the former represents a specific kind of 
identity for the states, while the latter corresponds to a specific kind of power, itself. 
If one tries to define the relationship between these two terms, it can be claimed that 
„soft power‟ as an ability to get the outcomes one wants makes use of „civilian 
power‟, that is, the inclination to use non-military means of power and the promotion 
of values. The way that these characteristics of civilian power is exercised can make 
a state a „soft power state‟ if it chooses to utilize them in a co-optive manner, and 
also a „hard power state‟ if it prefers to do so by commanding/coaxing the other 
states. 
 
2.2.2 Normative Power 
 Dwelling on the conception of „civilian power‟ presented above, Ian Manners 
developed another term to classify European Union in terms of its foreign policy 
identity with a firm theoretical basis, which is „normative power‟, in his article 
Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, published in 2000. He 
differentiates civilian, military and normative powers by giving E. H. Carr‟s and 
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Johan Galtung‟s differentiations, and defines normative power as “the ability to 
shape the conceptions of „normal‟.”66 Normative power in the conceptualization of 
Manners is based on norms and conscience, aims at setting the standards, and focuses 
on the power of norms to influence actors‟ identity and behavior.67 
According to Manners and Diez, the differences between civilian power and 
normative power are to be found in the tangibility of the resources used, the scope of 
the resources and intentions, and their position about the Westphalian state system. 
To quote: 
…the emphasis on material assets and physical power in civilian 
power approaches contrasts with the emphasis on the normative power 
of non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms 
through imitation and attraction. 
…civilian power writings emphasize the communitarian nature of 
civilian resources, objectives and strategies, exercised primarily for 
the benefit of the owners. ….In contrast, the normative power 
approach emphasizes the cosmopolitan nature of EU normative 
power, in particular through reference to norms and principles 
considered more universal because they are embedded in UN treaties 
and organs. 
…Finally, civilian power writings have come to accept a Westphalian 
cultural emphasis on international society as the form and means of 
world politics….This acceptance of Westphalian culturation, 
including the status quo of an international society between states, 
contrasts with the emphasis of the normative power approach on 
transcending the „normality‟ of world politics through world society.68 
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The normative power conception provided above resembles Nye‟s soft power 
conception in terms of the emphasis upon the ideas, values and norms in changing 
the behavior of others. However, these two concepts are different in practice. First of 
all, it is not very clear that how that normative power will be utilized in a co-optive 
or coercive manner. Secondly, soft power does not have universalistic claims, in 
contrast to the aim of normative power in shaping the normalcy. 
 
2.3 A Refined Theory of Soft Power 
As a result of the discussions above, a revised and refined theory of soft 
power can be laid down as such. First of all, it can be said that soft power is a 
relational concept. It characterizes a relation between two actors, and in this case 
these actors are sovereign states. It does not only depend on the power-holder states‟ 
capabilities and how they make use of those capabilities in a co-optive manner, but 
also on the perceptions of them by the other actors, the power-exerted states, in the 
international system. If other actors identify with the power-holder without any 
visible threats or inducements, then it can be claimed that power-holder state 
possesses soft power. Therefore, other actors should identify with the power-holder 
by applying the logic of appropriateness, but not the logic of consequences. They 
should comply with the power-holder not because they are afraid of being punished 
or they expect some benefits in material terms, but because they find it appropriate to 
act in accordance with it as they are admired by the attractiveness of the power-
holder, or as they see the actions of it legitimate and credible, or they believe that 
they share the same values and norms with the power-holder.  
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It can be deduced from the explanation above that the identification process 
comprises the crux of the relational aspect of the soft power. In cases where the other 
actors would choose to act in line with the power-holder as a result of a cost/benefit 
analysis, it is likely that there exists no soft power relationship. In other words, when 
other actors are either coerced (cost) or induced (benefit), then one cannot talk about 
soft power. They do not identify with the power-holder spontaneously, through their 
own free will, but due to an expected punishment or reward. They are simply 
compelled to make a cost/benefit calculation. Therefore, it can be argued that when 
the logic of consequences is at play, it would be hard to claim that the power-holder 
has exerted its soft power on others. On the other hand, soft power does not hinge on 
a cost/benefit calculation by the power-exerted actors. When they behave in line with 
the logic of appropriateness, rather than due to the logic of anticipated consequences, 
then one can assume that a soft power relationship can be found. The logic of 
appropriateness implies that the actors upon which the power is exerted decide to go 
with the power-holder simply because they find it suitable to do so. They comply 
with the power-holder‟s position because they think that both share the same moral 
and normative values and the compliance with the power-holder is in conformity 
with the self-created identity characteristics of the power-exerted actor. In other 
words, the power-exerted actors obey the rule of power-holder since they think that it 
is normatively and morally valid, true, right, natural and good, and it is necessary to 
do so since it is seen as a kind of moral obligation emanating from the identity of 
them.
69
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It is, also, highly plausible to argue that the suitability or appropriateness 
arises from the attractiveness of the power-holder in the eyes of the power-exerted 
actors. Then, how can the attractiveness be explained? In this regard, the 
conceptualization provided by Alexander Vuving will be utilized. As mentioned 
before, he talks about three power currencies that create soft power, in this 
conceptualization the attractiveness: benignity, brilliance and beauty. Benignity 
includes the foreign policy actions of the states and the approach adopted in foreign 
dealings. For example, Vuving counts „paying attention to others, listening to them in 
international forums, engaging with foreign states in dialogue, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, promoting peace, economic aid, humanitarian assistance and diplomatic 
support‟ as all expressions of benignity.70 Public diplomacy efforts aimed at creating 
positive relationships with foreigners are also mentioned as signs of benignity by 
Vuving.
71
 The second power currency, brilliance, creates soft power as a result of the 
accomplishments of a state in terms of economy, politics, military, science and 
technology and many other fields. According to Vuving, „a strong and awesome 
military, a wealthy and vibrant economy, a rich and radiant culture, and a peaceful 
and well-run society are manifestations of brilliance‟.72  In other words, if a state is 
economically and politically stable and strong, militarily triumphant and powerful, 
scientifically and technologically developed, then it is regarded as brilliant by the 
others. Hence, it can be claimed that brilliance represents the level of development of 
a state as a whole. The successes of a state turn it into a „model‟ and attract the 
attention of other states who want to reach the same level of development through 
imitating the practices and policies of it.  The last power currency, beauty, is about 
the values, ideals, visions represented and advocated by a state in the original 
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conceptualization provided by Vuving. If a country acts as the agent of a value, is 
perceived as the avatar of an ideal, champions a cause, or articulate a vision 
compellingly, then it creates beauty.
73
 The conduct of domestic policies on normative 
principles and the promotion of those values, such as liberal democracy, in foreign 
relations and the conduct of foreign policy through international institutions and 
organizations are projections of beauty, and therefore soft power, according to 
Vuving.
74
 As an addition to Vuving‟s original conception of beauty, it can also be 
argued that the popular culture symbolizes a form of beauty in the first meaning of 
the term. Such an addition would also be in line with Nye‟s conception of the soft 
power resources, since he counts culture as one of the sources of soft power in 
several writings. For example, TV series, movies, books can contribute to the 
positive images of a country in other countries. These kinds of cultural assets can 
help create familiarity with and awareness of that culture on the side of audience by 
giving various clues about the domestic values and the lifestyle of that country. 
Therefore, they can be catalysts in attracting students, tourists, and workers to come 
to that country. In this way, they can build societal relationships as various cultural, 
educational, and business exchange programs do. Such developments at the societal 
level can be transferred into political level in the form of policies favoring the power-
holder state, which indirectly means the increase of soft power of the power-holder. 
To clarify the points that have been made about the theory of soft power and 
to make them suitable for practical analysis, the following table differentiating 
between hard power and soft power would be of enormous help.  
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              Kind of Power 
 
Criteria 
 
Hard Power Soft Power 
Power resources 
Military X X 
Economic X X 
Ideological X X 
Strategy 
Command/Coaxing X - 
Co-optive - X 
Logic of action 
Logic of consequences X - 
Logic of appropriateness - X 
Table 2: Hard Power vs. Soft Power 
 
 This table stands for the illumination of the differences between hard power 
and soft power in the context that is going to be used in the following analysis of 
Turkish Foreign Policy. It can be inferred from the table that there is not a distinction 
between two forms of power in terms of the power resources being utilized. Both 
kinds of power can use all sorts of resources. The distinction between them lies in the 
way that those resources are being employed. Hard power, in this regard, resorts to 
command/coaxing strategies and emerges when the logic of consequences is on the 
ground. On the contrary, soft power applies co-optive strategies and necessitates the 
operation of the logic of appropriateness on the side of power-exerted actors. 
Therefore, states making use of all kinds of power resources regardless of its type in 
a co-optive manner and being perceived and responded by others through the logic of 
appropriateness can be labeled as „Soft Power States‟. As explained beforehand, the 
running of the logic of appropriateness is closely related with the attractiveness of the 
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power-holder and the issue of attractiveness has been explained in previous pages 
through the application of Vuving‟s categorization of power currencies. It is thought 
that the actions representing these three power currencies - benignity, brilliance and 
beauty - will bring about the methodological variables that are going to be applied to 
the case of Turkish Foreign Policy. Therefore, multilateralism, peace promotion, and 
economic and humanitarian assistance efforts are going to be dealt under the heading 
of benignity. In the brilliance section, the level of development in terms of economy, 
politics and military, and the promotion of a „model‟ to other countries will be the 
subtopics. For the last power currency, beauty, the adherence to universal values in 
domestic and foreign policies and the popularity of the culture abroad will be 
examined.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOFT POWER IN TRADITIONAL TURKISH FOREIGN 
POLICY: 1923-2002 
 
 
This chapter is going to search for the clues of soft power in Turkish foreign 
policy from the year 1923, the year that the Turkish Republic was proclaimed, till 
2002, when the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, hereafter AKP, (Justice and 
Development Party, in English) came to power in Turkey. It does not examine the 
foreign relations of Turkey with other countries on a bilateral basis as many other 
writings have done. However, this chapter will try to analyze Turkish foreign policy 
between 1923 and 2002 from the exclusive perspective of soft power in the way that 
was presented in the previous theoretical and methodological chapter. After 
sketching out the framework and the basic principles of traditional Turkish foreign 
policy, the soft power strategies adopted by Turkish state in its foreign dealings and 
the issue of attractiveness of Turkey are going to be examined under the heading of 
Soft Power in Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy. 
 
3.1 Main Determinants of the Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy 
 Before analyzing the characteristics of traditional Turkish foreign policy, it 
will be useful to examine the main framework of this policy in which it has been
36 
shaped, evaluated and conducted. It can be claimed that the principles of Turkish 
foreign policy that are going to be examined later on emerged from this general 
framework set by various structural determinants. According to Mustafa Aydın, there 
are three main sets of structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy, and these are 
the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the geographical realities, and the impact of 
Kemalism.
75
  
 
3.1.1 The Legacy of the Ottoman Empire 
It is almost unimaginable to assume that the Turkish Republic has not 
inherited anything from its predecessor Ottoman Empire. Despite of the fact that the 
founder cadre of the Republic, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, tried to disassociate 
itself from the Ottoman Empire in every aspect of life as much as possible, it is far 
from evident that they established the new state on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. 
The simple fact that they were serving in the Ottoman military clearly illustrates this 
point. Therefore, it was very likely that the newly-founded Turkish state would 
inherit the legacies of the Ottoman Empire in the foreign policy domain as well. 
Indeed, it is not going to be an exaggeration to argue that Turkish foreign policy is a 
continuation of the Ottoman diplomacy.  
The first legacy of Ottoman Empire on the foreign policy of the Turkish 
Republic was the inheritance of the foreign affairs bureaucrats. According to George 
S. Harris, a specialist in late Ottoman and early Turkish diplomacy, „two-thirds of the 
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Ottoman Foreign Service made the transition into the Republic‟s Foreign Ministry‟76. 
In addition to this, the ruling elite of the Turkish Republic had also been serving in 
the Ottoman system. On this issue, Aswini K. Mohapatra argues that “The fact that 
an estimated 93 per cent of the Empire‟s staff officers and 85 per cent of its civil 
servants retained their positions in the new republic suggests the continuity of the 
ruling elite from the Ottoman to the Kemalist era”.77 Being witnesses of the falling 
back of the Empire, the tragedy of First World War, which brought the Empire to an 
end, and the subsequent War of Independence, fought for regaining the lands lost due 
to the Sevres Treaty, these military officers had experienced a lot of misery and 
difficulties. Therefore, this experience had led them to avoid any military 
involvement in the first years after the establishment of the new Turkey. In 
accordance with this, the founders of Turkey didn‟t pursue any revisionist policies in 
terms of territorial gains. They stuck to the boundaries drawn by the Misâk-ı Millî, 
and they did not look for additional territories other than those defined by that 
document in order not to create other tragedies and not to put the newly-gained 
independence in danger. As a result of this development, one of the principles of 
traditional Turkish foreign policy can be considered as the maintenance of the status 
quo, which will be elaborated later.  
The second legacy of the Ottoman Empire on Turkish foreign policy is the 
Western orientation. Contrary to the arguments that Westernization in Turkey started 
with the proclamation of Turkish Republic, it should be remembered that reforms on 
the Western model had well started to be introduced in the Ottoman Empire albeit for 
a different reason than the Turkish Republic. (The Ottoman reformers tried to 
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prevent the dissolution of the Empire, while Turkish modernizers initiated a nation-
building project on the model of West.). At the same time, Ottoman Empire had a 
Western identity, i.e., it was accepted as an equal European country in the European 
system. The same can also be claimed for the Republic. Turkish Republic has 
identified itself as a European country, rather than as a Middle Eastern one, and 
consequently tried to be a member of various Western/European institutions. On this 
matter, Ali Karaosmanoğlu argues that: 
Turkey‟s integration process with Europe has undoubtedly been one 
of the major Ottoman legacies. Despite its ups-and-downs, it has been 
a fundamental aspect of the internal and external policies of the 
Republic. Turkey‟s alignment with NATO, memberships in the 
Council of Europe and the European Customs Union and Turkey‟s 
admission as a European Union membership candidate in the EU‟s 
1999 Helsinki Summit have all been cornerstones in that yet-
unfinished process.
78
 
 
The third legacy of the Ottoman Empire inherited by Turkey is the skepticism 
toward other states. Ottoman diplomacy was suspicious of others‟ intention 
especially in the last years of the Empire. Due to a sense of insecurity, the Ottomans 
perceived the international system as a self-help system and therefore chose to rely 
on their own strength. This skepticism has mainly manifested itself as three fears: the 
fear of dismemberment, fear of encirclement and fear of abandonment. The best 
crystallization of this development, which, also, resulted in the continuation of such 
an understanding in the newly-founded Turkish Republic, was the Sevres Treaty and 
the subsequent partition of Anatolian peninsula among the victors of the First World 
War. In Turkey, the so-called „Sevres Syndrome‟, according to which Turkey has 
lots of enemies trying to partition its lands, can be considered as the prolongation of 
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the fears of Ottoman Empire about eventual annihilation. It can be claimed that an 
obvious, direct result of this perception has been the securitization of almost every 
issue in Turkish domestic and foreign politics, which paved the way for a militaristic 
foreign policy. 
In line with the arguments above, it can be said that late Ottoman diplomacy 
and the diplomacy followed by the early Turkish Republic had a resemblance in 
terms of the playing off between great powers. As Aydın argues, the Ottomans 
conducted a successful diplomacy by taking advantage of the balance of power 
politics which delayed the actual dissolution of the Empire. Similarly, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk benefited well from the divisions among the European powers in 
finalizing the War of Independence in several fronts.  
Finally, a line of similarity can be drawn between Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Republic in terms of the threat perceptions. For both Ottomans and Turks, 
the primary threat was coming from the northern neighbor, Tsarist Russia for the 
former and the Soviet Union for the latter, especially after the World War II. Edward 
Weisband illustrates this point by claiming that one principle guiding Turkish foreign 
policy was that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of the 
republic and that the very same northern threat had been existent for the Ottoman 
Empire as well.
79
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3.1.2 Geographical Realities 
 The geography in which a country is situated is one of the most decisive 
factors in the formulation of its foreign policy. Holding of strategically significant 
spots, being located on trade routes, having specific topographic conditions are some 
of the important signifiers of geography which should be taken in the account by the 
policy-makers during the foreign policy-making process. Indeed, geography can be 
considered as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it engenders great 
opportunities if these chances are realized and benefited. For example, an island 
country can enjoy huge security advantages and divert its energy to its economic and 
scientific development. On the other hand, geography poses serious challenges. For 
instance, it may require a security-driven foreign policy for a small or medium-sized 
country having a lot of neighbors. Of course, the choice about which perspective will 
be prevalent in the foreign policy-making depends on the perceptions of the policy-
makers. In the case of Turkey, it can be argued that the second perspective, the 
emphasis upon the challenges entailed by geography, has been the traditional 
understanding of Turkey‟s geopolitics. According to Pınar Bilgin, the military 
establishment, especially, has been one of the powerful promoters of such an 
understanding of Turkish geopolitics through constituting geographical truths.
80
 
Therefore, the geographical realities to be mentioned in this section are going to be 
analyzed in this framework as well. 
 First of all, Turkey is situated at the heart of European, Asian and African 
land basins. Its closeness to these regions and its historical bounds with the countries 
in these regions make it a potential player in the politics of those regions. However, 
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the topographic conditions of the Anatolian peninsula, which is mountainous in the 
east, required Turkey, as well as the Ottoman Empire, „to look to the West rather 
than to the East for trade and cultural exchange‟.81 When the level of development of 
the West contrary to the backwardness and instability of the East has been taken into 
account, the establishment of closer links with the West seems reasonable for 
Turkey. 
 Secondly, Turkey hosts the Straits which are very crucial for European and 
Mediterranean and Black Sea countries. The ownership of Straits poses 
opportunities, but far more problems for Turkey. According to Aydın, „the 
possession of the Straits conveys political and military advantages, and raises Turkey 
from the position of a purely local power to one having crucial international 
influence.‟82 However, this situation creates envy on the side of potential aggressors 
of Turkey. At the same time, the Straits are hard to defend against aerial and naval 
attacks, necessitating a staunch military force. Similarly, the encirclement of Turkey 
by seas on three sides, especially on the Aegean coast where the problem of Aegean 
islands continues, creates another security issue for Turkey. It can be argued that 
tense relations with Greece and Cyprus and the adoption of a military–first approach 
by Turkey are manifestations of the insecurity perceived by Turkey.  
 Another point further aggravating the problem mentioned above is the 
number of Turkey‟s neighbors. Baskın Oran, in his comprehensive book about 
Turkish foreign policy, writes that „the existence of a strong relationship between the 
number and properties of a country‟s neighbors and the security of the very same 
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country has been proved by quantitative researches.‟83 He continues to state that „if 
the number of boundaries increases, the probability of being attacked, threatened or 
compelled to fight in several fronts simultaneously in wartime increases.‟84 Today, 
Turkey has eight land neighbors (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria), and if the countries having coastal zones on the seas around 
Turkey (Republic of Cyprus, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine) are 
included, this number rises to twelve.
85
 In line with the argument of Oran, it can be 
argued that Turkey has always felt the need to remain vigilant towards its neighbors. 
 One of the important dilemmas of Turkish geopolitical understanding has 
been the relations with the Soviet Union. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
primary existential threat to both Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic has 
emanated from its northern neighbor. Although the relations between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union had been friendly until the end of the Second World War, the shifting 
attitude of the Soviets towards Turkey led to the re-emergence of the fears on the 
Turkish side. The non-renewal of the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression 
by Soviet Union, the territorial demands on Eastern Turkey and concessions on the 
control of the Straits in 1945 was influential in pushing Turkey to look for the 
support of the West, which, at the end of the Second World War, was represented by 
the United States of America. While the relations between Turkey and its superpower 
neighbor started to improve with the Khrushchev‟s coming to power and several 
crises between Turkey and the United States, for instance, after Johnson‟s letter, the 
relations has continued to be dominated by a sense of insecurity on Turkish side.  
                                                             
83 Baskın Oran. “TDP‟nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi”, in Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1, Baskın Oran, ed. 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 24. 
84 Oran. “TDP‟nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi”, 24. 
85 Oran. “TDP‟nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi”, 25. 
 43 
 Lastly, the instabilities around the country, especially in the Middle East 
region, contributed to the security-dominated foreign policy in Turkey. Also, the 
hostilities inherited from the late Ottoman times between Turks and Arabs have 
played an important role in shaping Turkish foreign policy in general. First of all, 
Turks felt to be betrayed by Arabs, who fought against the Ottoman Empire as a 
result of the nationalist waves during the First World War. In return for this, Arabs 
are afraid of Turkey‟s neo-imperial ambitions. Therefore, there was a feeling of 
mistrust between these two communities. In addition, the developments during the 
Cold War, starting with the Suez Crisis of 1956, necessitated Turkey to be aware of 
the potential dangers stemming from the Middle East. The possibility of those crises‟ 
turning into superpower hot conflict and their spilling over to Turkish lands created 
great security concerns about the developments around the vicinity of Turkey. This 
perception added additional fuel to the securitized foreign policy of Turkey. 
 Turkey has also tried to maximize its interests by making intensive use of its 
geographical location. In other words, Turkey relied on its geographical location in 
order to strike deals with the Western countries in its favor. This situation can be 
frankly recognized in the relations with the USA during the Cold War years. 
Especially, the Menderes government in the 1950s resorted to such maneuvers in 
order to get more credits from the USA. The main argument of Turkey during that 
period was that Turkey is indispensible for Western interests due to its geography. 
This can be argued to represent the most obvious case where Turkey has tried to 
benefit from its geographical positioning. 
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3.1.3 The Legacy of Kemalism 
 The last structural determinant of traditional Turkish foreign policy is the 
ideological framework provided by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. According to Aydın, three goals and principles have influenced Turkish 
foreign policy.  
 The first one is the establishment and preservation of a nation-state with 
complete independence conditioned by Turkish nationalism.
86
 This meant that the 
newly-established Turkish state would focus on its internal stabilization first. Rather 
than maintaining the policies of the Ottoman Empire such as pan-Islamism, pan-
Turanism, pan-Ottomanism, the energy of the state would be devoted to domestic 
development and sustainability of the new regime. The important thing for the 
leaders of Turkish state was the internal reformation of the country as a whole. The 
reflection of this understanding on foreign policy domain has been that Turkey 
would not pursue any imperial policies aiming to resurrect the Ottoman Empire. On 
this issue, Atatürk said that „…the state should pursue an exclusively national 
policy…I mean…to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and 
welfare of the nation and the country.‟87 In other words, it was guaranteed that 
Turkish state would not pursue an imperial foreign policy. Furthermore, the Turkish 
state did not intend „to export its revolution to other countries as many contemporary 
revolutionary movements did‟88, according to Aydın. Sina Akşin provides another 
account of Turkey‟s reluctance to export its ideology by giving an example. 
According to him, Atatürk wanted the Cadre Journal (Kadro Dergisi, in Turkish), 
published from 1932 till 1935, to be abolished, since that journal was trying to export 
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the Kemalist ideology by claiming that Turkish War of Independence had provided 
an example, forerunner for all the colonial peoples.
89
 
The second principle set forth by Atatürk and influential in Turkish foreign 
policy has been „the promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization by 
means of Kemalist principles‟.90 According to this principle, Turkey would be 
developed on the Western model, which is the ultimate civilization. This necessitated 
Turkey to import various laws, such as the Swiss Civil Code, and various other 
policies from the West. In order to complement the reformation process, Turkey tried 
to develop closer ties to Western states in the immediate aftermath of the War of 
Independence, although it fought against them during that war. Therefore, this 
principle provided another explanation of Turkey‟s Westernization path.  
The third principle provided by Atatürk is „the attachment to realistic and 
peaceful means in foreign policy actions‟.91 The first part of the explanation, realistic 
foreign policy, has, on the one hand, meant not to follow unattainable dreams, but to 
reconcile Turkey‟s capabilities with its goals.92 Atatürk, himself, expressed this 
attitude by saying that:  
The government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly is national 
and material in its labors. It is realist...We are not swindlers who, in 
pursuit of great dreams, seem to do what we cannot do...This is the 
whole trouble. Instead of pursuing ideas which we cannot accomplish 
and increasing enemy pressure against ourselves, let us return our 
natural, our legal limits. Let us know our limits...
93
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In this context, Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu maintain that it was 
a natural outcome of Atatürk‟s realistic outlook that he was indifferent to the Pan-
Islamist, Pan-Turkist movements.
94
 On the other hand, this principle can be argued to 
form the basis of military non-adventurism by Turkey. For example, Weisband 
argues that Turkish leaders rejected adventurist policies that threatened to bring 
Turkey into the war.
95
 As mentioned above, the leading cadre of the Republic had 
witnessed the sufferings that the wars had brought to the country. Also, Turkish 
military was devastated during the War of Independence. In addition, the domestic 
reforms required a stable political environment in order for reforms to take root. 
Therefore, it was not only desirable for Turkey to avoid new conflicts, but also it was 
necessary not to involve in new military adventures.  In terms of the peaceful means 
part of the principle, it can be said that Turkey tried to solve its problems through 
legal means and by applying a diplomacy-first approach. To quote from Aydın:  
In contrast to a good number of other contemporary states, Turkey 
showed great willingness to solve its major problems by legal means. 
During the inter-war period, it would have been possible to resolve 
some of Turkey‟s problems left behind by Lausanne (such as those of 
Straits and the Sanjak of Alexandretta) by force or fait accompli 
without waiting patiently for an opportunity to solve them peacefully, 
but Atatürk rejected such adventures.96  
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3.2 Principles of Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy 
 The section above was intended to portray the general environment in which 
the traditional Turkish foreign policy has been structured. In this section, the 
characteristics of traditional Turkish foreign policy emerged in that broad scheme of 
determinants will be analyzed.  
 
3.2.1 Maintenance of the Status Quo 
The first thing to be inferred from the general framework of traditional 
Turkish foreign policy is that Turkey has been in favor of status quo. However, there 
is controversy on the meaning of status quo. In order to clarify what is meant by 
status quo in this context, it can be said that this status quo-oriented foreign policy 
means that Turkey has not pursued any irredentist policies, not aimed to get more 
territories, and that Turkey has tried to preserve the existing state of affairs as long as 
it is advantageous for her to do so. According to Kamer Kasım, the Turkish 
Republic, since its inception, has abstained from irredentist policies as a fundamental 
principle.
97
 Similarly, Tayyar Arı argues that one of the tenets of Turkish foreign 
policy has been not to pursue irredentist policies.
98
 The main connotation of the term 
„status quo‟ has been the preservation of the existing conditions. However, it could 
be properly understood that status quo-based foreign policy does not amount to a 
passive one. On the contrary, Turkey has tried to change the status quo in its favor if 
the conditions have been available for such an alteration. For example, the resolution 
of the problems of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, Hatay, and that of Straits in line with 
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Turkish interests can be considered as active foreign policy efforts to change the then 
prevalent conditions, in other words as anti-status quo developments. On that 
occasion, Edward Weisband writes: „With the exception of the Sanjak of 
Alexandretta, now the province of Iskenderun that was forcibly ceded to Turkey in 
1939, Turkish foreign policy since the founding of the republic on October 29, 1923 
has remained true to non-revisionist norms of Kemalist ideology.‟99 According to 
İdris Bal, the idea of preserving the status-quo based on the Lausanne Treaty has 
been one of the principles of Turkish foreign policy.
100
 
Baskın Oran adds a third dimension to the status quo-based Turkish foreign 
policy as the perpetuation of the existing balances.
101
 This balance has two 
dimensions. The first one is that Turkey has tried to sustain a balance between the 
West and its opponents
102
, led by Soviet Union during the Cold War. Secondly, 
Turkey has tried to reach equilibrium among the constituents of the West
103
 - among 
the Western European powers until the end of the Second World War, and between 
the United States and the Western Europe from that time on. He further argues that 
Turkey has not been fully successful in either of the balance initiatives. The policy of 
maintaining balances has been considered as one of the traditional principles of 
Turkish foreign policy by some other scholars as well. For example, İdris Bal counts 
the „policy of balances‟ as one of the fundamental behavioral factors of Turkish 
foreign policy in his recent article, and he, further, argues that Turkish foreign policy 
makers have carried on the Ottoman practice.
104
 Muharrem Hilmi Özev, TASAM 
Specialist, contends that the Ottoman practice of playing off between great powers 
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has continued to play an influential role in Turkey and has become a traditional norm 
of Turkish foreign policy.
105
 
As discussed above, one of the legacies of the Ottoman Empire - the 
inheritance of the military officers, which had experience prolonged wars during the 
last years of the Ottoman Empire, and their being the ruling elite of the Turkish 
Republic - has led to the emergence of non-revisionist policies. Moreover, the need 
for strengthening of the internal regime has been one of the principles of Kemalism, 
which called for the avoidance of new military adventures. At the same time, the 
weakness of the newly-emerged Republic in terms of military would not allow 
Turkey to go after territorially revisionist policies. The renunciation of pan-
movements promoted during the last years of the Ottoman Empire in order to hold 
the imperial subjects together by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues provided 
another rationale for the policies of Turkish state in accordance with the continuation 
of the status quo. Furthermore, the geographical reality that Turkey has an abundance 
of neighbors has entailed another reason for the status quo-based foreign policy of 
Turkish state. The possibility of opening other fronts when Turkey has been involved 
in a huge military adventure has not been so small to be neglected by Turkish 
authorities. Therefore, Turkey has opted for the maintenance of the status quo in 
order not to jeopardize the overall security of the country. On that account, Ömer 
Kürkçüoğlu argues that „there has been a need for cautious and prudent foreign 
policy as a requisite of Turkey‟s geography. From this point of view, Turkish foreign 
policy can be labeled as status quo-oriented.‟106 
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3.2.2 Western Orientation 
 The second feature of Turkish foreign policy has been its Western orientation. 
Many of the scholars tend to call this principle Westernism. However, since there is 
ambiguity on the term Westernism, it would be better to call it Western orientation. 
 As it was mentioned in the section explaining the general framework of 
Turkish foreign policy, all of the three structural determinants have included 
explanations for the Western orientation of Turkey. For the Ottoman legacy, Bal 
argues that the roots of the Westernism can be found in the last century of the 
Empire. According to him, the importation of various institutions and methods from 
the West was seen a cure for the preventing the dissolution of the Empire.
107
 In terms 
of the effect of the geography on Turkey‟s Western orientation, the explanation 
provided by Aydın can be recalled. After mentioning about the mountainous nature 
of the Eastern Anatolia and the existence of impermeable mountain ranges on the 
northern and southern coasts of Anatolia, he writes that: „This geographical setting 
has forced all states located on the Anatolian peninsula, including the Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish Republic, to look to the West rather than to the East for trade 
and cultural exchange.‟108 Lastly, the legacy of Kemalism had a profound influence 
on Turkey‟s Western orientation. The Kemalist goal of „the promotion of Turkey to 
the level of contemporary civilization‟ has necessitated Turkey to look for closer 
relations with the Western countries. 
In the light of these expressions, it can be claimed that there are two 
approaches to Westernism/Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the 
existing literature. The first one claims that Turkey takes the West as the model for 
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its own development, because the West was much more developed than any other 
part of the world. The statement of Atatürk reveals this point very fairly: „There are 
many nations, but there is only one civilization. For the advancement of a nation, it 
must be a part of this one civilization...We wish to modernize our country. All of our 
efforts are directed toward the establishment of a modern, therefore Western, 
government.‟109 Various scholars, as well, have made similar marks about the 
development of Turkey on the Western model. Berna Türkdoğan, for instance, 
argues that „Turkey has tried to establish the judicial and secular European model in 
political and modern terms‟110. In a similar vein, İlhan Uzgel writes that: „Turkey, 
since its establishment, has tried to construct its political, social and economic 
structures by taking the Western countries as the model.‟111  
For the second approach, in a sense closely related to the first one, Western 
orientation means the improvement of relations with the Western countries, and the 
Western world as a whole. In the first years of the Republic, in order to modernize 
the country and to promote it to the level of contemporary civilization, the co-
operation with the West was a must for Turkish Republic. For this matter, Adnan 
Sofuoğlu argues that „as the new Turkey has chosen the goal of reaching the level of 
most developed nations and surpassing that level, accordingly in the foreign policy 
domain, the improvement of the relations with the Western countries has been 
embraced as a fundamental.‟112 Therefore, Turkey has worked for establishing good 
relations with the Western countries by following policies closer to the Western 
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world. However, in time, Turkey has been unable to balance this Western 
orientation, and become heavily dependent on the West beginning from the end of 
the Second World War. Therefore, this pro-Western attitude of Turkish foreign 
policy has been criticized, from time to time, both domestically and internationally.  
 
3.2.3 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes/Commitment to International Law 
 It can be argued that Turkey has followed a peaceful foreign policy meaning 
that Turkish foreign policy has never been aggressive towards other actors in the 
international system. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy can be claimed to be 
conducted within the boundaries of international law. Turkey strived hard to obey the 
rules of international law and not to act against the general principles of it.  
Of course, the clearest illustration of the pacific nature of Turkish foreign 
policy has been the motto of „peace at home, peace in the world‟ presented by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He, first, mentioned this principle at the national 
declaration/appeal of May 20, 1931 by saying that „We are working for the peace at 
home, peace in the world‟.113 Then, this phrase has turned out to be one of the 
unchangeable dicta of Turkish foreign policy. „Peace at home, peace in the world‟ 
represents a comprehensive understanding of peace incorporating domestic, regional 
and international aspects of peace. From this understanding, it can be inferred that 
Turkey has worked for the installation of peace both in its region and in the whole 
world.
114
 Accordingly, İsmail Soysal asserts that when the numerous agreements that 
Turkey signed with its neighbors and the multilateral pacts established with Turkish 
initiatives are taken into account, how much Turkey has strived for maintaining 
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peace in its neighborhood and how much it has succeeded in that endeavor 
emerges.
115
 
 The first thing to be recognized as peaceful foreign policy behavior of 
Turkish state is that Turkey has prioritized diplomacy rather than war or the use, or 
threat, of force in settlement of its disputes. This can be clearly recognized from the 
following statement of Atatürk: „War must be inescapable and vital. Unless the life 
of the nation is endangered, war is murder.‟116 Moreover, Soysal claims that „Atatürk 
preferred the use of negotiations, in other words, the use of diplomacy, in solving 
national problems instead of resorting to faits accomplis like Mussolini and 
Hitler.‟117 Similar statements have also been made by other scholars. For instance, 
according to Tayyar Arı, the pacific settlement of disputes through diplomatic means 
has been one of the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy.
118
 In a similar vein, 
Faruk Sönmezoğlu argues that the Turkish understanding of taking diplomacy as the 
primary means in settlement of problems and of being apt to utilize and consume all 
diplomatic channels before resorting to military means has been continuing for a 
long time.
119
 Another similar statement has been made by Ramazan Gözen. Gözen 
asserts that Turkey has tried to solve its problems, territorial and/or 
political/economic, in the international system through cooperating with the 
international actors and by way of dialogue, to some extent by making use of 
peaceful methods.
120
 Kemal Kirişçi presents the peaceful characteristic of Turkish 
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foreign policy by putting forward the statement of „the avoidance from war and the 
use of violence‟ as a general principle of it.121  
 At the same time, Turkey has been cautious about observing the international 
law while generating and conducting its foreign policy. This also has been counted as 
one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy by various scholars. Oran calls 
this principle „legitimatism‟ (meşruîyetçilik). He argues that being a middle-sized 
country, Turkey needs international law.
122
 In another account written by Muhittin 
Keskin, Oran is said to claim that the limited power of Turkey has dictated the 
principle of legitimatism on Turkey.
123
 In addition, Keskin explains legitimatism as 
„the reliance of the foreign policy decisions on law‟ and claims that Turkish 
Republic, since its foundation, has tried to abide by this principle.
124
 
It can be argued that there are two dimensions of this principle. The first one 
is the legality of Turkish foreign policy actions. As Kürkçüoğlu argues, Turkey did 
not deviate from the international law in changing the status quo in its favor, 
especially on the issue of Straits, in contrast to the fact that many contemporaneous 
European powers tried to get what they wanted by force.
125
 In addition, Turkey has 
tried not to be involved in activities violating the general international rules such as 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states.
126
 Similarly, as Weisband argues, 
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the priority of peace, as a principle guiding Turkish foreign policy makers, was non-
interventionist in implication.
127
 
The second dimension relates to the commitment to international agreements. 
Aydın states this as such: „In Turkey it is honorable to comply with international 
commitments.‟128 Kirişçi, also, argues that „Turkey is a country committed to 
international agreements, having a tradition of working with the international 
organizations and trying to behave in accordance with the international society.‟129 
Accordingly, Arı enumerates the adhesion to international undertakings, 
commitments to the full extent as one of the tenets of Turkish foreign policy.
130
 
 
3.3 Soft Power in Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-2002 
In the light of the general framework of Turkish foreign policy and the 
fundamental principles stemmed from that setting, the soft power strategies that have 
been utilized in traditional Turkish foreign policy will be examined in this section. 
As previously mentioned, the scheme provided by Vuving will be adopted while 
searching for the soft power utilization by the Turkish state.  
 
3.3.1 Benignity 
 Benignity concerns the way of behaving of the power-holder in its relations 
with the power-exerted actors. The way in which a state acts towards other actors 
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defines the first soft power currency mentioned by Vuving. If a state performs its 
foreign policy actions in a benevolent and gentle manner by taking into consideration 
the sensitivities and necessities of others and by cooperating with them, then that 
country can be argued to show symptoms of benignity. The treatment of others with 
benign intentions creates a sense of sympathy and appreciation on the side of power-
exerted actors. It is through the production such feelings of affinity and gratefulness 
that benignity produces soft power, in other words attraction. Still the questions that 
„Which actions are likely to be considered as benign?‟ and „how can benignity be 
observed in the foreign policy domain?‟ remain to be examined. The coiner of the 
term, Alexander Vuving counts the actions of benignity as „paying attention to 
others, listening to them in international forums, or engaging with foreign states in 
dialogues, whether bilateral or multilateral, promoting peace, providing economic 
aid, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic support.‟131 In order to make these 
actions available for the research conducted, they are going to be handled under three 
subtopics in the following section: the actions of multilateralism, peaceful foreign 
policy and peace promotion, and economic and humanitarian assistance efforts. 
Therefore, the foreign policy actions of Turkish Republic between the years 1923 
and 2002 are going be examined with a specific emphasis on these three subtopics. 
 
3.3.1.1 Multilateralism 
Although Turkey has been a part of many multilateral international and 
regional organizations, the multilateral processes that were initiated by Turkey will 
be the main focus of this section in order to maintain the relevancy of the subject 
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matter with the theoretical analysis. The multilateral efforts of Turkish state date 
back to early 1930s. However, the inflexible environment of the Cold War era and 
the configuration of states around Turkey can be claimed to play a restraining role 
for the initiation of multilateral relations by Turkish state. It was obviously difficult 
to define common interests and adopt common positions on several matters among a 
number of countries in a neighborhood involving various states with different 
internal structures and different national interests. Therefore, the lack of numerous 
multilateral efforts in Turkish neighborhood seems understandable when the 
international context is borne in mind.  
 
3.3.1.1.1 Security-related Multilateral Efforts 
When the multilateral dealings of Turkey before and during the Cold War 
years are investigated, one factor outshines: the search for security of the Turkish 
state. In all of the regional multilateral initiatives that are going to be analyzed in this 
section, Turkey aimed to provide additional security for the country.  
Before the Second World War, there were two multilateral agreements, pacts 
that Turkey signed with its neighbors. The first one was „the Pact of Balkan 
Agreement (or the Balkan Entente)‟132 that was signed between Greece, Romania, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934. The Pact was the result of four 
consecutive multilateral conferences among Balkan countries that was held in Athens 
(1930), in Istanbul (1931), in Bucharest (1932) and in Thessaloniki (1933). During 
these conferences, various issues, starting with the conclusion of a pact that would 
guarantee the common borders and the pacific settlement of disputes, had been 
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discussed. For example, in the First Balkan Conference, organized with the 
participation of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, the 
participants agreed to create a Permanent Secretariat that would ease the 
establishment of Balkan Union by getting the Balkan nations closer in political, 
economic, social and cultural terms. Also, in the Third Balkan Conference, the 
Balkan states decided on the foundation of several institutions like Balkan Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, Balkan Bureau of Labor, Balkan Postal Union and even a 
Balkan Customs Union.
133
 The Pact of Balkan Agreement that was concluded only 
addressed the security aspect of the multilateral relations. According to William 
Hale: „Under the pact, the four states agreed that in the event of aggression against 
any of them, they would each guarantee the frontiers of the signatory state against the 
aggressor, and would consult to with one another in the event of any threat to peace 
in the region.‟134 However, other issues that were discussed during the conferences 
were not altogether put aside. With the signing of the Statute of Balkan Entente 
Organization in order to create the institutional mechanisms on November 2, 1934, a 
Council of Foreign Ministers that would meet twice a year, a Council of Economics 
and a Special Commission were set up.
135
 Although the institutionalization of the 
Pact had been obtained, the Balkan Entente did not live long and vanished with the 
start of the World War II.  
The importance of the Entente for Turkey was that it provided the easement 
of the worries of an attack that would come from the Balkans. In other words, the 
underlying motivation of the Turkish state in participating into the Balkan Entente 
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had been to secure its Balkan borders. Since the Turkish state was not allowed to 
remilitarize the Straits and the Thracian border according to the Lausanne Treaty, 
Turkey was almost defenseless in its Western borders. The regional context provided 
additional fuel to the Turkish concerns. To remind, right after the World War I, there 
were two divisions in the Balkans. On the one hand, there was pro-status quo camp 
including Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia, which gained territory at the end of 
World War I, and hence, adopted an anti-revisionist stance. On the other hand, there 
was the revisionist camp including Bulgaria and Hungary, which were unsatisfied 
with the territorial settlements of the First World War and tried to revise it in their 
favor. Also, Italy emerged as one of the revisionist states especially with Mussolini‟s 
coming to power. It was in such an environment that the Balkan Entente came out 
and helped Turkey feel a little bit more secure.  
The second multilateral undertaking of Turkish state in the interwar period 
was the Saadabad Pact. It was signed among Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey on 
July 8, 1937 in Tehran. It was the extension of a trilateral treaty among Iran, Iraq and 
Turkey that was concluded in Geneva in 1935. The Saadabad Pact was a non-
aggression and friendship agreement in its essence. Hale‟s explanation clearly shows 
this point: „This obliged four states to preserve their common frontiers, not to 
interfere in one another‟s internal affairs, to commit no aggression against one 
another‟s territory, and to consult together on all matters of common interest.‟136 
Similar to the Balkan Entente, this pact was also institutionalized with an additional 
protocol that established a Council of Ministers and a Secretariat General. However, 
the fate of Saadabad Pact also resembled to that of the Balkan Entente. With the start 
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of the World War II, the Saadabad Pact was neglected, albeit not formally dissolved 
until today.  
The rationale of states in coming together around the idea of a pact is argued 
to bring final solutions to the border disputes among its members.
137
 There were 
bilateral frontier problems between Iran-Turkey, Iran-Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq. Also, 
there was a trilateral Kurdish problem among Iran, Iraq and Turkey, that would turn 
into secessionist movements. Hence, with such a multilateral initiative, it can be 
argued that all of those disputes were aimed to be resolved permanently.  Mehmet 
Gönlübol and Cem Sar contend that Turkey became involved in this kind of a 
multilateral scheme due to the increasing Italian aggression that became crystallized 
with its attack on Ethiopia. In line with that claim, it can be argued that Turkey took 
part in, even initiated, the project in order to guarantee its eastern border in the case 
of an attack from Italy that would come from the Balkans. Whatever the true 
motivation of Turkish officials of the time had been, whether the fear of Kurdish 
secessionism and the fear of an external attack, it can be observed that Turkey had 
prioritized its security needs in this multilateral initiative.  
Two similar multilateral projects in the same geographical zones as the ones 
that were mentioned were also initialized in the 1950s as well. Although there was a 
different international system after two World War II, a bipolar one, the core logic of 
Turkish state in partaking the multilateral efforts around its environs has remained 
unchanged: to provide and maintain the security of the state. Although in the 
interwar years, the main threat to Turkey was emanating from the Balkans, Bulgaria 
and/or Italy, the centuries-old traditional threat to the Turkish state, and the Ottoman 
                                                             
137 Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. “1923-1939 Orta Doğu‟yla İlişkiler”, in Türk Dış 
Politikası Cilt 1, Baskın Oran, ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 367, and Hale. Turkish Foreign 
Policy, 1774-2000, 62. 
 61 
Empire, stemming from its northern neighbor re-emerged in the body of the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. However, an additional raison d‟être can be argued to 
play a substantial role in the initiatives of the 1950s. It was to prove beneficial to the 
Western alliance in order to get extra foreign economic aid and/or debt. It was the 
idea of the Menderes government that if Turkey participated in such multilateral 
dealings in order to expand the zone of security alliances against the Soviet threat, 
the value of the country in the Western eyes would increase, and, in turn, this would 
help the government find further foreign aid/debt from the Western countries.  
The first initiative emerged in the Balkans. On February 28, 1953 Greece, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia signed an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation in 
Ankara. According to this document, these three countries agreed upon cooperation 
in security, military matters (Articles 2 and 3) and in economic, technical and 
cultural domains (Article 4). They also decided on the peaceful settlement of disputes 
among them (Article 5). Moreover, it was concluded that foreign ministers of the 
respective states would meet once a year. In line with the last point, the first summit 
meeting of foreign ministers was held in Belgrade on 7 November 1953. At that 
meeting, it was determined that a Permanent Secretariat would be established, the 
ways of intensifying cooperation in military field would be investigated and a 
trilateral committee would be set up for economic cooperation. In this process of 
escalating cooperation among these states, the Agreement was turned into an alliance 
with the conclusion of the Balkan Defense Pact
138
 or the Agreement on Alliance, 
Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
139
 on 9 August 1954 in Bled, 
Yugoslavia by the very same states. It was Article 2 of the document that portrayed 
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the nature of alliance of that cooperation. According to that article, „an attack on any 
of the signatories would be counted as an attack on all of them and they would 
immediately take all measures, including the use of armed force, for their common 
defense‟.140 It was also stated in the Article 4 of the Pact that a Permanent Council 
composed of the parties‟ foreign ministers would meet twice annually on a regular 
basis. The multilateral cooperation was tried to be deepened at the intergovernmental 
level with the formation of a Permanent Assembly that was decided to be launched in 
the first meeting of the Permanent Council in March 1955. However, the changing 
international context, especially seen in the softening Soviet foreign policy towards 
Yugoslavia and Turkey with Stalin‟s death, and the rise of bilateral problems 
between Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus issue brought the end of the efforts of 
increasing multilateral cooperation. According to Gönlübol, the pact was officially 
dissolved in June 1960.
141
 For Fırat and Gönlübol, it was not very astonishing that 
the Pact could not survive for the time period it was envisaged, initially for 20 years, 
since the cooperation was interpreted differently by the signatories. Fırat asserts that 
there was a marked cleavage between Turkey and Yugoslavia on the principal areas 
of cooperation. While Turkey emphasized military cooperation more, Yugoslavia 
insisted on the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in other domains than the 
military.
142
 Gönlübol, also, agrees with this argument and provides the accounts of 
Yugoslav and Turkish government officials‟ speeches that proved the divergence of 
perceptions between the two signatories.
143
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The Baghdad Pact that was signed between Iraq and Turkey and enlarged 
with the inclusion of Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran later on was the second 
multilateral initiative in Turkish vicinity in the 1950s. It provided a multilateral 
defense system on the eastern borders of Turkey. The first indication of the Pact 
came with the signing of the bilateral Karachi Agreement between Turkey and 
Pakistan on 2 April 1954. It was mainly about the friendly cooperation between the 
signatories on the matters of economics and culture.
144
 Afterwards, on 24 February 
1955, Turkey and Iraq concluded the Agreement on Mutual Cooperation, also known 
as the Baghdad Pact, „for their mutual security and their defense‟145. Britain joined 
the Pact on 4 April, Pakistan on 23 September and Iran on 3 November 1955. With 
the reaching of 5 members, the Permanent Council, which was foreseen to be 
established in the Baghdad Pact, came together in late November 1955. According to 
the official statement published at the end of that meeting, it was decided that special 
permanent committees for military planning, economic planning and counter-
subversion would be set up.
146
 However, the Pact did not last long in its original form 
and was turned into Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in August 1959 with the 
formal withdrawal of Iraq from the pact as a result of the coup d‟état that occurred in 
July 1958. With the Iranian Revolution in 1979, CENTO, too, came to an end.  
It should be kept in mind that both of the initiatives, the Balkan Pact of 1954 
and the Baghdad Pact of 1955, were originally foreseen as defense structures like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Indeed, it is argued by some scholars 
that they were complementary regional institutions to NATO. Therefore, the main 
aim of them was to extend the defense mechanism of the West, i.e., NATO, to the 
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regions around Turkey. Seen in this perspective, it can be argued that the United 
States was the main architect of those structures. In spite of the fact that the USA 
never became an official member of those pacts, it is widely known that it staunchly 
supported these seemingly regional initiatives, especially the Baghdad Pact.  
 
3.3.1.1.2 Other Multilateral Dealings 
Even though Turkey‟s principal motive in joining multilateral formations had 
been to augment the security condition of state, Turkey has taken part in various 
multilateral enterprises prioritizing other issues in time. The multilateral economic 
relations, especially, gained more weight.  
 Despite the failure of the Baghdad Pact in terms of the defense system it 
aimed to create, three of CENTO members, i.e., Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, came 
together and found Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) on 21 July 1964. 
This organization aimed at speeding up the development of those countries and 
ensuring cooperation in domains like culture, communications, transportation, trade, 
tourism, banking and insurance.
147
 With the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which 
terminated the CENTO, the military forerunner of RCD, RCD did continue to exist at 
a dormant manner, but not officially dissolved. In 1985, it was transformed into 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).  
Another multilateral undertaking was initiated by Turkey in the early 1990s in 
the Black Sea region. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the communism 
sharply changed the geopolitical picture of the region. It is widely believed that the 
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disintegration of the Soviet Union has created a power vacuum in the Black Sea 
region. Therefore, the idea of creating an organization in order to contribute to the 
overall security and stability of the region has emerged. Such an idea was put 
forward for the first time in early 1990 by the Turkish ambassador to the USA during 
the 1980s, Şükrü Elekdağ, who is an MP from the Republican People‟s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, in Turkish) today. He stated that the original aim of the 
project was to provide the necessary conditions and institutional arrangements in 
order to improve and diversify the economic cooperation among the Black Sea 
countries.
148
 Various international summit meetings were convened subsequently, in 
Ankara in December 1990, in Bucharest in March 1991, in Sofia in April 1991 and in 
Moscow in July 1991. As a result, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Organization was formally established with a declaration published at the end of the 
Istanbul Summit on 25 June 1992. The signatories of the declaration were Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey 
and Ukraine. Later on, Serbia and Montenegro, also, applied for membership and 
became a member in 2003. 
The declaration creating the BSEC consisted of 18 articles. The important 
ones are: Articles 2, 3, and 4 emphasize the importance of democracy, human rights, 
economic prosperity, equality, geographical proximity and environmental problems 
for the BSEC. Article 5 focuses on the cooperation on economic field by stating the 
intention to create a Europe-wide economic area and to integrate the region to the 
world economy. Article 10 presents the gradual nature of economic cooperation. 
Articles 12 and 13 provide the cooperation fields and priority areas for the 
organization. Article 16 is about the financial matters and states the objective of 
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establishing a bank for trade and investment. Article 17 lays the basics of the 
institutional structure of the BSEC by stating the authority of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers.  
The Charter of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation was 
signed by the Heads of States or Governments of the eleven BSEC participating 
states in Yalta on 5 June 1998 and eventually entered into force on 1 May 1999.  
With the entry into force of the Charter, the BSEC officially became a “regional 
economic organization” with an international legal identity. It enabled to combine all 
the summit declarations and statements into a one structured document. It brought 
together and presented the objectives, areas of cooperation, principles, institutional 
and organizational structure, legal and financial provisions in a coherent manner. 
 
3.3.1.2 Peaceful Foreign Policy and Peace Promotion  
 Peaceful foreign policy has been one of the legacies of the Kemalist foreign 
policy. Apart from the implementation of peaceful methods such as diplomatic 
initiatives in its foreign relations, Turkish state has worked for the enlargement of the 
zone of peace, both regionally and internationally. 
The bilateral peace, friendship, neutrality agreements that Turkey signed with 
the countries in its vicinity can be argued to represent Turkish efforts of promoting 
peace. İsmail Soysal provides a rich account of the agreements that was concluded in 
the interwar years between Turkey and other states.
149
 Some of them include: the 
Agreement of Friendship and Settlement in 1925, the Agreement of Neutrality in 
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1929 with Bulgaria; the Agreement of Friendship and Security in 1926, the 
Agreement of Security, Neutrality and Non-aggression in 1932 with Iraq; the 
Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation in 1928 with Afghanistan; the Agreement 
of Friendship in 1937 with Egypt. 
Also, Turkish mediation initiatives for international disputes, conflicts can be 
considered as peace promotion. However, the number of such efforts conducted in 
the Cold War years is not very impressive. Ertuğrul Apakan, the Permanent 
Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, attributes this situation to the rigid 
nature of the international system during the Cold War in his speech at the UN last 
November.
150
 The limited cases of such attempts include: the arbitration efforts 
between Iran and Afghanistan for frontier disputes in 1934
151
; Turkish mediation 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 1956 over Pakhtunistan
152
; Turkish 
mediation efforts under Özal during the Iran-Iraq War153. The attempts of İsmail 
Cem, together with its Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, in bringing the 
Palestinians and Israelis on negotiation table in the late 1990s can also be added to 
Turkish mediation initiatives.
154
 
Turkey has also tried to promote peace by participating in the United Nations 
Peace Operations. Although the number of Turkish contribution to UN peacekeeping 
operations during the Cold War years is not more than only 1, starting with the 
1990s, Turkey actively took part in those operations especially carried out in the 
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regions adjacent to it.  According to Oğuzlu and Güngör, the first and the unique case 
of Turkish contribution during the Cold War was the UN military operation in Korea 
in 1950. In that article, Oğuzlu and Güngör provide a very useful background of 
Turkish participation in UN peace operations. According to the same article: 
Since 1988, Turkish armed forces have actively joined various peace 
operations with various observation functions: four UN, one OSCE, 
one regional peace operation with military observers and eight UN 
peace operations with military contingents. In summary these include 
the following operations:  
In the Balkans, Turkey participated in the UN Protection Force in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) in 1993-95, Implementation 
Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1996-present), Combined Police Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1995), UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (1995-
present), International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1997-present), Operation „Alba‟ in Albania (1997), Kosovo 
Verification Force (1998-99), and Kosovo Force (2001-present)… 
In the Middle East, Turkey contributed to the UN Iran-Iraq Military 
Observer Group (1998-91), the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
(1991-2003), Operation „Provide Comfort‟/ „Northern Watch‟ after 
the Gulf War of 1990-91 (1991-2003), and Temporary International 
Presence in Hebron in Israel-Palestine (1997-present 
In the Caucasus, Turkey has contributed to the UN Observer Mission 
in Georgia (1993-present) with five officers since the 21 October 1994 
within the framework of OSCE. Elsewhere, Turkey also participated 
in the UN Operation in Somalia (1992-94) and the UNMISET (United 
Nations Mission in Support East Timor) with two officers and 20 
policemen. ..
 155
 
 
Although Turkey has adopted a peaceful foreign policy towards its neighbors, 
its relations with the surrounding countries have not been free from problems, in 
which Turkey had to resort to force or threatened to do so from time to time. For 
                                                             
155 H. Tarık Oğuzlu and Uğur Güngör. “Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey‟s 
Security Policy”, Contemporary Security Policy, 27:3 (2006), 476-477. 
 69 
example, it is alleged that Turkish government under Menderes took up the idea of 
military interventions in Syria and Iraq in the late 1950s in the face of the communist 
takeovers in these countries, in spite of the fact that these thoughts were denied by 
the governmental officials several times.
156
 Moreover, during the crisis with Syria in 
1990s, due to the Syrian support for PKK, a terrorist organization with separatist 
claims, and the problems in the sharing of water from Euphrates and Tigris, Turkey 
used a hawkish rhetoric, including military threats to Syria if Turkish demands are 
not responded.
157
 
  However, the most prominent example of such an attitude is the notorious 
Cyprus dispute. According to Fuat Aksu, Turkey resorted to coercive diplomacy 
twice, during the problems in 1963-64 and in 1967, in the period leading up to the 
subsequent military intervention in 1974.
158
 It can be argued that although Turkey‟s 
actions were legal, since the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960 allows such 
activities, Turkey could not be able to defend its cause effectively in the international 
forum. On this matter, Aydın argues that: “The failure of its diplomatic efforts, 
begun in the 1960s, to gain support among Arab and non-aligned countries for its 
policies in Cyprus was strikingly displayed at the 1976 Colombo Conference of non-
aligned nations (as it had been at Lima in the previous year), while a UN General 
Assembly vote on a draft resolution on Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 
against Turkey, with 27 abstention.”159 It cannot be argued that the seemingly 
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aggressive attitude of Turkish state constitutes the sole reason behind the lack of 
support for Turkish stance regarding the Cyprus dispute. However, it can be claimed 
to show that military operations or other command strategies may portray countries‟ 
actions as illegitimate in the eyes of other states even if they are acting within the 
legal boundaries. 
 
3.3.1.3 Economic and Humanitarian Assistance 
 The Turkish tradition of providing economic and humanitarian assistance to 
the needy states has also started to be developed in the 1980s. Until that time, Turkey 
initiated bilateral aid programs to the countries requested help. The poor economic 
conditions of the country played the leading role in the paucity of the foreign aid 
provided by Turkey. It should be noted, here, that Turkey was one of the prominent 
aid-gatherer states especially from the United States of America in the immediate 
aftermath of the World War II. Turkey was in great need of foreign assistance. In this 
context, it could not be expected for Turkey to be a donor country. 
 Still however, Turkey tried to provide assistance to the countries in terms of 
technical and educational matters. For example, Turkey helped Afghanistan a great 
deal. Starting with the signing of an agreement on 1 March 1921, even before the 
official proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish-Afghan relations were mainly 
based on the Turkish cultural and technical aid.
160
 According to the Article 8 of that 
agreement, Turkey has undertaken the responsibility to assist Afghanistan in cultural 
domain and to send teachers and military officers there.
161
 Similar marks can also be 
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found in the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Turkey and 
Afghanistan signed in 1928. This kind of Turkish assistance efforts has been 
multiplied since 1980s. For instance, Turkish military officers were sent to Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait in order to train those countries‟ armies after the conclusion of an 
agreement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in February 1984.
162
 In the 1990s, 
Turkey expanded the area of its educational assistance to the states in the Balkans. 
After the Dayton Peace Agreement that halted the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
1995, Turkey took part in the train and equip program and started to educate the 
Bosnian military personnel in 1996.
163
 A military education program was also 
initiated with Albania. In that program, almost 600 Albanian military personnel were 
trained in Turkey.
164
 
 Apart from the technical and educational aid activities, Turkey started to be 
involved in economic assistance initiatives in the mid-1980s. In the article written by 
Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, it is stated that: „Turkey started its aid activities 
on 5 June 1985 when it prepared a comprehensive aid package worth $10 million to 
the Sahel countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Niger and Chad) under the 
coordination of Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization of Turkey (SPO)‟.165 
However, Turkish economic assistance efforts boomed in the period after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of Turkic Republics in 
the Caucasus and the Central Asia. According to Aydın, Turkey aiming to have 
economic and political influence through trade relations and foreign aid in the region 
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wanted to be the leading foreign aid country in the years 1991-1993.
166
 In this 
context, Turkey started to provide huge amounts of economic aid and to give credits 
to those republics. For instance, according to a report prepared by the State Planning 
Organization in 1998, Turkish bilateral aid between the years 1992-1996 is almost 
1.9 billion USD and 86.4 per cent of this amount was given to Turkic Republics.
167
 
In terms of the credits, Turkey, via the Turkish Eximbank
168
, extended a total of 
1,203.26 million USD to those countries until 2000.
169
 The establishment of the 
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) under the 
Foreign Ministry on 24 January 1992 provided the institutional mechanism for 
Turkish foreign aid. In another article, Hakan Fidan summarizes the responsibilities 
of TIKA as such: „TIKA‟s primary duty was to coordinate Turkey‟s cooperation with 
the Turkic Republics in the fields of economics, education, culture, art, history, 
research, language and alphabet, ethnography, tourism, administration, justice, 
security, communication, environment, science and technology.‟170 In 1999, TIKA 
was attached to the Prime Ministry and began to play a substantial role in planning 
and coordinating Turkish development assistance activities in the neighboring 
regions.  
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3.3.2 Brilliance 
Brilliance means the achievements of a country in terms of politics, 
economics, military, science and technology. For Vuving, „it generates soft power 
through the production of admiration.‟171 If a country is perceived by others 
successful, then, those countries try to emulate the successes of that country by 
adopting the strategies, policies implemented by it in order to achieve the level of 
development of that country. In other words, other states‟ perception of the 
accomplishments of a country and their inclination to draw lessons from the story of 
that country composes the basis of the brilliance. According to Vuving, „a strong and 
awesome military, a wealthy and vibrant economy, a rich and radiant culture, and a 
peaceful and well-run society are manifestations of brilliance‟.172 In line with the 
explanations of Vuving concerning the manifestations of brilliance, the extent of 
Turkish soft power on the eyes of other states will be analyzed under the headings: 
the economic development, the political maturity and the military strength. 
 
3.3.2.1 Economic Development 
 The economic situation of the Turkey was not pleasant in the first years of the 
Republic. The country just got out of a series of wars. The Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913, the World War I that lasted from 1914 to 1918, and the subsequent War of 
Independence between 1919 and 1923 further deteriorated the economic conditions 
in the country. There was no private sector able to invest in the resurrection and the 
development of the state economically. Therefore, the state took the upper hand and 
tried to achieve economic development through the public sector under the policy of 
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statism/étatism especially with the 1930s. On that matter, Halil Erdemir writes as 
such: 
As a result of the neutrality policy which followed the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923, and the lack of private capital and investments, the 
Turkish authorities had to pursue a statist economic policy for 
structural and industrial investments for rapid development of the 
newly established state over the next three decades.
173
 
 
Starting with the 1950s, Turkish economy was based on foreign aid and 
debts. Moreover, the industrial development of the country could not be achieved. In 
the 1960s, Turkey turned back to economic planning with the establishment of State 
Planning Organization in 1960. In those years, Turkish economy recovered from the 
negative effects of the previous era to some extent. However, the oil crisis in 1973 
and the Cyprus intervention in 1974, together with the domestic political instabilities, 
damaged seriously the improving economy. In the 1980s, Turkish economy 
underwent a great transformation with the January 24
th
 Economic Austerity 
Measures, and from then on, started to be integrated into the global economy. 
As it can be observed from this very brief Turkish economic history, Turkey 
could not be perceived as successful in economic terms. Still however, there are 
several aspects of Turkish economic situation appreciated by other states. The first of 
these aspects is that Turkey achieved to get rid of capitulations that put a significant 
burden on the Ottoman economy. It was with Article 28 of the Treaty of Lausanne 
that capitulations were eventually lifted. This created a hope for other colonized 
people. The second one is the gradual transformation of the economy into the free 
market in the 1980s. Especially after the emergence of independent Turkic states in 
the early 1990s, Turkey started to be presented as a model for those republics in 
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economic terms. It was stated that those newly-independent states could look for 
Turkish example and transform their planned economies into free market economies. 
Mario Zucconi writes by giving an indigenous declaration as an example:  
As a cultural kin, and due to its more advanced stage of economic 
development and integration with the industrial West, Turkey was 
looked upon as an important model of development by the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia (four of the five republics are Turkic, 
together with Azerbaijan in the Caucasus; four are mostly Muslim) as 
the Cold War ended and the USSR came apart. “I announce to the 
world that my country will go forward by the Turkish route,” 
Uzbekistan‟s President Islam Karimov announced the very day of the 
formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 
1991.
174
 
 
The declarations of US officials, also, deserve being mentioned in this regard. 
For example, as cited by Hale: „Meanwhile, during a trip to several capitals in the 
region (Central Asia), the US Secretary of State James Baker urged the new 
republics to adopt the „Turkish model‟ of economic and political development.‟175 
 
3.3.2.2 Political Maturity 
Turkey was established as a republic and the rule of people, popular 
sovereignty was put forward as a fundamental principle of Turkish state from its 
inception. However, Turkey has not been recognized as a stable political entity due 
to a number of factors, despite the establishment of democracy. On this matter, 
Mohapatra writes that:  
                                                             
174 Mario Zucconi. “The Impact of the EU Connection on Turkey's Domestic and Foreign Policy”, 
Turkish Studies, 10:1 (2009), 31. 
175 Hale. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, 291 
 76 
While the Arabs ridicule Turkey‟s democracy as a complete farce and 
a „democracy of tanks‟, Western critics harp on its illiberal character 
reflected in the absence of democratic political culture, high level of 
human rights abuse and denial of cultural liberties to the minority 
Kurds.
176
 
 
The first factor constituting such an imagination of Turkish political and 
democratic immaturity was the continuation of the one-party rule till 1946. Although 
several attempts were made in transiting the political arena to multi-party system in 
the 1920s and 1930s, all of these initiatives could not succeed due to the fragile 
political conditions of the country. The Progressive Republican Party, the second 
political party in Turkey that was established on 17 October 1924, was closed after 
the Sheikh Said rebellion. The Free Republican Party or the Liberal Republican 
Party, also, was established in the August 1930 and gained popularity in a short 
period of time. However, when it was realized that the party became the point of 
gathering for the conservative opponents, it was dissolved by its founder in 
November 1930. Therefore, the inability of such efforts for transition to multi-party 
democracy in Turkey further strengthened the one party rule of the Republican 
People‟s Party. Turkey had to wait until 1950s in order to achieve a truly multi-party 
system.  
The second factor of weakness of Turkish political system was the 
interruptions to the democratic rule. Turkey witnessed three military interventions in 
the years 1960, 1971 and 1980. Apart from the military coup d‟état on 27 May 1960, 
the others, but especially the last military intervention in 1980, created huge 
problems for the delicate democracy in Turkey. Furthermore, the influence of 
military in Turkish political sphere has been put forward as one of the obstacles in 
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front of further democratization of the country by several circles inside and outside 
Turkey. At the same time, the abundance of short-lived coalition governments in 
Turkish political history can be shown as the sign of an unstable political 
environment in Turkey. The analysis of Mustafa Aydın can be mentioned in this 
context. He argues that: 
[In the 1970s], As far as foreign relations were concerned, increasing 
political and social instability generated by political violence and 
terrorism seriously damaged Turkey's image in the world at a time 
when Turkey was in great need of economic and political support.
177
 
 
The last factor contributing to the Turkish political immaturity concerns the 
increasing ethnic problems. The rise of Kurdish nationalism in mid-1980s has 
provided additional troubles for the Turkish political weaknesses. The inability to 
solve this problem through political means and the transformation of the problem 
into violence, armed struggles has been regarded as the symptoms showing the 
underdevelopment of Turkish political life. The remarks of Aydın and Ismael can be 
mentioned in this context. They write that: 
As long as Turkey is not full control of domestic situation, freedom of 
movement in foreign and security politics will be subjected to and 
limited by requirements of Kurdish issue. Also, it is quite obvious that 
a country with such a domestic problem could not convincingly claim 
to be a role model for stability and democratic-liberalism to anyone.
178
 
 
In the light of these factors, it would be hard to expect Turkey to attract less 
politically developed countries to follow the Turkish example. Nevertheless, Turkey 
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was portrayed as a „model country‟ in the early 1990s especially for the countries 
gaining their independence from the Soviet Union. For this issue, Kirişçi writes that: 
…it was not surprising that the Economist in December 1991 declared 
Turkey to be the „Star of Islam‟ and presented Turkey with its 
democracy, secular form of government and liberal market economy 
as a „prototype‟ to be emulated by the newly independent states of 
former Soviet Union.
179
 
 
3.3.2.3 Military Strength 
 The military awesomeness can be argued to represent the only domain in 
which Turkey gets the attraction of other states right from the establishment of the 
republic. The attainment of independence against the imperialist powers made 
Turkish War of Independence as one of the first examples of anti-colonial struggles. 
Therefore, the victory set in motion by Turkish Army led by Mustafa Kemal during 
the War of Independence may be claimed to inspire other states dreaming of their 
own political independence. On this issue, Sandıklı writes that:  
We attribute this influence primarily to the fact that the struggle he 
(Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) gave aroused the hope for independence and 
freedom in nations oppressed by Western imperialism and 
colonialism. The extent of the impact in the Muslim world from 
Morocco to Indonesia and many African countries was not clear at the 
beginning. But as these countries achieved their independence, they 
expressed their admiration for Atatürk. The statements of Bourghiba 
in Tunis, of the members of the Young Officers Movement in Egypt 
which put an end to the kingdom in 1952, and of Sukarno of Indonesia 
are examples of such admiration nourished secretly. 
180
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 In a similar vein, Meliha Benli Altunışık asserts that:  
Turkey was considered as a model in the Islamic world in the early 
twentieth century for it was the only successor state of the Ottoman 
Empire, which "succeeded in rebuffing the newly emerging 
international system, and in fashioning its own destiny".
181
 
 
 In another article, Altunışık clarifies her point by writing that: 
After all, unlike the other countries of the region, Turkey was born out 
of a determination not to accept the post-WW I settlement that was 
imposed on it by the winners of the war. Turkey‟s war of 
independence was closely monitored by nationalists in different parts 
of the Arab world, who were formulating their own plans for 
independence.
182
 
 
The military education programs mentioned above can also be asserted to 
illustrate the Turkish military strength and other countries‟ motivation to learn from 
Turkish experience in the military domain. To remind briefly, Turkey educated and 
trained Afghan, Saudi Arabian, Bosnian and Albanian military personnel. 
 Also, the participation of Turkish military in the peace operations conducted 
under the leadership of the United Nations could be seen as a sign of Turkish 
brilliance in terms of military matters.  
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3.3.3 Beauty 
 Beauty corresponds to the values, norms that are embraced and advocated by 
a state in its internal and external relations, and the appealing nature of such values to 
the other countries. As Vuving argues, it „generates soft power through the 
production of inspiration‟.183 The conduct of domestic policies on normative 
principles and the promotion of those values, such as liberal democracy, in foreign 
relations and the conduct of foreign policy through international institutions and 
organizations are projections of beauty, and therefore soft power, according to 
Vuving.
184
 In other words, if a country takes into account the prevailing norms of the 
international society in its dealings with its own citizens and its international 
relations, and if it works for the spread of those of values to the other countries, then, 
it can be argued to have soft power in terms of beauty. The functioning of domestic 
institutions on universal principles, the upholding of such values in the 
implementation phase of the foreign policies generates beauty in the perceptions of 
other states. In addition to the original formulation of beauty by Vuving, the 
popularity of a country‟s culture can be argued to form another basis of that power 
currency. The images that are displayed by the cultural products of a country can 
contribute to the understanding of that country in others positively. These kinds of 
cultural assets can help create familiarity with and awareness of that culture on the 
side of audience by giving various clues about the domestic values and the lifestyle 
of that country. Therefore, the Turkish case in terms of beauty will be explored under 
two headings: The adherence to universal values in domestic and foreign policies and 
the popularity of Turkish culture abroad. 
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3.3.3.1 Adherence to Universal Values 
 Turkey having situated its domestic politics predominantly on the Western 
model is expected to conduct its domestic and foreign policies according to the 
principles championed by the Western world. Although the foreign policies seem to 
be less problematic in terms of the application of such values and principles, there 
are serious problems on the realization of those values in the domestic sphere 
especially. According to Ramazan Gözen, Turkey did not fully succeed in the 
adoption of the civilized norms and values embraced by the West, or even by the 
whole world.
185
 He develops his argument by writing that:  
If examined more tangibly: a real and truly democratic order could not 
be established, because the democratic processes, which are 
intrinsically civil/civic, participatory, based on popular will and stable, 
i.e., the principles of democracy, considered as the touchstones of 
contemporary civilization was not/could not be operated….a free and 
pluralist democratic order could not be established…the system of 
human rights and freedoms could not be built.
186
 
 
3.3.3.1.1 Domestic Policies and Institutions 
 The inabilities of Turkey in achieving a smooth transition to the multi-party 
democracy and the late achievement of a truly liberal economy have been mentioned 
in the brilliance section. Hence, the domestic issues other than those such as human 
rights, multiculturalism, and secularism in the light of the civil-military relations will 
be explored in this section. 
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It can be argued that these issues came to the fore with the airing of a 
“Turkish model” right after the end of the Cold War by the United States officials.187 
However, there remained serious obstacles in front of the projection of the „Turkish 
model‟ concerning the issues mentioned above. These issues can be summarized well 
by quoting from Ziya Öniş‟s article. He writes that:  
During the early 1990s, Turkey had the potential to present itself as a 
model of multiculturalism and a secular version of Islam. 
Nevertheless, the country‟s democratic deficits, particularly as 
reflected in its inability to extend democratic rights to its own 
minorities, effectively meant that its potential as a role model could 
not be realized in practice. Furthermore, the democratic deficit also 
manifested itself as a rather rigid form of secularism that effectively 
failed to incorporate the demands for religious freedoms on the part of 
the more liberal Islamist groups. Both of these aspects have reduced 
the attractiveness of Turkey as a model of multiculturalism both for 
the West and the Islamic world.
188
 
 
 The first issue that has been creating troubles for Turkey is the respect for 
human rights. Although the Turkish Constitution of 1961 provided the most liberal 
and democratic system in Turkey respecting the human rights almost fully, especially 
with the worsening political conditions of the 1970s and the military coup in 1980, 
Turkey has been started to be accused of committing human rights violations by 
West, to a great extent by the European Council, European Community/Union, and 
to a lesser extent by the United States. According to Gökçen Alpkaya, Turkey carried 
the title of „Violator of Human Rights‟ in the 1980s.189 It was the suppressive rule of 
the military regime that suspended democracy and resorted to violent means with the 
purpose of restoring the domestic order. Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution, which 
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was prepared under the supervision of that military regime, helped the anti-
democratic practices become embedded in Turkish political life. For Oran, the 1982 
Constitution was based on the limitation of societal and individual rights against the 
state and the government.
190
 Although Turkey turned to democratic rule, albeit 
limited, in three years time with the holding of general elections on 6 November 
1983, the problems regarding the human rights abuses continued to exist as an 
important agenda item of Turkish foreign relations.  
The deterioration of the Kurdish problem and the internationalization of that 
issue also coincided with that period. The negligence in searching for the root causes 
of the problem and the perception of the problem only from the perspective of PKK 
terrorism required military measures to be implemented instead of working to 
ameliorate the living conditions of the population in the southeastern Turkey. Under 
these circumstances, Turkey was criticized for not respecting the minority rights of 
the Kurds. The restrictions on the use of Kurdish language put forth by the 1982 
Constitution and the Law on the Fight against Terrorism entering into force on 12 
April 1991 were the sources of such critiques.  
Although there were several improvements initiated in the same period such 
as the vesting the right of individual application to the European Commission of 
Human Rights in 1987, the ratification of European Social Charter in 1989, the 
establishment of the Human Rights Inquiry Committee in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly in 1990, Turkey could not have been viewed as a country 
respecting enough individual, societal and minority rights in the period up to 2002.  
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The third issue concerns the role of military in Turkish politics. As mentioned 
before, Turkish Army intervened in Turkish political life three times in the years 
1960 and 1980 with coup d‟états, in 1971 with a memorandum. The role of the army 
was first ensured with the establishment of the National Security Council in line with 
the 1961 constitution. However, the National Security Council was criticized as 
unbalancing the civil-military relations in Turkey. Consequently, Turkey has been 
forced by the European states in order to restore the civil-military balances in favor 
of civilian rule by either reforming or dissolving the Council.  
Turkey, on the other hand, was successful in achieving gender equality in 
political life. Even before many of the European states, such as France, Italy and 
Switzerland, Turkish women had acquired the right to elect and to be elected.  
Therefore, it will not be wrong to argue that Turkey has failed to uphold the 
universal values in practice to a great extent, in spite of the fact that these values are 
accepted in principle. The poor record of Turkish state in human rights conditions, in 
providing a political solution to the Kurdish problem and in sustaining the civil-
military balances can be claimed to portray the failure of Turkey in complying with 
the universal norms starting with the 1980s.  
 
3.3.3.1.2 Foreign Policies and Institutions 
 In stark contrast to the inabilities in observing universal norms in Turkish 
domestic politics, the foreign policy of the Turkish state can be argued to be bound 
by common values and practices. For example, Turkey has abstained from 
intervention in matters under the domestic jurisdiction of other states, which shows 
that Turkish state respects to the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-
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intervention. Similarly, the priority of peaceful means in the resolution of disputes, 
rather than unilateral coercive practices, constitutes another domain where Turkey 
advocates a universal value. The signing of bilateral friendship and non-aggression 
agreements with a number of countries also provides another instance of the 
prevalence of the norm of peace in Turkish foreign policy. The multilateralism can 
also be claimed to be a value championed by Turkish state. Instead of unilateral 
initiatives, Turkey prefers multilateral efforts. Even before the unilateral military 
intervention launched by the Turkish military on the Cyprus Island in 1974, Turkish 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit had gone to London in order to convince the British 
government for a multilateral intervention. This can be cited as the most important 
signifier of the multilateral approach adopted by Turkey. The Turkish insistence on a 
multilateral intervention in the Bosnian War can also be considered another case of 
Turkish multilateralism. Turkey has, also, worked for the spread of universal values 
like democracy, liberal economy by creating multilateral institutions. The 
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation can be cited as the most 
significant initiative of Turkey in this regard. Within the framework of this 
organization, Turkey has aimed to consolidate democratic structures in those states 
and to integrate them into the global economic.  
 
3.3.3.2 Popularity of Turkish Culture 
 The cultural domain may be claimed to constitute the area where the state 
organs have the least control in terms of soft power production. Nonetheless, the 
states can be involved in the distribution of various TV programs, educational 
leaflets, movies in order to send positive images of the country to the outside world. 
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It is hard to estimate the real influence of the cultural assets on the production of 
attraction, inspiration, admiration. It can be achieved through the conduct of several 
public polls. However, there is found no data on the popularity of Turkish culture for 
the years between 1923 and 2002.  
However, the linguistic initiatives can be mentioned in this context. The 
emergence of Turkic republics in the former Soviet Union lands with similar 
linguistic characteristics to Turkish language provided another avenue to increase 
Turkish influence in that region. For this reason, Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation (TRT) established a channel to be broadcasted in the former Soviet 
Union republics in 1992 named as „TRT Eurasia‟. Also, a common Turkic alphabet 
consisting of 34 letters was created and adopted by the Alphabet-Spelling 
Conference organized by TIKA on 8-10 March 1993.
191
 
 
3.4 Analysis 
 In general, it can be concluded that Turkish state during the period up to 2002 
has some degree of soft power. The main determinants of traditional Turkish foreign 
policy and the principles emerging from that broad setting can be claimed to play a 
substantial role in the production of Turkish soft power in the eyes of other states and 
in the execution of soft power strategies by Turkish Republic in its international 
relations. For example, the adoption of a relatively peaceful foreign policy attitude 
towards other countries, the adherence to legal means in the resolution of conflicts in 
most cases, the inception of several multilateral initiatives, the mediation efforts that 
are mentioned in the „benignity‟ section can be argued to represent the soft power 
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strategies that Turkey has implemented. In this regard, Turkey can be perceived as 
fairly successful in the adoption of soft power strategies in its foreign relations. On 
the other hand, in terms of the „brilliance‟ and „beauty‟, Turkey can be said to show 
symptoms of failure when the low level of economic and political development 
hampered by various internal problems is taken into account, despite the popularity 
of Turkish example, i.e., „Turkish model‟, in its neighborhood during the early 
periods of the Republic and the early 1990s. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SOFT POWER IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE 
AKP GOVERNMENTS: 2002-2009 
 
 
 This chapter will examine the soft power character of Turkish foreign policy 
that was conducted under the three successive AKP governments
192
 between the 
years 2002 and 2009. Like in the previous one, this chapter does not attempt to 
provide a chronological account of Turkish foreign policy between those years, but 
to search for the soft power elements found in Turkish foreign policy according to 
the theoretical scheme provided in the related chapter. The chapter begins with the 
foreign policy understanding of the AKP. In this section, the concept of „strategic 
depth‟ suggested by Ahmet Davutoğlu, which was considered as the backbone of the 
AKP‟s foreign policy approach, the party program, the election manifestos and the 
governmental programs that were declared by the AKP officials, and the principles 
of AKP‟s foreign policy outlook will be elaborated on. The foreign policy initiatives 
and activities of Turkey under the AKP governments will be examined in the light of 
the soft power theory presented in the concerning chapter.  
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4.1 Foreign Policy Understanding of the AKP and AKP Governments 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs193, has generally been 
regarded as the main architect of the foreign policy of the AKP. Having an academic 
background,
194
 Davutoğlu can be argued to provide the theoretical basis for the 
foreign policy understanding of the AKP with its seminal work „Stratejik Derinlik: 
Türkiye‟nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey‟s International Position)‟ 
which was published in 2001. Therefore, it is better to summarize the main points 
that Davutoğlu presents in his book in order to provide the general framework taking 
part in the shape of AKP‟s foreign policy.  
 
4.1.1 Strategic Depth Doctrine 
 
4.1.1.1 Origins 
The book written by Davutoğlu consists of three main parts. The first part 
presents the conceptual and historical framework. In the sections comprising the first 
chapter, Davutoğlu deals with the issues of the conception of power and the 
historical depth mainly. Davutoğlu begins his book with a new power conception. 
According to him, there are two kinds of parameters of power: the constant 
parameters (CP): history, geography, population and culture; and the potential 
parameters (PP): economic, technical and military capabilities. Also, strategic 
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mentality (SM), strategic planning (SP) and political will (PW) affect the power of a 
country in his conception. With the combination of these elements, Davutoğlu argues 
that the power of a country can be shown with the following formula: “Power = 
(CP+PP) x (SMxSPxPW)”195 
Afterwards, Davutoğlu looks at the prior power conceptions of Turkey, and 
argues that Turkish power has been calculated in an erroneous manner mainly due to 
the lack of a strategic theory. He presents the reasons of the lack by looking at three 
dimensions: the institutional and structural background, mainly the problems in the 
foreign policy making process; the historical background, the problems caused by the 
stark contrasts between the foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic; and the psychological background, the problems related to the self-
identification of Turkish state. It can be deduced from Davutoğlu‟s book that  the 
problems found in these areas/backgrounds has hindered the development of a 
strategic theory that would correctly evaluate the power of Turkey and help Turkey 
position itself properly in the international stage. 
In the light of his power conception and the lack of a strategic theory in 
Turkey, Davutoğlu tries to portray the international position of Turkey in a historical 
order, where he puts forward the concept of the „historical depth‟ of Turkey. 
According to him, the historical background is the fundamental determinant of a 
society‟s position in the temporal dimension.196 Therefore, Davutoğlu traces the issue 
back to the Ottoman era and tries to assess the process of international positioning of 
the current Turkish state from that time till the early 2000s. Davutoğlu pays special 
attention to the end of the Cold War in that historical process. According to him, the 
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post-Cold War era brought together an enormous scaling up in the dynamic 
framework and the fact that Turkey has found itself psychologically and strategically 
unprepared against the global and regional scaling up necessitates the redefinition of 
Turkey‟s international position and the readjustment of its cultural, geographical, 
economic, political and strategic parameters according to this redefinition.
197
 Then, 
Davutoğlu examines the external and internal parameters of international position in 
the post-Cold War period. It can be said that the external parameters of the 
international position, which allows for “a large field of action/movement for the 
countries trying to level up in the „categorization of states‟198”,199 and the domestic 
parameters of the international position
200
, which basically means the revival of the 
past for claiming a central role for Turkey in its neighborhood, have played an 
important role in showing the historical depth of Turkey in terms of the redefinition 
of its position. 
In the concluding section of the chapter, Davutoğlu criticizes the present-day 
interpretation of the historical depth of Turkish state and gives some clues about the 
possible positive outcomes of an eventual re-interpretation of it. On that issue, 
Davutoğlu writes that:  
The formation of a unilateral and uniaxial (with one axis only) 
domestic political culture and a related foreign policy making prevents 
Turkey from developing a political and diplomatic attitude which is 
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able to adjust itself to different scenarios and to realize the value of 
Turkey‟s multi-directional historical accumulation of experience. 
Such a uniaxial approach, which is devoid of a vision open to all kinds 
of alternatives, strategic decisiveness and tactical flexibility, neither 
perceives the shifts of axis in the international relations in a timely 
manner, nor utilizes the advantages that will elevate Turkey into a 
position of a country which is influential in its region and has a weight 
in international politics from that of an ordinary state in the region, 
which the big powers see as a passive element of their tactical 
objectives.
201
 
 
In the second chapter of the book, Davutoğlu presents the geographical 
framework. He examines the geopolitical theories present in the literature, criticizes 
the inability of Turkish state in making use of its geopolitical situation properly 
despite the extensive use of geopolitical rhetoric, and provides a new geopolitical 
theory for Turkish foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu, the Turkish geopolitical 
understanding is too narrow and static due to the lack of dynamic reinterpretations in 
different periods
202
, and the post-Cold War era is one of these periods that requires a 
re-interpretation of Turkey‟s geopolitics. One of the significant points made by 
Davutoğlu is that “geopolitical position is not an asset itself, but turns into one when 
it becomes an effective instrument of a foreign policy strategy set forth in a 
convenient manner with this position”203. In line with this understanding, Davutoğlu 
maintains that “the geopolitical position (of Turkey) shall no longer be seen as a 
means of a strategy of the maintenance of the status-quo led by the impulse of the 
protection of the borders. On the contrary, this geopolitical position should be seen as 
a tool for a gradual opening to the world and the conversion of regional influence 
into a global one.
204
 As a result of this new geopolitical approach, the Turkish 
foreign policy strategy for the 21
st
 century is summarized by Davutoğlu as such: “the 
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reorganization of the relations with the power centers in an alternative manner and 
the formation of a hinterland with which the long term cultural, economic and 
political bonds are reinforced, consolidated.”205 
Davutoğlu defines three geopolitical zones of influence, hinterlands as the 
geopolitical basis of the Turkish foreign policy strategy aimed at strengthening its 
global position. These hinterlands are contiguous land basin, consisting of the 
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus; the maritime basin, comprised of the 
Black, Eastern Mediterranean, Caspian seas and the Persian Gulf; the continental 
basin, including the Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Middle and East Asia.  
In order to briefly mention about Davutoğlu‟s thinking related to these areas, 
it can be said that he proposes a progressive approach starting from the neighboring 
regions to the global sphere. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey is an indivisible part of 
its contiguous land basin both historically and geographically and Turkey‟s 
international position will be bound to its influence and performance in this 
hinterland.
206
 Therefore, Davutoğlu asserts that “Turkey‟s regional influence depends 
on reorganization of its relations with its neighbors, because it is impossible for a 
state having continuous crises with its land neighbors to generate regional and global 
policies”207. Davutoğlu also makes several policy recommendations. For example, 
Davutoğlu writes that: “Turkey, on the one hand, should pioneer regional security 
and cooperation endeavors in its contiguous land basin and, on the other hand, should 
take steps that will reinforce the interdependency on economic and cultural fields.”208 
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For the maritime basin, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey does not have any 
long-term and well-coordinated seas and water routes strategy despite being 
surrounded by 3 seas and situated at the crossroads of water routes, inland seas and 
gulfs.
209
 For the Black Sea basin, Davutoğlu suggests that the Black Sea should be 
seen as a gateway to East and North Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia and that 
the transportation policies which would connect Eastern Europe and the Asian 
steppes to the Middle East and Indian Ocean should be devised
210
. For the Straits, 
which he defines as the strategic knot of the Afro-Eurasian mainland, Davutoğlu 
argues that Turkey should develop a flexible diplomatic method and strengthen the 
legitimate/legal basis of its control over the Straits.
211
 In terms of the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin, which includes the most troublesome maritime relations of 
Turkey, i.e., the Aegean problems and the Cyprus question, Davutoğlu argues for a 
pro-active and offensive policy emphasizing the linkages of the Aegean Sea with 
other maritime basins and adopting a comprehensive approach to the Cyprus dispute. 
The Persian Gulf and the Indian basin are significant in terms of “transforming 
Turkey‟s regional influence into continental one”212 in the Davutoğlu‟s framework. 
Lastly, “the Caspian basin is the key maritime basin for Turkish openings to the 
Central Asia”213, Davutoğlu writes. He argues for “three fundamental tactical 
principles for Turkey‟s Caucasus-Caspian-Central Asia policy of linkage: to 
strengthen the status of North Caucasian states within the Russian Federation in 
order to provide the connection between the Caspian and Black seas; to revive and 
strengthen the relations with Iran in a dynamic and rational economic cooperation 
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scheme to counterbalance Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus; to 
promote all kinds of cooperation among the Central Asian states.”214 
The continental basin, made up of the Europe, North Africa, South Asia, 
Middle and East Asia, constitutes the last element of Davutoğlu‟s geographical 
framework. According to Davutoğlu, identifying continental basin for Turkey will 
determine the continental connections providing the transitivity between the 
regional-scale and global-scale policies.
215
 Davutoğlu also maintains that “the 
making of a new continental basin definition by Turkey provides an essential 
alternative to the Turkish foreign policy settlement which has a peripheral role in the 
European system. A country like Turkey cannot look for a unidirectional, one-sided 
international position.”216  
In the third main chapter, Davutoğlu deals with the implementation of the 
broad conceptual and theoretical understanding provided in the previous chapters by 
focusing on the strategic instruments, i.e., the international and regional 
organizations, and the regional policies for the Balkans, the Middle East, the Central 
Asia and the Europe. When examined in detail, it can be recognized that this chapter 
gives specific policy prescriptions for Turkish foreign policy regarding these 
organizations and areas. According to Davutoğlu, “Turkey should revise its foreign 
policy instruments based on the alliance relationships which it developed within the 
specific conditions of the Cold War and the instruments gaining prominence in the 
post-Cold War era in a strategically integrated way that takes into account the 
transformations these instruments have undergone in the dynamic international 
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conjuncture”217. Therefore, Davutoğlu elaborates on Turkey‟s relations with the 
NATO, OSCE, OIC, ECO, BSEC, D-8 and G-20 and evaluates the current state of 
relations together with providing some road-maps for Turkey on its way to increase 
its regional and global influence. The last point is also relevant for the sections of the 
book dealing with the Turkey‟s foreign policies in the neighboring regions in depth. 
The main argument of these sections can be argued that Turkey should have a grand 
strategy aiming at creating a sphere of influence in order to become a truly global 
power which should be devised according to the specific sensitivities, problems and 
advantages of the respective regions and the interactions between them. 
 
4.1.1.2 Interpretations of the Strategic Depth 
 It can be argued that the concept of „the strategic depth‟ coined by Davutoğlu 
has become too popular both in the national and international academia, as well as in 
political circles. Therefore, it is important to consider the ways it is perceived and 
interpreted for clearly presenting the foreign policy approach of the AKP.  
 Although the term was coined and comprehensively presented by Davutoğlu 
in 2001, many scholars argue that Turkey has entered into a process of awareness 
about its depth in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The Turkish foreign 
policy during Özal period, for instance, is argued to form the basis of the current 
foreign policy of AKP. On this issue Rabasa and Larrabee writes that:  
This process of broadening and deepening Turkey‟s ties to areas 
beyond the West began well before the AKP came to power. Under 
Ozal, for instance, Turkey made a concerted effort to establish closer 
ties to Central Asia. But efforts to expand Turkey‟s ties to areas where 
it has had strong historical and cultural ties have gained greater 
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impetus under the AKP and have been heavily influenced by the 
doctrine of Strategic Depth, a concept developed by Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, a Turkish academic who became Erdoğan‟s chief foreign-
policy advisor after the AKP won the November 2002 elections.
218
 
 
Many of the scholars interviewed by USAK (Uluslararası Stratejik 
Araştırmalar Kurumu, in English, the International Strategic Research Organization) 
also maintain similar arguments. For example, Şaban Çalış says that: “We should 
admit that the AKP‟s foreign policy understanding, at least in some domains, shows 
parallelism with the foreign policy that Özal tried to conduct”219. Mustafa Türkeş 
asserts that “the AKP reproduces and implements the policies of the Özal period” 
and there is continuity between these two periods.
220
 Similar statements can be found 
in the interviews with other academics, such as Tayyar Arı, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Ersel 
Aydınlı, Kamer Kasım, etc., throughout the books published by the USAK.221 
Meliha Benli Altunışık argues that İsmail Cem, who served as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 1997 to 2002, the period just before AKP‟s term, has also 
mentioned about the depths of Turkish state in terms of foreign policy options. 
Altunışık claims that:  
Cem‟s vision was based on the critique of traditional foreign policy, 
which was characterized as “being bereft of a historical dimension”, 
“lacking „depth‟ with respect to time and „breadth‟ with respect to 
space”, and having an inadequate approach to culture.222  
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When the writings of İsmail Cem is reviewed, there can be found lots of 
similarities with the Davutoğlu‟s „strategic depth‟ concept, and in terms of aims and 
methods to be used in Turkish foreign policy presented by the two thinkers, although 
they use different words to portray their opinions. For example, the aim of the two 
thinkers is to make Turkey‟s international position elevate into a place where Turkey 
will be able to have an influence in regional and global affairs. However, Cem 
formulates his aim as “becoming a „world state‟”223, while Davutoğlu uses the term 
„a central global power‟224. While Cem defines Turkey as a European and Asian 
country
225, Davutoğlu enlarges the definition and says that Turkey is a European, 
Asian, Balkan, Caucasian, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean country
226
. From these 
points, it can be argued that the work of Davutoğlu presents the ideas formerly 
expressed by Cem in a more solid framework with a firm conceptual and theoretical 
background underneath. 
There are also very different interpretations of the term „strategic depth‟ 
found in the literature. It can be argued that many of these comments revolve around 
the centrality of „historical and geographical depth‟ as the two main constitutive 
elements of the „strategic depth‟. For example, Nicholas Danforth claims that 
historical depth and geographic depth are „the two components of the eponymous 
strategic depth‟227. Alexander Murinson argues that “the main thesis of this doctrine 
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is that strategic depth is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth.”228 
Similarly, Rabasa and Larrabee also write:  
The core idea of the doctrine of Strategic Depth is that a nation‟s 
value in international relations depends on its geostrategic location. 
[....] In addition, the concept of Strategic Depth emphasizes the 
importance of Turkey‟s Ottoman past and its historical and cultural 
ties to the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
229
 
 
In a similar vein, Öniş and Yılmaz contend that:  
Davutoğlu argues that in order to formulate a long-lasting strategic 
perspective one needs to take into account “historical depth,” which 
provides a sound assessment of the links between the past, present, 
and future, as well as a “geographical depth,” penetrating into the 
intricate dynamics of the relations between domestic, regional, and 
global factors.
230
 
 
 In terms of the foreign policies that the adoption of the „strategic depth‟ 
perspective will bring about, many scholars converge on the point that Turkey will 
diversify its foreign policy alternatives and deepen its relations with the regions 
surrounding it, especially with the contiguous land basin in Davutoğlu‟s terminology. 
For instance, Oğuzlu writes that:  
According to this (strategic depth), Turkey is a country which is never 
be able to follow a one-sided and one-dimensional foreign policy and 
which should position itself always at the center while determining its 
interests mainly because of the geography it is situated on and the 
historical and cultural legacies it possesses.
231
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Danforth, also, writes that “Davutoğlu argued that Turkey is located at the 
center of several “geo-cultural basins” –the West (including the United States), the 
Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia– and that Turkey should pursue an active 
policy to take advantage of the opportunities that exist in all of them.”232 Öniş, in 
another article of him, claims that: “In Davutoğlu‟s vision, foreign policy is no 
longer perceived as a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves but as a 
series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes.
233
 Öniş, furthermore, 
claims that the central country character of Turkey and the fact that Turkey has 
several regional identities necessitates Turkey „to extend its influence simultaneously 
to Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, 
the Caspian and the Mediterranean‟.234 In an article appeared in the Economist last 
year, after stating that the strategic depth constitutes one of the pillars of Davutoğlu‟s 
approach, it is said: “This (strategic depth) calls for a Turkish zone of political, 
economic and cultural influence, primarily among neighbors (many of them former 
Ottoman dominions) in the Balkans, the south Caucasus and the Middle East.”235 
Murinson, as well, reports that “Davutoglu argues that Turkey [....] needs to develop 
a genuinely multi-directional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic 
advantages.”236 
It is thought that the information provided about the „strategic depth‟ concept 
and doctrine has done enough to portray the general framework drawn by Ahmet 
Davutoğlu in terms of the foreign policy understanding of the AKP and the 
governments formed by it. Therefore, it would be fruitful to assess the effect of 
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Davutoğlu in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy in the minds of AKP officials 
by analyzing the documents prepared by them concerned with the foreign policy 
issues.  
 
4.1.2 Party Program and Election Manifestos 
As a political party that was established in the post-Cold War period,
237
 the 
foreign policy outlook presented with the party program, the election manifestos and 
the programs of the AKP governments signal the conditions of that era in compliance 
with the general framework drawn by Davutoğlu. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
foreign policy sections of all these documents include the evaluation of the post-Cold 
War environment made by Davutoğlu as a basis for the AKP‟s projection of Turkish 
foreign policy.  
In an interview with Yaşar Yakış, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first 
AKP government (58.Turkish government), he asserts that he has written the foreign 
policy section of the party program, which was also used in their election manifesto 
and the subsequent governmental program.
238
 Yakış also argues that this document 
that he has penned constitutes the general framework of Turkish foreign policy since 
that time.
239
 Therefore, several identical statements can be found in different 
documents related to AKP‟s foreign policy vision. For example, the party program, 
the election manifesto of 2002 and the AKP‟s first and second governmental 
programs of 2002 and 2003 have the same statements almost with no change. 
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However, the party program will be utilized mostly since it is the first official 
document writing down the principles of AKP‟s foreign policy understanding.  
It can be argued that the party program makes a redefinition of Turkish 
geopolitical stationing in the dynamic conditions of the post-Cold War period that is 
in stark contrast to geopolitical imagination of Turkey under the very rigid, static 
conditions of the Cold War era. First of all, it is argued in the party program that “the 
dynamic circumstances brought about by the post cold war period have created a 
suitable environment for developing a foreign policy with several alternatives”240. In 
the light of this statement, the party program suggests Turkey to “rearrange and 
create its relations with centers of power with alternatives, flexibly and with many 
axes”241. On this matter, Hasret Dikici Bilgin writes that: “In the party program, 
foreign policy was formulated to be based on multiple axes and reciprocal interests 
so as to establish flexible relations with power centers.”242 Also, it is argued in the 
same document that “against changing regional and global realities, our Party 
believes that Turkey must redefine its foreign policy priorities and create a balance 
between these realities and its national interests”243. Hence, it can be inferred from 
the party program that, under the new circumstances brought about with the end of 
the Cold War and globalization, Turkey is expected to diversify its foreign relations 
and to enrich its foreign policy options by forging new relations with the 
regions/states that it does not have any contacts and by revitalizing its relations with 
the lately neglected areas. With the „strategic depth‟ concept analyzed in the previous 
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section in mind, it can be argued that these statements totally correspond to the vision 
and suggestions made by Davutoğlu.  
Another important theme mentioned in the party program is the significance 
of international and regional cooperation. It is the first article of the party program 
that it was mentioned. According to that article, “the geopolitical situation of Turkey 
has the potential to create an attraction zone for many cooperation projects”244. 
However, the importance of security and stability for the development of cooperation 
is emphasized, and it is argued that “Turkey shall make more efforts for providing 
security and stability in its near surroundings, shall increase its attempts to maintain 
good relations with its neighbors based on dialogue, thus it shall contribute more to 
the development of regional cooperation”245. In addition to this statement, it can be 
derived from the party program that Turkey will be more active in the maintenance 
of security and stability in its region by contributing to the crisis management and 
conflict resolution efforts. According to the party program, “it (Turkey) shall take 
more initiative in the spots of crisis in regions neighboring Turkey and try to make a 
more concrete contribution to the solution of the crises”246. Bilgin formulates these 
two points as such: “A noticeable approach in the party program in terms of foreign 
policy is the repeated emphasis on the leadership role for Turkey in conflict and 
crisis resolution, as well as regional initiatives.”247 
After years of experience in the office, the AKP revised and rewrote its 
foreign policy section in the 2007 election manifesto. In addition, the program of the 
60.Turkish government, the third government under the AKP rule, can be considered 
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as a summary of that election manifesto. With a general view, it can be argued that in 
these recent documents, the points that have been mentioned in the previous written 
records lying down the AKP‟s foreign policy outlook are better conceptualized and 
put together in a more coherent manner. It should be noted, here, that Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, the-then chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Erdoğan, has 
increased his effectiveness in the formulation process of these documents. His impact 
can be realized from the similarity of the languages utilized in his work, „the 
Strategic Depth‟, and these documents.  
In the recent election manifesto, Turkey was defined as a “multi-directional 
and multi-dimensional country in terms of foreign policy agenda and responsibility 
areas”248. Later on, the necessity for “a multi-dimensional foreign policy based on a 
well-identified and integrated framework owing to the historical accumulation, 
geographical and cultural depth, and the strategic location of the country”249 has been 
mentioned. It can be argued that these statements correspond to the calls for a foreign 
policy with alternative options in the previously mentioned records and they do 
comply with the remarks of Davutoğlu.250 Another point in these new documents is 
that the AKP shall adopt a vision-oriented approach, but not a crisis-oriented one. 
Therefore, according to them, “the main goal of the AKP foreign policy is to get 
Turkey out of a reactive, defensive posture and to make it a decisive actor steering 
the developments with a regional and global vision”251. In the subsequent lines, the 
foreign policy methods in order to reach that goal are explained in the following 
way:  
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“To achieve this goal, the use of our deterrent/coercive hard power 
and our soft power with its diplomatic, economic and cultural qualities 
within a well-coordinated form is an absolute necessity. That is why 
we embrace a pro-active and dynamic foreign policy method which is 
principled, balanced, performed in contact with all global and regional 
actors, based on rational grounds and well-timed.”252 
 
 In terms of the relations with the neighboring states, the election manifesto 
declares that the principle of „zero problems with the neighbors‟ constitutes the 
backbone and the method used is defined as „constant contact‟.253 This principle, as 
well, is linked to the grand aim of becoming a „central country‟. For the neighboring 
regions, the point made in the party program and the election manifesto of 2002 is 
reiterated that Turkey will strive for peaceful resolution of the conflicts in those 
regions in order to prevent the spillover of these crises. 
 As a reflection of the recommendations that Davutoğlu made regarding the 
international and regional organizations, it is mentioned in the election manifesto that 
“the AKP will work for increasing the existence, representation and efficiency in 
international organizations and forums”254. The huge influence of Davutoğlu in this 
document can also be realized from the following statements: “We define the global 
position of our country not with a role of reactionary and passive bridge, but on the 
axis of an active and effective central country of its own. This definition is not a 
conjuncture-bounded and tactical, but a permanent and strategic one necessitated by 
our country‟s deep historical accumulation and geopolitical position”255 
 It is thought that a general overview of the AKP‟s foreign policy 
understanding has been presented with the examination of the documents prepared 
                                                             
252 AKP Election Manifesto 2007. 
253 AKP Election Manifesto 2007. 
254 AKP Election Manifesto 2007. 
255 AKP Election Manifesto 2007. 
 106 
by the AKP cadres with an eye on the effect of Davutoğlu‟s concept of „strategic 
depth‟. Furthermore, it can be recognized, especially from the election manifesto of 
2007 that foreign policy principles of the AKP governments have started to come out 
and be presented in a clearer manner as a result of the maturation of AKP‟s foreign 
policy understanding and the experience gained in office during the period between 
2002 and 2007. Therefore, it is better to shed light on these principles governing the 
foreign policy conducted by the AKP in order to fully grasp the approach of AKP 
towards foreign policy issues before searching for the clues of soft power elements. 
 
4.1.3 Principles of AKP Foreign Policy 
 The first attempt to define the principles guiding the AKP foreign policy was 
made by Ahmet Davutoğlu, again. In the article he published in 2008256, which is 
based on a transcript of a TV program he attended, Davutoğlu makes the principles 
of AKP‟s foreign policy public almost for the first time. In the following years, he 
has developed his stance, and it seems that Davutoğlu has given the eventual shape 
of the principles in the very recent article he wrote for the Foreign Policy 
magazine
257
. According to this article, there are three methodological and five 
operational principles driving Turkish foreign policy.  
 The first methodological principle is the „vision-oriented/visionary‟ foreign 
policy approach instead of a „crisis-oriented‟ one, which means that rather than 
taking issues into consideration on a case-by-case basis in the face of crises, Turkey 
has started to evaluate the cases according to the integrated visions it has developed. 
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According to Davutoğlu, there is a Turkish vision on almost every issue, ranging 
from Middle East to the Caucasus, and from climate change to the political 
economy.
258
 As a result of the adoption of a visionary approach, Davutoğlu argues, 
"It (Turkey) has to take on the role of an order-instituting country in all these regions. 
…Turkey is no longer a country which only reacts to crises, but notices the crises 
before their emergence and intervenes in the crises effectively, and gives shape to the 
order of its surrounding region."
259
 In the first speech he gave as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Davutoğlu declared that the vision of Turkey has three legs.260 The 
first one is about our country. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey will be one of the 
prosperous countries in the world in which the equilibrium/balance between security 
and freedom is well-established. The second vision is about the neighboring regions 
and basins, according to which Turkey will proceed from „zero problems‟ to 
„maximum benefits/cooperation‟ with the neighbors and Turkey should have the 
responsibility of an “order-instituting country”261 in the regions surrounding it.  
Lastly, the global vision aims at making Turkey a country which is „lent a careful ear 
on a myriad of regional and international issues‟262. 
The second methodological principle, suggested by Davutoğlu, is “to base 
Turkish foreign policy on a "consistent and systematic" framework around the 
world.”263 It can be argued that this principle ensures the integrity of the visions 
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about different issues under a coherent scheme. In other words, the visions should 
not contradict with another in any case. In Davutoğlu‟s words:  
Similarly, in foreign policy, you have to put the colors in such a way, 
that those who are observing the foreign policy they will feel that 
there is one political brain, one approach behind this policy. Today, 
the advantage of Turkey, in the last 6-7 years, there is one party 
government, therefore you can follow. There is consistency, and 
continuity.
264
 
 
Bülent Aras, commenting on the Davutoğlu‟s foreign policy line, claims that 
“(According to Davutoğlu) Turkey needs to develop a new policy of integrating 
foreign policy issues within a single policy formulation framework.”265 He develops 
his argument by writing that: “Turkey has multiple regional identities and thus has 
the capability to follow an integrated foreign policy to bring a variety of issues into 
the same picture, from the Middle East peace process to Caucasian stability, giving 
priority to immediate issues without ignoring other foreign policy concerns.”266 Also, 
Y.V. Gaber writes that “Elaborating an “integrated foreign policy approach”,  
Davutoglu aims to build relations with other global actors on a complementary, not 
competitive basis.”267 
The third methodological principle defined by Davutoğlu is “the adoption of a 
new discourse and diplomatic style”268. Davutoğlu continues by writing that 
“Although Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, 
we do not make threats. Instead, Turkish diplomats and politicians have adopted a 
new language in regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey's civil-
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economic power.”269 In another record, Davutoğlu calls this instrument „Soft 
Power‟.270 On this subject, Oğuzlu, in his article titled „Türk Dış Politikasında 
Davudoğlu Dönemi (Davutoğlu Period in Turkish Foreign Policy)‟, mentions the 
instruments to be used in the Davutoğlu approach as an additional point to the five 
operational principles and argues that “according to Davutoğlu school, there is the 
fundamentality of the persuasion of the other side through attraction and reasoning, 
and the preference of non-military instruments as a supplement.”271 Still however, it 
can be argued that this point has not been elucidated enough, but deserves to be dealt 
closely and deeply. Therefore, this paper will constitute a modest contribution to the 
endeavor searching for the role of soft power in AKP‟s foreign policy. 
After lying down the methodological principles, Davutoğlu goes on to explain 
the operational principles leading Turkish foreign policy. The first operational 
principle is the „balance between security and democracy‟. This principle provides 
the linkage between domestic and foreign domains. According to Davutoğlu, “if 
there is not a balance between security and democracy in a country, it may not have a 
chance to establish an area of influence in its environs. The legitimacy of any 
political regime comes from its ability to provide security to its citizens; this security 
should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country.”272 
The second operational principle, „zero problems towards neighbors‟, has 
turned out to be the most popular one in the academic and journalistic fields. It can 
be said that this principle is headed to normalize and deepen -politically, 
economically and culturally- Turkey‟s relations with the neighboring countries. 
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Kirişçi explains this principle as “to address and attempt to resolve bilateral problems 
and actively develop closer relations with the neighbors”.273 Other scholars place this 
principle into a wider framework, such as a new neighborhood policy of Turkey. For 
instance, Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı argues that the new foreign policy approach of the 
AKP governments includes the development of “a neighborhood policy which 
requires zero problems and maximum cooperation with neighbors”274. Bülent Aras 
thinks alike and writes that “Turkey‟s new neighborhood policy appropriated a vision 
of minimizing the problems in its neighboring regions, which has been called „zero 
problem policy‟ by Davutoğlu himself, while avoiding involvement in international 
confrontations.”275 Although, there are several arguments on the novelty of this 
principle
276
, it should be noted that these efforts can be considered as a continuation 
of the policy initiatives started during İsmail Cem‟s tenure. In his book, Cem writes 
by quoting his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 1997 that:  
Improving our relations with our neighbors is another priority. When I 
took office, observing that we were not on best terms with several 
neighbors, I thought that some of the fault should lie with us. We thus 
adopted and declared the principle that if one positive step comes 
from the other party, we will respond by two.
277
 
 
In a supplementary manner to the argument presented above, it is written by 
the European Stability Initiative experts that: 
Inspired by his conviction that "we need a Turkey that has friendly 
relations with the regions with which it shares history and culture," 
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Cem's "positive steps" diplomacy was to mark a profound change in 
Turkey's engagement with its neighbors. It was also a change that 
some in Ankara regarded with suspicion.
278
 
 
 The third operative principle is “‟proactive and pre-emptive peace 
diplomacy‟, which aims to take measures before crises emerge and escalate to a 
critical level.”279 As a natural extension of the vision-oriented approach, Turkey will 
try to be active as much as possible in the maintenance of regional and global peace 
and stability, since the crises and conflicts around Turkey would have negative 
implications for domestic politics as well. Therefore, Turkey will intend to take all 
necessary measures to prevent the escalation of crises to a critical level and to bring 
them to a satisfactory solution for all parties involved with its effective intervention 
through peaceful means. 
 “The adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy” constitutes the fourth 
operational principle of Turkish foreign policy according to Davutoğlu. It can be 
claimed that what Davutoğlu means by this principle is that Turkey should have 
“compatible global relations”280, meaning that the forthcoming relationships should 
not contradict with the existing ones and the initiatives of Turkey in increasing its 
alternative foreign policy options should not be understood as deviations. In 
Davutoğlu‟s words, “Turkey's relations with other global actors aim to be 
complementary, not in competition”281.  It can be inferred from this statement that 
this principle is the display of the second methodological principle, „consistent and 
systematic framework‟, on the ground.  
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 “The „rhythmic diplomacy‟, which aspires to provide Turkey with a more 
active role in international relations”282 is the fifth operational principle of Turkish 
foreign policy put forward by Davutoğlu. It corresponds to the “active involvement 
in all global and international issues, in all international organizations”283, which is 
compatible with the global vision of Turkey. Davutoğlu seems to confirm this claim 
by writing that “Turkey‟s aim is to intervene consistently in global issues using 
international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a central 
country to a global power.”284 Öniş and Yılmaz explain this principle like this: 
“Turkey has tried to act within a framework of what Davutoğlu named „rhythmic 
diplomacy,‟ pushing for a sustained pro-activism in the field of diplomacy, trying to 
achieve a more active role in international organizations, and opening up to new 
areas where Turkish contacts have been limited in the past”285. 
 
4.2 Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy during the AKP Era 
 In the light of the explanations provided about the foreign policy 
understanding of the AKP, this section will investigate the soft power strategies used 
by the AKP governments. The general theoretical framework which is used in the 
previous chapter will be utilized in this section as well.  
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4.2.1 Benignity 
 Without repeating the points regarding benignity, the examples of 
multilateralism, peaceful foreign policy and peace promotion, and economic and 
humanitarian assistance efforts by the AKP governments will be presented in the 
following sections. 
 
4.2.1.1 Multilateralism 
 It can be argued that taking part in multilateral initiatives, instituting new 
ones and increasing the effectiveness of Turkey in the multilateral organizations in 
which Turkey is already a member is a requisite for the global vision presented by 
the AKP governments, which wants to make Turkey a global power through 
increasing its effectiveness in the international arena. The multilateral efforts of the 
AKP governments can be collected under two broad headings: the initiation of novel 
multilateral organizations and the enhancement of Turkish position in the existing 
ones. 
 
4.2.1.1.1 New Multilateral Dealings 
 One such fresh initiative is „Iraq‟s Neighboring Countries Process‟ which was 
institutionalized in early 2003 with the meeting of foreign ministers of countries 
neighboring Iraq in İstanbul for the first time.286 It is argued by several journalists 
that it was the-then Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gül who started this process in 
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early 2003.
287
 On this subject, it can be said that it was not a mere coincidence that 
this gathering was realized just after the visits of Gül together with Foreign Minister 
Yaşar Yakış to several Middle Eastern countries.288 Although the initial aim of this 
process was to prevent the impending war in Iraq by convincing it to comply with the 
related UN requirements
289
, it was turned into a forum where the participant 
countries declare their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, devise policies 
for the reestablishment of stability and order in Iraq, and combine their strategies to 
help the Iraqi authorities in reconstruction efforts starting with the second gathering 
in Damascus on 2-3 November 2003. From that time on till early 2009, there 
convened nine official and three non-official summits of foreign ministers, five 
official meetings of interior ministers. In 2007, these regional meetings were 
broadened to include representatives from five members of the UN Security Council, 
the European Commission, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League 
and G-8 countries. The first expanded meeting of Iraq‟s neighbors was convened in 
Sharm el-Sheikh in May 2007. The second of these meetings was held in Istanbul in 
November of the same year. The last one was convened in April 2008 in Kuwait. 
According to Davutoğlu, “The meetings of the Extended Neighboring Countries of 
Iraq have made a serious contribution to the Iraqi question in the international arena. 
Turkey‟s efforts have not only helped to establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
government, but also paved way for Iraq to be not solely an American but an 
international issue to be dealt with within the framework of the United Nations.”290 
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 The second multilateral initiative is the „Alliance of Civilizations‟291 which 
was developed in tandem with the Spanish government. Actually, it was the Spanish 
Prime Minister Zapatero who first proposed the initiative “between the Western and 
the Arab and Muslim world to the secretary general of the United Nations in his 
speech at the fifty-ninth UN General Assembly on September 21, 2004”292. Kofi 
Annan, the-then UN Secretary General supported the idea and proposed that a 
Muslim country should also be included in the process as a co-sponsor, and 
consequently the position was offered to Turkey because of its dual identity as an 
Islamic country culturally and a  Western one politically, and its stance towards the 
global terrorism.
293
 After negotiations, Turkey decided to support the initiative and 
the project was officially launched under the auspices of the UN on July 14, 2005. 
Then, the State Minister Mehmet Aydın became the co-chair of „the group of wise 
men‟, which was established for drawing up an action plan that would determine the 
basic functions of an initiative launched by UN
294
 Later on, “Turkey became a more 
vocal advocate of the project than even Spain, promoting it at numerous international 
platforms such as the EU General Affairs Council Meeting in March 2006, during 
the Arab League Summit on March 28, 2006, and at the World Economic Forum on 
May 20–21, 2006.”295 It can be argued that this initiative shows the ambitions of the 
AKP government in rejecting the clash of civilizations scenarios by highlighting the 
sui generis model of the Turkish state combining Islamic and Western elements. The 
following remarks of Prime Minister Erdoğan seem to confirm this argument: 
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“Turkey presents an important opportunity and is a model country which can negate 
the „clash of civilizations‟ scenarios.” According to Balcı and Miş, its importance 
lies in the fact that “Turkey has assumed the position of the spokesperson of Islamic 
world and for the first time has undertaken a pioneering role in a global initiative”296. 
 The third area where the AKP governments participated in multilateral efforts 
is the Caucasus. In terms of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, “Turkey initiated a trilateral process of dialogue among the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan – the first meeting was held in 
Reykjavik in May 2002, followed by many other such meetings, one of the last 
taking place in New York in September 2008.”297 It should be mentioned that the 
process started with the initiatives of İsmail Cem, who “suggested Turkey hold 
trilateral talks with troubled neighbor Armenia and close ally Azerbaijan to help 
solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”298, but the AKP government has embraced 
the issue and worked for the continuation of the talks between these countries.   
However, the main multilateral initiative proposed by the AKP government in this 
region is the „Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform‟. Although the process of 
forming such an institution began well before the AKP term
299
, the project re-
emerged following the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. The project was aired by 
Prime Minister Erdoğan during his visits to Moscow and Tbilisi. This multilateral 
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mechanism is designed to include Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
and “to tackle common security, economic and energy security issues; be based on 
the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE; 
and resolve common problems in the region before their emergence to avoid further 
crises”300. According to Aras, the Turkish initiative was welcomed by other 
organizations as well. He writes that: “The EU gave the green light to this initiative, 
and the EU progress report on Turkey‟s accession negotiations positively mentioned 
the project. NATO supported the platform as a constructive step for security in the 
wider Black Sea region with reference to Turkey‟s constructive policy line during the 
crisis.”301 These remarks can be considered as the proof of Turkish multilateral 
initiatives‟ having a sound effect in the regional and global politics.  
 
4.2.1.1.2 Increasing Effectiveness in Multilateral Settings 
 As a result of the intentions of the AKP governments to raise the regional and 
international reputation of Turkey, Turkey has started to work for increasing its 
influence in the multilateral organizations and institutions of which it is a member. 
The most important achievement in this regard can be argued to gain the non-
permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Turkey occupied this position for three 
times before for a total of 5 years in 1951-52, 1954-55 and 1961. However, the fact 
that Turkey could not serve as a temporary member in the Security Council for 
almost 50 years shows the inability of Turkey to play a role in the world politics. In 
order to put an end to this situation, Turkey applied for full membership for the 
2009-2010 council term on July 21, 2003 and actively worked to get the seat. As a 
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result of the Turkish efforts in this vein,
302
 Turkey won a seat as a non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council in the election held on October 17, 
2008 by getting 151 votes out of 192 at the General Assembly. Turkey is now 
“chairing three critical commissions concerning Afghanistan, North Korea, and the 
fight against terror”303.  It should be noted here that the establishment of relations 
with the countries in Africa, South America and the Pacific has enabled Turkey to 
win the seat.
304
 Therefore, it can be argued that Turkish openings to the previously 
neglected areas in line with the multidimensional approach of the AKP governments 
have paid off.  
 Another important development is witnessed in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference. The election of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish academic, as 
the Secretary General of the OIC on 16 June 2004 is significant in terms of three 
points. First of all, it was the first time in the organization‟s 35 years of history that 
the Secretary General of the organization was determined with the democratic 
election process through the initiatives of Turkey. Until that time, the Secretary 
General was decided through compromise. In other words, İhsanoğlu is the first by-
vote-elected Secretary General of the OIC.
305
 Secondly, it was also the first time that 
a Turkish candidate was assigned to the post.
306
 Yaşar Yakış, the former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was also nominated for the post, however, he decided to withdraw 
and support the previous Secretary General of the organization, Abdelouahed 
Belkeziz.
307
 Thirdly, the OIC is the second biggest international organization after 
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the United Nations with its 57 members and it is the world‟s largest Muslim body.308 
It means that Turkey is accepted to represent and lead this huge organization by the 
Muslim community in the world. Altunışık asserts on that issue that: “The election of 
a Turkish secretary general, Ekmelleddin Ihsanoglu, to the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, was a sign of Turkey's improved standing among the 
governments of the Islamic world.”309 
 One of the recent developments is the election of Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, an 
Antalya deputy for the ruling AKP, to the position of the president of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 25 January 2010. Çavuşoğlu is 
the first Turkish president in the body's 61-year history and will hold the post for 
next two years. It is generally commented by Turkish scholars and journalists that 
Çavuşoğlu‟s election confirms the Europeanness of Turkey. For instance, Erhan 
Akdemir from the Ankara University European Union Research Center said that “It 
provides significant evidence that Turkey is part of Europe. A Turk will head a 
European institution.”310 It is also significant in terms of portraying the effectiveness 
of Turkish foreign policy in the European politics.  
 Another example of increasing Turkish effectiveness in multilateral settings 
has been witnessed very recently in the Asian continent. Turkey now holds the 
Chairmanship of CICA, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia,
311
 for the next two years effective from 8 June 2010 till 2012. 
CICA is a multi-national forum for enhancing cooperation towards promoting peace, 
security and stability in Asia which was established with the initiatives of the 
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President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev in 1992. It has 22 member states 
located in the Middle East and Asia. The Turkish Chairmanship of CICA is 
important because it signifies that Turkey does not ignore, disregard the Asian 
continent and tries to have a say in the regional politics of Asia as well.  
 Other efforts of Turkish government in terms the augmenting effectiveness at 
the multilateral initiatives can be summarized well by Davutoğlu‟s own statements:  
Turkey undertook the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East 
European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue among Balkan 
states and their immediate neighbors, for 2009 and 2010. Turkey is 
also a member of G-20, maintains observer status in the African 
Union, has a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and actively participates in the Arab League.
312
 
  
Another dimension related to multilateralism is the hosting of international 
and regional summit meetings in Turkey. On this matter, Meltem Müftüler-Baç and 
Yaprak Gürsoy contend that “Turkey has participated in and hosted several 
international meetings with an attempt to „gain […] more influence in international 
organizations‟.”313 The examples in this regard include the summits of the OECD, 
the OIC and NATO in June 2004. Also, Kireçci provides a good account of summit 
meetings convened in Turkey. The examples provided by Kireçci cover the summit 
between Turkey and the member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
which was held on August 21-23 2008, “The First Africa-Turkey Cooperation 
Summit” between 18-21 August 2008, and the United Nations Ministerial 
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Conference of the Least Developed Countries which took place in Istanbul July 9–
11, 2007.
314
  
At the same time, Turkey has renewed its multilateral efforts in the Central 
Asia. In this sense, the tenth Turkish Congress was held in Antalya in 18-20 
September 2006. This reflects a renewed effort to revive the relations with the 
Central Asian countries since the last congress was held in 2001. Similarly, the 
summit of Turkic-speaking countries, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, was convened in November the same year. At the 
latest gathering of this initiative in Nakhchivan last October, the participating states 
decided to institutionalize the project by establishing a permanent council. According 
to the agreement signed at the end of the meeting, it was determined that the 
following institutions will be set up: the Turkic-speaking Countries Cooperation 
Council, the permanent secretariat to be based in İstanbul, Turkic-speaking 
Countries' Heads of State Council, Turkic-speaking Countries' Foreign Ministers 
Council, Senior Officials Council and a Wise Men Delegation.
315
 
 
4.2.1.2 Peaceful Foreign Policy and Peace Promotion 
 It is mentioned in the previous section that „zero problems with the 
neighbors‟ has been one of the operative principles of Turkish foreign policy defined 
by Davutoğlu. In this section, the illustrations of this attitude will be provided. 
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 First of all, Turkey has started to take up a reconcilable attitude towards its 
neighbors with which Turkey has enduring problems. The most important change in 
this regard has been experienced in the Cyprus dispute. With the AKP governments, 
Turkey has abandoned the passive policy of „deadlock is a solution‟ and embraced a 
“we will always be a step ahead of the Greeks” attitude.316 This attitude has boldly 
manifested itself in Turkish support for the Annan Plan prepared under the auspices 
of the UN, which calls for a „bi-communal, bi-zonal federation‟317. However, the 
rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots has resulted in the perpetuation of the 
existing situation in the island.  
 A second development has been witnessed in Turkey‟s relations with 
Armenia. Due to the problems between these two countries about the so-called 
“Armenian genocide” and the occupation of Azerbaijani‟s Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast and seven adjacent districts by Armenia, these two neighbors 
were not on good terms for a long time. However, the “zero problems” principle has 
pushed Turkey to normalize its relations with Armenia. As a reflection of this, the 
relations began to improve from 2008 onwards. The visit of Turkish President 
Abdullah Gül to Armenia on 6 September 2008 for the football match between 
Turkey and Armenia for the World Cup qualifying round marked the beginning of 
the rapprochement between the countries. In the words of Nona Mikhelidze:  
The Turkish-Armenia rapprochement began in September 2008 with 
the so-called “soccer diplomacy”, when Turkey‟s President Abdullah 
Gül travelled to Yerevan and attended a soccer match between the two 
countries‟ national teams. Later Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan 
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became the first Armenian leader who visited Turkey in order to 
attend the return soccer match.
318
 
 
 From that time on, the two countries have taken several steps to further their 
relationship. For instance, on 22 April 2009, the two countries announced that they 
had initiated a “roadmap” setting out the parameters for formalizing ties.319 As a 
consequence of the negotiations conducted in line with the roadmap, “On October 
10, 2009 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his Armenian counterpart 
Edward Nalbandian signed two historical documents – the “Protocol on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations” and the “Protocol on the development of 
bilateral relations”.”320 According to these protocols, both countries will work for 
“the enhancement of trade, economic and cultural relations especially in the 
framework of international (UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council) and regional (BSEC) organizations. Furthermore both parties 
have undertaken the commitment to “make the best possible use of existing transport, 
communications and energy infrastructure and networks.”321 However, these 
documents are still waiting to be ratified, which prevents the achievement of stable 
relations between these countries.  
 The conclusion of bilateral agreements with neighboring countries
322
 and the 
establishment of high-level strategic council meetings with Iraq, Syria, Greece and 
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Russia
323
 can also be considered as indications of peaceful foreign policy of Turkey. 
According to Davutoğlu, “There are also preparations to establish similar 
mechanisms with Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Ukraine as well as other neighboring 
countries.”324 At the same time, the lifting of visa requirements can be considered as 
signs of benevolent approach embraced by Turkish state. Davutoğlu has noted, on 
this issue, that “Turkey abolished visa requirements with, among others, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Albania, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya and Russia.”325 One of the very recent 
developments in this regard occurred in the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum 
(TAC), organized in early June this year. The signing of an agreement calling for the 
establishment of free trade zone among Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan can be 
considered as a contribution to the regional peace initiatives of Turkey. According to 
the joint political declaration, it has been agreed that a “Quadripartite High Level 
Cooperation Council” and a zone of free movement of goods and persons among the 
four countries mentioned will be established.
326
  
 Turkey has also ameliorated its record on international mediation efforts 
during the AKP era. According to some commentators and the AKP officials, it is a 
responsibility bestowed upon the Turkish state to contribute to the regional peace and 
stability. Ünlühisarcıklı, for example, argues that “Turkey‟s historical and cultural 
ties with countries and peoples in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle 
East provide Turkey with the opportunity and responsibility to play the role of a 
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mediator in regional conflicts and contribute to peace and stability.”327 Therefore, 
Turkey has actively been involved in mediation efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian, the 
Israeli-Syrian disputes and recently on Iranian nuclear program. In terms of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Natalie Tocci and Joshua Walker argue, Ankara tried to 
mediate twice. They write:  
The first was over a prisoners‟ exchange deal in the aftermath of the 
capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006. Then Turkish 
Prime Minister advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu travelled to Damascus 
several times to broker a deal. [….] The second instance of Turkish 
mediation with Hamas was during Operation Cast Lead in December 
2008-January 2009. Egypt played a crucial role, yet the well-known 
difficulties between Hamas and the Egyptian regime also opened a 
space for Turkey. Davutoğlu readily used it by holding two meetings 
with Hamas leader Meshal and shuttling between Damascus and Cairo 
in order to secure a ceasefire by Hamas in return for an Israeli 
ceasefire and the lifting of Israel‟s closure of Gaza. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, appreciated Turkey‟s called for Turkey‟s role.  
Following the end of the Israeli offensive, Turkey‟s efforts were 
openly praised by the Arab League, Syria, France and the European 
Union.
328
 
   
 As an addendum to these initiatives, Szymanski mentions the direct talks 
between the leaders of two conflicting parties. In the words of him: 
President Mahmud Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert traveled to 
Turkey on 12-13 November 2007, just prior to the summit in 
Annapolis (27 November 2007), which Turkey also participated. For 
the first time ever, they were invited together to the presidential palace 
by the Turkish head of state. They took part in the Ankara Forum for 
Economic Cooperation, during which they signed a declaration where 
they expressed their support for the actions of Turkish private 
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enterprises on the territory of the Palestinian Autonomy and the new 
Tarkumia industrial zone in the West Bank.
329
 
 
 The main mediation efforts of Turkey have been realized in terms of the 
Israeli-Syrian dispute. Turkey played the role of a facilitator between these two 
countries by carrying messages to each party about their willingness to restart talks. 
For example, “Following his conversation with the Syrian president, the AKP 
conveyed information about the Syrian desire to revive peace talks with the Israeli 
ambassador in Ankara, Pinhas Avivi.”330 However, the real achievement came in 
mid-2008 with the personal initiatives of Prime Minister Erdoğan. After his visit to 
Damascus and a subsequent telephone call with Ehud Olmert in late April, both 
countries agreed to resume talks under Turkish mediation.
331
 In the end of these 
efforts, “Israeli and Syrian authorities declared on May 21 that they started indirect 
talks under the supervision of Turkish diplomats in Istanbul.”332 As a result, 
“between May 2008 and December 2008 four rounds of official indirect talks via 
Turkish shuttle diplomacy took place.”333 While the direct talks between these two 
parties were on the verge of installment
334
, the Israeli attack on Gaza strip in the last 
days of 2008 put an end to this process.
335
 Recently, Davutoğlu stated that “Turkey is 
ready to try again to broker a peace agreement between Israel and Syria if they agree 
to resume the stalled initiative” 336 in January this year. 
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 As a recent initiative, Turkey has increased its efforts to mediate between Iran 
and the Western world on the issue of Iranian nuclear program. Turkey has declared 
its willingness to play a mediator role in this dispute through the statements of 
President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu.337 
However, the last attempt developed in tandem with Brazil seems to be the most 
ambitious initiative in this regard. In this regard, the signing of a tripartite agreement 
between Brazil, Turkey and Iran on the issue of uranium swap, in which Iran has 
accepted to “ship most of its low enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for 
higher enriched non-weapon grade fuel rods used for research in cancer 
treatment”,338 on 17 May 2010 is significant in terms of showing the effectiveness of 
Turkish mediation efforts. 
 Turkish mediation efforts are not confined solely in the areas mentioned 
above. Turkey has also been very active in working to bring about satisfactory 
solutions to the conflicts in the Balkans and the Southeast Asia. For instance, Turkey 
has been mediating between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to achieve a 
durable peace with regard to the long-enduring Bosnian dispute coming from the 
early 1990s. The process was initiated by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, who brought together the foreign ministers of both countries in October 
2009 for the first time. From then on, ministerial meetings have continued and the 
process has been turned into a Balkan Summit. The Trilateral Balkan Summit was 
convened in İstanbul with the participation of the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of 
Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 24, 2010. It has been regarded as a 
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historic move since the President of Serbia and its Bosnian counterpart came together 
for the first time as a result of the initiatives of Turkey.
339
 
 A similar initiative was launched between Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in April 2007. The tripartite summit was held upon the invitation of former Turkish 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, following the visit of the-then Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gül to Islamabad, extended to Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai to visit Ankara, which has signaled 
the pioneering role of Turkey in the initiative.  From that time on, four rounds of 
tripartite talks have been held.
340
 In a recent document emerged after the trilateral 
meeting of foreign ministers, the importance of the summit process has been 
mentioned as such: 
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs recalled the invaluable contribution 
of the Trilateral Summit Process as a robust platform, since its launch 
on 30 April 2007, in furthering the multi-dimensional dialogue and 
cooperation among the three countries for their peoples‟ as well as 
their region‟s benefit. They underscored the importance of the 
Trilateral Summit Process as a useful mechanism to develop, 
implement and oversee cooperation in a broad range of issues 
including, among others, trade, economy, including support to private 
sector interaction, education, security and intelligence. They further 
emphasized the added value brought by the Trilateral Summit Process 
in facilitating exchanges among parliamentarians, high-level 
government officials, members of the armed forces, intelligence 
circles and businesspersons.
341
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4.2.1.3 Economic and Humanitarian Assistance 
 In line with the ameliorating economic conditions of the country, Turkish 
economic and humanitarian efforts have boomed in the AKP era as well. In the AKP 
election manifesto of 2007, it is stated that as a result of the increased level of 
Turkish foreign aid and the commencement of the recording of these aids according 
to the international standards, Turkey has been given the title of „donor country‟ by 
the UN and the OECD. Similarly, Abdullah Gül, in one of his speeches, has stated:  
[..] extending from Asia to Africa, Turkey is an appreciated country in 
terms of the humanitarian and technical aid it provides. I just want you 
to note that once Turkey was the recipient country. I would like to 
remind you that today Turkey is in the club of aiders and has made 
donations totaling one billion dollars just in terms of humanitarian 
aid.
342
 
 
 As a supportive document, in the monthly newsletter UNDP Turkey, New 
Horizons, it is stated that: “Turkey has come a long way in terms of development aid. 
These aids, achieved through rapidly increasing budgets, have greatly contributed to 
Turkey‟s emerging role as a donor.”343 When the statistics of the OECD-DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee) is reviewed, the rising amount of Turkish aid 
can be easily realized. (See Table 3). 
Dataset: ODA 
by Donor  
        Donor Turkey 
Amount type Current Prices (USD millions) 
Aid type I. ODA 
Flow type Net Disbursements  
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  72,97 66,63 339,15 601,04 714,21 602,24 780,36 718,2 
 
Table 3. Turkish Official Development Assistance between 2002 and 2009.  
Source: OECD DAC, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR  
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When Table 3 is analyzed, it can be clearly noticed that Turkish ODA 
(official development assistance) has increased ten-fold between 2002 and 2009. It 
should be pointed out that this period also corresponds to the time section when the 
AKP has been in power in Turkey.  
It should be emphasized that Turkish foreign aid does not only consist of 
official development assistance. In an interview with the president of TIKA, Musa 
Kulaklıkaya has noted that “Turkish foreign aid from both private and public sources 
totaled $3 billion last year.”344 Kulaklıkaya has also reported that “Turkey's 
humanitarian assistance, reconstruction aid and technical support programs have 
helped 131 countries so far.”345 The last point he made is of importance in terms of 
showing the global reach of Turkish foreign aid initiatives. Moreover, it should be 
mentioned here that TIKA has 23 liaison offices in 20 countries and there are plans 
on the way to augment this number. Recently, “the State Minister Faruk Çelik said 
the agency was working to raise its project coordination offices in 23 countries to 
30.”346 Another initiative displaying Turkish effectiveness in the global development 
assistance community is mentioned by Kulaklıkaya in another interview of him. 
Kulaklıkaya has said that: “There‟s even a policy dialogue on development and 
cooperation started through our initiative which aims to host conferences to establish 
policies between DAC members and non-members. The first one was hosted in 
Istanbul in 2006. The 4th one will be hosted in Mexico, September 28-29 this 
year.”347  
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The Central Asia and the Caucasus comes first in the allocation of Turkish 
official development assistance. According to Hakan Fidan, “sixty per cent of 
Turkey‟s US$702 million in development aid in 2007 was allocated to Central Asia 
and the Caucasus.”348 There are two places deserves a deeper explanation. The first 
one is Afghanistan. According to the TIKA Report of 2008, Afghanistan is the 
country which received the highest level development assistance from Turkey with a 
figure of USD 141.96 million.
349
 One of the examples of aid provided to Afghanistan 
is mentioned by Aydemir Erman, Turkey‟s former envoy to Afghanistan. Erman 
contends: “Since 2006, the Turkish government has spent $20 million in the province 
funding a police training academy, building schools, restoring a mosque and setting 
up a medical clinic.”350 It should also be mentioned that Turkey has been actively 
providing emergency aid after natural disasters. For instance, Turkey has aided 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Haiti, etc. Turkey provided USD 2.68 million in emergency aid 
to Pakistan alone, allocated 8.62% of the total 2008 emergency aid budget to this 
country.
351
 Also, Pakistan comes second after Afghanistan when the total amount of 
Turkish assistance is evaluated on a country basis.
352
 
Palestine can be suggested as an example of the sensitivity of Turkish people 
and their contribution to humanitarian assistance efforts. According to the data of the 
Turkish Red Crescent Society, a total of 2.285 tons humanitarian assistance supplies 
were sent to Gaza after the Israeli attack in late 2008.
353
 The total amount of aids 
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gathered was above 63 million Turkish liras on 2 February 2009 in almost a month of 
time from the beginning of the attack, according to the news.
354
 
In terms of the reactions to Turkish assistance efforts, it can be said that they 
are generally welcomed. In order to give an example, the following quotation from 
Erman would be of enormous help. 
Halim Fedai, the governor of Wardak province, has said: “The 
Turkish programs are very well received and readily accepted by 
Afghans because they work within Afghan culture. They are sensitive 
to Afghan values. We have very good, strong, historical relationships 
with Turkey.” 355 
 
4.2.2 Brilliance 
 In this section, the issue of brilliance in the sense provided in the theoretical 
chapter and put into usage in the previous chapter will be analyzed for the period 
when the AKP has been ruling the country. Therefore, the issues will be dealt with 
under the headings of economic development and political maturity. 
 
4.2.2.1 Economic Development 
 It has been generally asserted that Turkey has become the most developed 
country in its region as a result of the economic reforms gaining pace under the AKP 
rule. Sedat Laçiner, for instance, gives all credit to the AKP governments on this 
manner. He says in an interview: “Turkish economy, in terms of trade, direct Turkish 
investments, foreign investments in Turkey, tourism, industrial production etc., has 
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boomed in the last five-six years.”356 Similarly Öniş and Yılmaz give several 
examples of the success of the AKP governments by writing that:  
[…]the economy has also become stronger during the AKP era. The 
1990s-style foreign policy activism had been hampered by the chronic 
instability of the Turkish economy and recurrent financial crises. 
Under the AKP, given the party‟s strong commitment to monetary and 
fiscal discipline, inflation has been reduced to single-digit levels and 
significant growth has been generated.
357
 
 
 Turkey has been defined in the top-20 economies of the world by several 
scholars and journalists as well. For example, Gökhan Türk thinks that Turkey has 
the 16
th
 largest economy in the world
358, while Cengiz Çandar classifies Turkey as 
the 15
th
 largest economy in the world and the 7
th
 in Europe. Laçiner, in another 
occasion, compares the level of Turkish economic development with other Muslim 
countries and concludes that “Turkey is the biggest economy among Muslim 
countries in the world.”359 Fuat Keyman, in a similar vein, claims that Turkey is one 
of the important, but not pivotal, emerging market economies of today‟s economic 
globalization with its dynamic economy, recursive growth rates and young 
population.
360
 The economic development of Turkey under the AKP governments 
has also attracted the attention of foreign thinkers. Matein Khalid, who defines 
Turkey as „the Anatolian tiger‟ and „an emerging economic powerhouse in the 
Islamic world‟, makes one of the comprehensive comments on the success of the 
AKP‟s economic policies. Khalid argues that:  
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Economic reform has underwritten Turkey‟s spectacular return to 
grace on the international stage. Erdogan‟s government slashed 
inflation into single digits for the first time in modern history, 
reengineered a historic currency reforms that saw the lira lose five 
zeros against the dollar, committed Ankara to EU mandated reform on 
subsidies and competition, and, above all, attracted $80 billion in FDI, 
more foreign investment than all his predecessors had managed since 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
361
 
 
 Still however, there are voices that Turkey should be cautious about the 
potential problems it might face in the coming years in terms of its economic 
development process. For example, Keyman points out the deficit of the Turkish 
economy in making itself a sustainable economy in terms of its success in human 
development.
362
 Öniş and Yılmaz warn Turkey on this matter by recording that:  
In spite of recent improvements in overall economic performance and 
the growing strength of Turkish private capital, elements of 
vulnerability still remain. The presence of a large current account 
deficit and the heavy dependence of the growth process on large 
inflows of external capital and favorable global liquidity conditions 
suggest that there might be problems in terms of sustaining the high 
growth generated during the early part of the decade.
363
 
 
 In addition to the points raised by Öniş and Yılmaz, it can be argued that 
Turkish economy has still been suffering from various structural economic problems 
as well. For example, the income distribution has not been achieved in a fair manner. 
The income gap between the rich and the poor continues to augment. Moreover, GNI 
(Gross National Income) per capita is less than expected from a country like Turkey 
which is argued to be the 17
th
 largest economy in the world. 
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4.2.2.2 Political Maturity 
 In terms of the maturity of the political life in Turkey, the AKP‟s coming to 
power, itself, has been regarded as a clear illustration, since the AKP has been 
considered as the heir/successor of the Islamist tradition in Turkish domestic politics 
after the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, in Turkish) was banned from politics in 2001. 
Such a thought seems reasonable because the AKP has been founded by the former 
MPs of the Virtue Party. However, it was the reformist wing of the Virtue Party who 
established the AKP, while the traditionalist wing within the Virtue Party came up 
with the another political party called the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, in Turkish).  
 Altunışık thinks that the AKP‟s coming to power in Turkey is an asset for two 
reasons. The first one is that „it demonstrates the evolution of the Islamist movement 
in Turkey‟, and the second reason, according to her, is that it presents „the potential 
for reconciling democracy and Islam‟.364 Altunışık, also, claims that there has 
occurred a favorable change in the perceptions of the Arabs on Turkey due to the 
AKP‟s coming to power.365  In another article, Altunışık comments on the AKP‟s 
coming to power as such: 
The AKP's coming to power has also become an asset for the Turkish 
model as it demonstrated the reconciliation of a party with Islamist 
roots with democracy and secularism. Thus the Turkish experience 
seems to lend support to the argument that the Islamic movements can 
be moderated through democracy.
366
 
 
In a similar vein, Elie Podeh writes that: “The coming to power of the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in November 2002 
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eventually seemed to be an auspicious event, demonstrating that Islamic movements 
could be moderated through democracy.”367 Podeh expands this argument by saying 
that:  
Arab and Muslim thinkers and politicians began to portray Turkey as 
a model to be imitated, particularly with regard to three issues: its 
moderate version of Islam; reforms; and democracy.  
The importance of the Turkish model, according to this thinking, is 
derived from the fact that it showed Arabs and Muslims that Islam, 
modernization, and democracy are not necessarily incompatible 
concepts […].368 
 
 Also, Dr. Mustafa Ellabbad, the Director of Alshaq Center for Regional and 
Strategic Studies in Cairo, says regarding the changing Turkish perception in the 
Arab world that: “Turkey's image is much better than it was only one decade ago. So 
many factors are playing a role here; coming to power of the AK Party, the collapse 
of Arab imagination of the Middle East, the rising of Turkey and emergence of a 
Turkish model played role.”369 As a supplementary, Ellabbad says that “Arabs also 
appreciates Turkish modern power to rotation since there was no political process in 
Arab countries like in Turkey where opposition was coming to power.”370 
 The Tezkere crisis (the Bill/Motion crisis), in which Turkey did not allow the 
US to station its troops on Turkish soil to open a northern front to Iraq in March 
2003, has also been seen as a reflection of the political maturity and resulted in a 
change in the perception of Turkey especially in the Middle East. The decision of the 
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Turkish parliament can be regarded as an indication of a well-operating 
parliamentary system. It is significant in terms of breaking the grounded image of 
Turkey in the Middle Eastern states as a „servant‟ of the West, emanating from the 
Cold War years. On this matter, Baskın Oran argues that, after the incident, 
international media and public opinion, as well as several states, has given up 
treating Turkey as a „mercenary‟, but appreciated the Turkish stance, and there 
emerged writings titled „Turkish Parliament Rejects Bribe‟.371 As a foreign scholar 
thinking similarly, Dietrich Jung can be given as an example. Jung writes in his 
article that:  
Furthermore, the decision of the Turkish Parliament on 1 March 2003, 
not to allow the US to deploy combat troops on Turkish territory for 
the upcoming war in Iraq, contradicted the traditional image of the 
country as an instrument of American politics in the Middle East.
372
 
 
Altunışık, as well, argues in a likely manner on the Tezkere crisis: 
Finally, the Turkish parliament‟s refusal to allow the U.S. to station its 
troops on Turkish soil to open a second front against Iraq increased 
Turkey‟s credibility in the Arab world. This decision challenged 
Turkey‟s image as a stooge of the U.S. in the region, and garnered 
respect for Turkey as an independent actor looking after its own 
interests.
373
 
 
 The civilianization of decision-making processes in domestic and foreign 
policy issues can also be presented as another example of increasing political 
maturity in Turkey. One of the most significant developments in this regard has been 
the changing status and composition of the National Security Council, which was 
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believed to determine the foreign policy actions of Turkey. In line with the demands 
of the European Union via its Copenhagen membership criteria, the civil-military 
relations in Turkey have been reorganized starting with the changes in the National 
Security Council. The process of reform in the council began well before the AKP 
term. For example, the number of civilian members was increased with the 2001 
Constitutional amendments. Furthermore, “the NSC secretariat has been transformed 
into a consultative body that is no longer able to conduct national security 
investigations on its own initiative. The secretariat of the NSC is now deprived of its 
executive powers, such as “requesting reports from government agencies on how 
they were dealing with the threats for which the NSC had recommended specific 
measures‟.”374 In addition to these changes, the balance between civil and military 
members of the council was further developed in favor of the civilians in 2003. 
Gencer Özcan comments on that issue as such: 
The Seventh Democratization Package, which was adopted in August 
of 2003, aimed at further demilitarization of the council. The most 
significant amendment of the package was geared towards removing 
legal obstacles that prevented the appointment of a civilian to the 
influential office of the Secretary General of the NSC. Thus, in 
August of 2004, for the first time in the history of the NSC, it became 
possible for the government to appoint a career diplomat, Ambassador 
Yiğit Alpogan, as the Secretary General of the council.375 
  
Another instance showing the primacy of civilians over the military in 
decision-making processes has been witnessed when the EU began to prepare to take 
over the operation in Kosovo from the UN in 2007. The inclusion of the Greek 
Cypriot state into an EU-led operation that would utilize NATO assets created 
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tensions between the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other. On 
the matter of Cypriot contribution to the operation, there seems to be a convergence 
of opinion between the military and the government, both of which objected fiercely 
to the inclusion of Cyprus to the mission. However, there was disagreement over the 
Turkish contribution the EU mission inside the country. To quote from Müftüler-Baç 
and Gürsoy:  
The military believed that unless the dispute was settled, Turkey 
should not contribute to the EU mission. However, the government 
opposed the military‟s position. The civilian cabinet was concerned 
about the possibility that ‟Turkey might be excluded from the 
international body which will for some time have a say in the 
administration of Kosovo‟ (Inanç 2008). As a result, the government 
decided to contribute to the EU‟s Kosovo mission.376 
   
 These developments can be given as signs of Turkey‟s obedience the 
accountability criterion necessitated by the governance system of the globalization. 
The appointment of civilians to critical posts regarding the security and foreign 
policy of Turkey and the fact that elected civilians taking the lead over appointed 
bureaucrats can be argued to increase the political maturity of the country. 
 
4.2.2.3 Turkish Model in the AKP Era 
 This section has been added to present the ideas and comments on the 
„Turkish Model‟, which combines the two elements mentioned above, the economic 
development and the political maturity. 
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 Mario Zucconi is one of the scholars commenting on the „Turkish Model‟. 
According to Zucconi, “what ultimately makes today‟s Turkey into an attractive and 
useful model is the combination of political and economic development”.377 In the 
following pages, Zucconi explains his idea in detail by noting that: “In fact, it is even 
more its cultural consistency with those regions, its quality of advanced democracy 
(post secularist and non-ideological), and its extraordinary success story of 
modernization, Europeanization, and economic development that make Turkey into 
an attractive example [...]”378 
 The following remarks also show the resonance of the success story of 
Turkey in the neighboring regions. According to Paul Salem, the Director of the 
Carnegie Middle East Center:  
Turkey is the only country in the entire Middle East that has integrated 
with modernity. It has a functional and democratic political system, a 
productive economy, and has found workable balances between 
religion and secularism, faith and science, individual and collective 
identity, nationalism and rule of law, etc. No other country in the 
region, from Morocco through to Pakistan, has succeeded in this 
way.
379
 
 
 Dr. Mustafa Ellabbad is, also, reported to say that “Arab population is looking 
to Turkey now as the model for political progress, stability and development in 
economy and in society.”380 
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4.2.3 Beauty 
 The spread of the universally accepted values both inside and outside of the 
country by a state helps it to gain respect and attractiveness in the eyes of other 
countries. The whole idea behind „beauty‟ as a soft power currency is this. Therefore, 
the adherence to universal values in domestic and foreign insttutions and relations by 
the AKP governments constitutes the first sub-section of this part. As an addition to 
the original idea, the popularity of one‟s cultural products has been introduced as a 
soft power currency as a result of the endeavor to combine Nye‟s soft power 
conception. Hence, the popularity of Turkish culture during the AKP period is the 
second element to be examined.   
 
4.2.3.1 Adherence to Universal Values 
 The problems related with the inability of Turkish state to comply with the 
norms and values of the Western world have been mentioned in the previous chapter. 
It seems, however, that Turkey has taken a long way to embed these values into its 
domestic political and social life as well as its foreign dealings in the period of AKP 
governments. 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Domestic Policies and Institutions 
 It can be said that the reforms undertaken by the AKP governments in order 
to meet the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership have contributed to the positive 
image of the country in its region. According to Bilgin, “reform packages on the rule 
of law, human rights, and the market economy were approved by parliament so as to 
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satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria. Between 2002 and 2004, 17 legal reform packages 
were passed.”381 According to Altunışık, “through new “Harmonization Packages” 
and amendments to the Constitution, freedom of thought, expression and assembly 
have been enhanced while new measures have been taken to prevent torture.”382 The 
following remarks will provide several examples on the reforms initiated during the 
AKP term.  
Turkey took giant steps in the direction of democratic consolidation 
through a series of major reforms, building upon the initiatives of the 
earlier administrations (involving such key steps as eliminating the 
death penalty) and dealing with its perennial Kurdish problems 
through a series of democratic openings that involved the extension of 
cultural and language rights to its citizens of Kurdish origin.
383
 
 
As a result of these reforms, Turkey has become a country taken as an 
example by the other states in the region. On this matter, Balcı and Miş state by 
quoting from the speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan that: “Turkey is “a democratic, 
secular Republic, with a market economy … where the majority of the people are the 
Muslims” and a “source of inspiration for the peoples of the region that wish to see 
modernization, pluralism, democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and 
freedoms in their own countries”.”384 Similarly, Altunışık argues that: “At a time 
when almost all Arab governments are facing a crisis of governance and legitimacy, 
which is well-documented by successive Arab Human Development Reports of the 
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UNDP, Turkey‟s recent reform experiences have been largely seen as a source of 
inspiration, especially by the reformers in the region.”385 
It can be claimed the reformation process in Turkey has contradicted with the 
general tendencies emerging after the September 11 attacks, which do prioritize 
security over freedoms. This point makes the efforts of the AKP governments more 
meaningful. On this subject, Öniş and Yılmaz state that “The AKP‟s emphasis on 
democratization and the use of soft power is all the more striking in the post-
September 11, 2001 context, during which there has been a significant shift away 
from democratization to “securitization” at the global level.”386 
 
4.2.3.1.2 Foreign Policies and Institutions 
 The internal reform process has manifested itself in the foreign policy of the 
Turkish state in several areas. First of all, Turkey has started to push other countries 
for reform by using the multilateral forums. The governing elite of the AKP have 
called for reform on several occasions. On this matter, Hakan Altınay writes that: 
The AKP leadership speaks about reform in the Muslim world with 
authority – and a level of unusual candor. This started with Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Gul‟s speech in Tehran for the OIC summit of June 
2003 where he argued that the Muslim world has a depressing record 
in terms of freedoms, basic rights, gender equality and social rights. In 
ensuing meetings, he urged Muslim countries to undertake these 
reforms without using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a pretext for 
delay.
387
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“The adoption of the İstanbul Declaration with its emphasis on the need to 
move towards greater democracy in the Muslim world in June 2004 by the OIC 
summit”388 can also be considered as another Turkish attempt for introducing more 
reforms in the region. 
In line with this, Turkey has shown its support for democratically elected 
leaders and emphasized that democracy should be deepened. The support of Turkish 
state to HAMAS emerges as the clearest illustration of this policy.  
In addition, it can be maintained that the democratic reforms, inside, 
especially on the Kurdish issue, help Turkish government ease the pressures and 
accusations exerted upon it and resulted in a more consistent foreign policy stance. It 
is thought that the following explanations accurately indicate what is meant.  
In the 1990s Turkey often encountered the criticism of double 
standards, for example when it tried to promote the rights of the 
Bosnians against the Serbs at a time when the rights of its own 
Kurdish minorities were effectively repressed in the domestic sphere. 
In the new era, with the enlargement of cultural and civil rights in the 
domestic sphere, Turkey‟s proactive foreign policy moves appear to 
be more convincing and stand on firmer ground.
389
 
 
 Secondly, in line with the third methodological principle of Turkish foreign 
policy declared by Davutoğlu, i.e. „the use of soft power‟, Turkey has continued to 
refrain from use of force in its relations with other countries. If Turkey is in a 
position to do so, it seeks international legitimacy. The most prominent example of 
this situation is the military incursions into Northern Iraq. Öniş and Yılmaz argue 
that “in fall 2007 Turkey favored diplomatic channels before resorting to unilateral 
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power in the crisis in northern Iraq over the cross-border operations against PKK 
terrorists.”390 Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, also, comment on this issue almost 
identically. They write: “Military operations still continue, but Turkey seeks more 
multilateral backing in its efforts against the PKK, including demands from the US 
against the PKK camps in the region. It is significant that both before and after the 
military operations, Turkey has sought diplomatic solutions.”391 Similar remarks can 
also be found in one of Oğuzlu‟s articles. Oğuzlu argues:  
Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that Turkey first exploited all 
non-military options and worked to gain international legitimacy 
before undertaking the military operation.
392
 
 
4.2.3.2 Popularity of Turkish Culture 
 One of the arguments put forward for the rising soft power during the AKP 
period is about the popularity of Turkish cultural products in the neighboring regions. 
Laçiner argues, for instance, that “Turkish cultural products are part of Turkish soft 
power”.393 In another article of him, Laçiner asserts that:  
Other soft power elements for Turkey are in media and culture fields. 
Turkish cultural products correspond to the needs of region. Turkish 
serial films have remarkable potential in particular, and the TV series 
Nour for example was in high demand throughout the region. Thanks 
to the Turkish cultural products many people in the region see Turkish 
way of life as a model.
394
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 The popularity of the TV series „Gümüş‟ aired in the the pan-Arab satellite 
service MBC as Noor (“Light”) can be understood clearly when it is reported that it 
turned out to be the most watched program in the history of Arab satellite TV. 
“According to MBC, the final episode was seen by 85 million viewers, including 
more than 51 million adult women. That‟s roughly half the total female population of 
the region”.395 In another article, Mustafa Akyol writes that polls have shown that 74 
per cent of Saudi women have watched „Noor‟.396 In addition, Akyol indicates an 
effect of these series upon the Saudi women by writing that:  
What is important is that in the series, Saudi women see a Muslim 
society in which young men and women, if they like each other, can 
go out on a date, sit on a bench near the sea, and hug each other while 
watching seagulls. These are unthinkable acts in the Saudi Kingdom, 
but their presence on the screen makes them thinkable dreams. Hence 
the cultural impact of the series, according to a poll by Ka Research 
Limited Company, has been to “promote the idea of individual 
freedom and independence among Saudi women.”397 
 
The success of Turkish film and music industry can also be presented as an 
illustration of the rising soft power of Turkey. The films of several Turkish directors 
such as Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Fatih Akın and Semih Kaplanoğlu have been awarded in 
various film festivals in Europe and the USA.
398
 Furthermore, Turkish singers have 
been increasingly awarded in the various competitions across Europe. The success of 
Sertab Erener, who won the Eurovision Song Contest in 2003 with the song „Every 
Way that I Can‟, has been followed by the band Athena, Kenan Doğulu and Hadise, 
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who got the 4
th
 place in the very same competition in 2004, 2007 and 2009 
respectively. Similarly, Emre Aydın became the first in the MTV Europe Music 
Awards 2008 in the "Europe's Favorite Act" category. One year later, the Turkish 
band, maNga, got the Best European Act award in the MTV Europe Music Awards 
2009. They, also, represented Turkey at the Eurovision Song Contest 2010 with the 
song "We Could Be the Same" and took second place. 
Another development aimed at raising the popularity of Turkey in its environs 
is the launch of the first Turkish Arabic channel on 4 April 2010. One of the 
projections of such an increase in the popularity can be considered the speech of its 
director, Sefer Turan, who states that “TRT Arabic's main aim is to introduce Turkey 
to the Arabs "directly".”399 
The important thing to note here is the process of turning this popularity into 
real influence in the region. On this subject, a voice from the region explains this 
situation very briefly. Dr. Ellabbad says that:  
For example, many Arab viewers are looking to Turkish TV series. It 
reflects that Turkey's soft power is very high now, so it is up to 
Turkey how to use its soft power to create stability and peace in the 
region, that is exactly why Turkey is favorite candidate to lead this 
region towards stability, economic development and peace.'
400
 
 
4.3 Analysis 
 It can be deduced from the enormous analysis of Turkish foreign policy 
conducted by the AKP governments that soft power character of Turkish state has 
increased and strengthened. It appears to be right to conclude that when compared 
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with the analysis of traditional Turkish foreign policy, covering almost 80 years, the 
soft power of Turkey during the AKP term in the last 8 years has augmented 
substantially. The success of the foreign policies followed by AKP governments is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it can be argued that the visibility of soft 
power in Turkish foreign policy since 2002 has risen. It can also be maintained that 
this rise has been in conformity with the foreign policy outlook of the AKP and the 
principles emerging out of that broad setting.  
When investigated in detail, the instances of the rising Turkish soft power can 
be summarized as such. Turkish state under the AKP rule has become very active in 
multilateral settings, in terms of formation of new organizations and of becoming 
more effective in the existing ones. Moreover, Turkish contribution to spreading the 
zone of peace in its neighboring regions via mediation and facilitation efforts and 
Turkish endeavor to help the needy countries through economic, technical and 
humanitarian assistances have tried to be augmented. The developments in the 
economy in terms of growth rates, GDP (gross domestic product), export rates, etc., 
and in the political life through democratization attempts have been considered as the 
successes of the Turkish state by other countries which think of taking Turkey as a 
model. Furthermore, the amelioration of the fundamental rights and freedoms inside 
the country and the promotion of such values in Turkey‟s surrounding regions 
together with the rising popularity of Turkish cultural products have been presented 
as a source of inspiration for other countries. All of these factors have contributed to 
the soft power of Turkey during the AKP term. Nevertheless, these are not said to 
give all credits to the AKP governments. In other words, the current level of Turkish 
soft power has not solely been achieved by the AKP leadership, but it is reached 
through the accumulation of past experiences and developments.  
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The impact of the Europeanization process should also be considered in this 
regard. When closely examined, the AKP governments activities such as the 
utilization of a foreign policy style emphasizing the use of non-military, diplomatic 
means and the betterment of domestic conditions in terms of economy and politics 
can already be taken into account as the requirements of the prospective European 
Union accession. To put it differently, the transformation process of Turkey in order 
to meet the Copenhagen membership criteria on the way to EU is very likely to have 
a significant impact in the adoption and implementation of soft power policies by the 
Turkish state. Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey has been pursuing a soft power 
policy as a result of the requirements of the EU membership and that if there has not 
been such a projection of Turkey, Turkey may not have been acting as a soft power 
state. The following remarks of Eleni Fotioua and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou seem to 
support this argument: 
Turkey‟s European Union bid has deeply affected its political identity 
in terms of democratic opening, the enhancement of a cooperative 
culture, and an increase in the participation levels of civil society. 
Turkish political culture is moving from what Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba defined as „„parochial‟‟ to a more „„participatory‟‟ 
model; this may entail the transformation of Turkish foreign policy 
from the use of hard power to the adoption of soft power patterns 
depending on diplomacy and culture to achieve their goals in the 
liberal idealist vein.
401
 
 
In addition to the internal changes, the perception of Turkey by other states, 
especially the Muslim ones, can also be argued to change in a positive manner due to 
the possible EU accession. On this matter, Zucconi writes that: 
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[…] others find Turkey‟s relations with it a promising, important 
development. Syria, after its rapprochement with Ankara, counts on 
reaping benefits from its neighbor‟s accession. Morocco, itself 
interested in possible formal ties with the Union (a formal application 
for membership by Rabat was turned down by the European Council 
in 1997), is eager to see Turkey breaking the barrier of a Muslim 
country entering that institution.
402
 
 
 Similarly Dietrich Jung points out the rising prestige of Turkey in the Arab 
world with the following sentences:  
In the light of Turkey‟s EU accession process, the image of the 
country among its Arab neighbors could change from it being seen as 
an “instrument” of western interests to it being recognized as a 
respected partner in EU-Middle East relations.
403
 
To sum up, Turkish state has had some degree of soft power before the AKP‟ 
coming to power as stated in the previous chapter. What the AKP governments have 
done in this vein is that Turkish efforts to play the role of a soft power by presenting 
the country as an attraction center through its domestic and foreign policy activities, 
its successes and its cultural assets have been intensified under the AKP governments 
which have succeeded in benefiting from the EU accession process on this endeavor.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this study, soft power in Turkish foreign policy has been discussed in a 
comparative manner by dividing the history of Turkish Republic into two phases, 
before the AKP era, 1923-2002, and during the AKP era, 2002-2009, according to 
the refined theory of soft power presented. When the issues discussed in the 
respective chapters are reviewed, the following conclusions can be drawn.  
As a result of the discussions made in the second chapter, it can be argued 
that the soft power theory presented originally by Joseph Nye Jr. has emerged 
specifically in the American context and it has not provided a universally valid 
theory applicable to all cases. Furthermore, it has been problematic in terms of the 
definition and sources of soft power. Rather than providing a specific definition of 
soft power, Nye chooses to exemplify it by giving the examples of the wielding of 
soft power. Also, even though Nye counts three sources of soft power, which 
accounts for the production of attraction, he does not provide the process in which 
these sources are made ready for implementation. In other words, Nye does not 
explain how the attraction is gained. Therefore, it can be argued that Nye‟s theory of 
soft power is both hard to apply for the examination of soft power of other countries 
due to its heavily American approach and it is partly flawed since it does not
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adequately explain the crux of the issue of soft power, i.e., the production of 
attraction, owing to the practical approach he has adopted. Hence, a refined theory of 
soft power has been aimed to be presented at the concluding section of the chapter. 
The newly-created theory has been constituted by combining the views of several 
scholars reached through the literature review about soft power theory. In the 
proposed theory, it is mainly argued that soft power is the ability of one state to reach 
the outcomes it wants in a co-optive manner which heavily depends on the 
perceptions of other states on the capabilities and the actions of the power-holder 
state. What is meant by the co-option is that the power-holder state does not have to 
resort to any threats or inducements, but it gets its desires realized due to the fact that 
power-exerted states find it appropriate to act in accordance as they are admired by 
the attractiveness of the power-holder, or as they see the actions legitimate and 
credible, or they believe that they share the same values and norms with the power-
holder. On the issue of production of attraction, the conceptualization and 
operationalization provided by Alexander Vuving has been utilized, since it is 
thought that it would serve better for the objectives of the current study. Vuving 
introduces three power currencies that create soft power and these are benignity, 
including the foreign policy actions of the states and the approach adopted in foreign 
dealings; brilliance, which accounts for the accomplishments of a state in terms of 
economy, politics, military, science and technology and many other fields; and 
beauty, which comprises the values, ideals, visions represented and advocated by a 
state. As a modest addition to this categorization of power currencies, popular culture 
has been added as an item under the beauty section. In this context, the analysis of 
soft power in Turkish foreign policy has been based on this theoretical approach. In 
other words, Turkish foreign policy has been analyzed through the lenses of three 
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power currencies of benignity, brilliance and beauty. Under the benignity section, the 
multilateral relations of Turkish state, the adoption of a peaceful foreign policy and 
the peace promotion attempts, and lastly the economic and humanitarian assistance 
efforts have been examined. The items that have been discussed under the brilliance 
include the economic development, the political maturity, the military strength and 
the „Turkish model‟. The beauty section comprises of the adherence to universal 
values in domestic and foreign spheres and the popular culture.  
As a result of the study based on the research of these elements in Turkish 
foreign policy history, it can be concluded that Turkey has had some degree of soft 
power before the AKP came to power in 2002. The foreign policy understanding, 
approach, practices and methods of Turkish state have shown the characteristics of a 
soft power state resorting to foreign policy strategies using co-optive methods. It can 
be claimed that the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy and the principles 
coming out of that broad setting has played the most significant role in granting such 
a role for Turkish state. When examined respectively, all of the three determinants, 
the Ottoman heritage, the geographical location and the Kemalist ideology, have 
called for a modest and peaceful foreign policy for Turkish state. Throughout the 
period from 1923 to 2002, Turkey, in most cases, has avoided from utilizing 
command and coaxing strategies aimed at threatening or inducing other states in its 
foreign relations. Instead, Turkey has shown its willingness to co-opt with other 
states by adopting of a non-aggressive stance, by respecting the universally valid 
norms and practices, by searching for the attainment of legitimacy and credibility in 
the eyes of others. At the same time, Turkey has played an initiatory role in various 
multilateral settings and has tried to contribute to the regional and international peace 
and stability through mediation efforts, economic and humanitarian aid programs. 
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The domestic reformation of the country according to the Western model in line with 
the ideals of the founding fathers of the Republic has placed Turkey as a successful 
example for a number of other countries especially in the immediate aftermath of the 
establishment of the Republic and in the early 1990s. However, soft power of Turkey 
has been hampered by various factors during the period under investigation in the 
chapter three. First of all, the cases in which Turkey resorted to use of force or 
threatened to do so have damaged the image of Turkey as a peace-loving country. It 
can be claimed that Cyprus problem and the unease relations with Greece come first 
in this regard. The problems with the Middle Eastern neighbors of the country, 
namely Syria and Iraq, in the mid-1950s and in the 1990s worsened the situation. 
Secondly, on the contrary to the initial expectations about the success of Turkish 
reformation process, Turkey has not been able to reach the level of a developed 
country in economic and political terms, despite some level of accomplishment. The 
country has experienced serious economic crises, the industrial base of the country 
could not been established on firm grounds. In terms of the politics, the relatively 
late transition to multi-party democracy and the interruptions to civilian rule with 
three military takeovers are among the factors that have been influential in 
preventing Turkey to represent a successful example for other countries. Thirdly, 
Turkish state has not been in a position to promote values and norms in a staunch 
manner due to the internal problems it has been facing in those years. The poor 
record of Turkey in terms of both human rights and the achievement of a peaceful 
multicultural society can be given as instances signaling that Turkey has been far 
from being admired by other countries for respecting these values in its own 
domestic practices.  
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As a result of the discussions about soft power in Turkish foreign policy 
under the AKP governments made in the fourth chapter, it can be concluded that soft 
power of Turkish state has augmented significantly with the AKP‟s coming to power 
in 2002. It comes with no surprise that such an increase is in conformity with the 
foreign policy understanding of the AKP and the AKP governments which has been 
outlined by the writings of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu, himself, points out the use 
of a new method, style in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy, which he calls Soft 
Power, as one of the methodological principles guiding Turkish foreign policy. It can 
be said that Davutoğlu utilizes this concept for the strategies rejecting the use of hard 
power, in other words, military power. His statement that “No Turkish leaders have 
used any terminology in any plane that has threatened the use of hard power”404 can 
be argued to prove that argument. The other principles mentioned by Davutoğlu can 
also be argued to provide support to the increasing soft power in Turkish foreign 
policy. For example, the „zero problems with the neighbors‟ principle has called for a 
peaceful foreign policy towards the neighbors of Turkey. Similarly, „the proactive 
and pre-emptive peace diplomacy principle‟ illustrates the willingness of Turkey to 
expand the zone of peace in its region and in the world. What is important in this 
regard is that these principles have not remained in paper, but have turned into the 
policies followed by Turkish state. In terms of benignity, one of the power currencies 
for the production of attraction, especially, Turkey can be said to show a great 
performance under the AKP government. Turkey not only have initiated a number of 
new multilateral institutions, but also increased its effectiveness in the existing ones. 
Turkey has altered its stance towards its neighbors with whom it has problematic 
relations especially towards Armenia, Syria and Cyprus and taken up a conciliatory 
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approach aimed at solving the bilateral issues through dialogue. In addition, Turkey 
has increased its mediation efforts and tried to provide good offices between various 
conflicting states for the long term resolution of conflicts in a peaceful manner. 
Turkey has turned out to be regarded as a donor country as a result of the increasing 
amount of economic and humanitarian aid it has provided to the needy countries. The 
attractiveness of Turkish state in the sense of brilliance and beauty has also increased 
during the tenure of the AKP. The economic situation has become stronger and, now 
Turkey has been pointed out to be located in the top-20 economies of the world. In 
terms of the political maturity, as well, Turkish state has achieved a lot in the recent 
years. The coming of a political party with Islamist roots, like the AKP, into the 
power has been perceived as a sign of the political development in Turkey. At the 
same time, the Tezkere crisis of March 1, 2003 has been given as an example of a 
functioning parliamentary democracy. The same event has, also, helped the 
destruction of the image of Turkey as „the pious servant of the interests of the West‟ 
in the neighboring countries. The changing of the balances in the civil-military 
relations in favor of the civilians has also been considered as the development of 
political culture in Turkey. These developments in the economic and political 
domains have generally been commented on to signify the attractiveness of „Turkish 
model‟ in the recent years especially in the Arab lands and in the Middle East. At the 
same time, Turkey has ameliorated its performance in respecting universal values 
and promoting them via various opportunities. The success of cultural products, 
recently, have been also been presented as one of the indicators of rising soft power 
of Turkish state. 
One of the recent surveys conducted by TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve 
Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı; Turkish Foundation on Economic and Social Studies) on the 
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issue of Turkish perception in the Middle East seems to confirm the points 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. According to the survey conducted in seven 
Middle Eastern countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria, Turkey has a positive image in these countries by 75 per cent and 
it comes second after the Saudi Arabia, which is regarded positively by 80 per cent, 
in this regard.
405
 Similarly, Turkish government is believed to behave in a friendly 
manner towards these countries with a percentage of 78 among the interviewed 
people.
406
 Turkey is thought to be able to suggest a model for these countries by 61 
per cent of the interviewed people in these countries as well.
407
 The experience of 
Turkey in terms of combining the elements of Islam and democracy is perceived to 
be successful the 63 per cent of the people in these countries.
408
 
Nevertheless, the increasing weight of soft power in Turkish foreign policy 
should not be attributed to the AKP governments only. It should be remembered 
from the analysis of the third chapter that Turkey already had some degree of soft 
power before the AKP took office. What the AKP governments have accomplished is 
that they have intensified the use of soft power strategies in the foreign dealings of 
Turkey and have strengthened the attractiveness of Turkish state through the reforms 
they have been introducing since the beginning of their term. In this regard, the 
impact of Europeanization process should be taken into account. It is highly likely 
that the increasing use of soft power strategies and the rising attractiveness of the 
Turkish experiences have been realized as a direct outcome of the Europeanization 
process that the country has been undergoing since the 1999 Helsinki Summit during 
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which Turkey was announced as a „candidate country‟ eligible for European Union 
membership. The argument that various signs of increasing Turkish soft power have 
been gathered in the coalition government, in which İsmail Cem was the Foreign 
Minister, serving before the elections in 2002 seems to be convincing in this vein.  
As could be seen above, the soft power in Turkish foreign policy under the 
AKP governments have significantly increased according to the criteria set by the 
suggested theory of soft power in the related chapter. However, the current level of 
Turkish soft power should be assessed by taking the accumulation of the past 
experiences, i.e., the existing soft power culture before the AKP period, and the 
Europeanization process into account. 
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